Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India⁰

Washington, August 20, 1963, 8:21 p.m.

423. New Delhi’s 476,¹ info Karachi 213, London 189; Karachi’s 243,² info New Delhi 78, London 56. We are keeping in forefront our minds your views on 3-year MAP program for Pakistan during our consideration this problem. You will agree that achievement of our objectives on subcontinent as a whole requires us take very hard look at full range of actions which might be of use in straightening out our relations with Pakistan. As we proceed with this examination we shall, of course, be alive to Indian reactions.

As you aware, we are considerably disturbed over current state US-Pak relations. Should Paks enter into alliance with Chicoms, Indians would be flanked and entire subcontinent endangered. We would, therefore, expect Indians to share our concern over trend in US-Pak relations and show sympathy toward US efforts to rectify situation. Indeed, conversations with TTK, M.J. Desai and B.K. Nehru, as indicated Deptel 131,³ suggest there some appreciation of this within GOI. Beyond our broad strategic interests in security subcontinent, we derive special advantages from our relationship with Pakistan which our interests require we protect.

There follow further clarifications of our thinking about 3-year program under consideration.

1. Three-year MAP proposal would be largely continuation of existing military assistance commitments. The program, including the F-104 A/B aircraft (the Paks, as you know, have one such squadron now) is more of the same which Paks have been receiving since 1955, and of which the GOI is well aware. Incidentally, the F-104 A/B is not the same aircraft that the GOI has requested.

2. We must at the very minimum indicate to Pakistan scope of MAP program at least for FY 1964. While normal timing for other countries would call for such disclosures after appropriations voted (probably November this year), we have what approaches a tradition with Pakistan of earlier disclosure, at least of principal elements. This was done with Ayub personally in July, 1961 and September, 1962 and odds are that he would press key issues himself again this year, particularly the question of fighter aircraft.

3. Three-year rather than one-year proposal has general advantage enabling us to assure Ayub that we intend to continue our special relationship with Pakistan over a period of time despite the changes in our policies with regard to India. It would also enable us to attach virtually explicit conditions that fulfillment must, of course, depend on continuation generally satisfactory US-Pak relations over period of time as well as satisfactory cooperation in special areas. Believe we would have better leverage over Paks if we have given them reassurance of our strong friendship through this sound projection, indicating at same time its fulfillment dependent on their reasonably good behavior.

4. Fighter aircraft, of course, key abrasive item vis-à-vis India, since no other element in package differs materially from on-going programs. Replacement of their F-86F fighters, which are becoming rapidly obsolete and are unsupportable beyond FY 1968, is covered under our general 1960 modernization commitment. Both in 1961 and 1962 Paks pressed us hard for indication our replacement plans, with closest possible indication these must be supersonic to be acceptable. We would almost certainly have to bite the bullet on this one in the course of presenting an FY 1964 program, whether on a one-year basis or as part of three-year package. By putting proposal into three-year framework, we can postpone delivery dates, with deliveries beginning in July, 1965, in increments of six every six months. Initial delivery date gives us time to look at Indian needs. Our present thinking is along these lines. We continue to believe that the installation of radar, the training of Indian technicians, and improved Indian performance in the handling of their present fighter inventory should come first. When these things have been accomplished, the US believes India should be able to obtain a limited number of such aircraft, probably in the mid-1965 time frame from Free World sources. This would leave open the question whether the supply of advanced aircraft should be by the UK or the US. These thoughts have not yet been conveyed to the Indians nor should they be at this time.

5. The F-104 A/B, although superficially glamorous because of its Mach 2 speed, is in fact purely day fighter-interceptor with very limited bomb-carrying capacity; its range is so short that without effective intercept control (which Paks do not have) it has only limited intercept capability and considerably lesser capability to bomb Indian bases effectively. GOI sought all-weather F-104G.

Three-year proposed program is, as noted, based on prior commitments and valid military requirements. It is substantially same as we planned to do in three one-year installments, and about $18 million less than sum of previous three years. Our commitment to it would have two key goals: (1) reassurance of continuing US support at key psychological moment in terms Pak policy examinations, and move towards elimination Pak stalling many areas of importance to US; and (2) hopefully getting us off hook on prior commitment which we are unable to fulfill—replacement of obsolete destroyers. In short, the three-year package would not be major new undertaking with Pakistan but rather minimum acceptable continuing program. Further, it would not be unprecedented in area, for we have five-year commitment with Iran completed last September, and Paks almost certainly know of this in view close Pak/Iran military ties. Also, since we must announce our plans now for the F-104 A/Bs, even though we do not plan delivery until mid-1965, our MAP programs for the next three years (FY 1964-65-66) are, in poker parlance, clearly an ace, a ten and a five. If we play the ace, without simultaneously playing our other two cards, we (1) lessen the initial impact and (2) are left holding a poor hand in FY 1965 and FY 1966. Consequently, MAP as a political tool can best be used now.

The long and short of it is that, while we recognize our opportunities in India, we must also be mindful of our interests in Pakistan. We have responded in India’s time of need and are continuing to do so. The Indian MAP program receives greater attention, and her needs get a higher priority, than any other MAP recipient in the world, with the possible exception of Vietnam. Since the Chinese attack the US alone has already given, or is planning to give $110 million in military aid, not to mention, as you so rightly point out, our past economic assistance, for which we have not sought the very tangible quo’s that we do elsewhere, particularly in Pakistan. We feel that the GOI can be persuaded of necessity for our meeting our commitments to Pakistan in continuation of existing programs in interests of stable Pakistan oriented to Free World. Although we are committed to integrated, subcontinental approach to our problems and opportunities in South Asia there is presently serious danger of an imbalance which could undermine our position on subcontinent. Surely, Government of India does not expect it is in our or India’s interest that as we assist India we divorce ourselves from Pakistan.⁴

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-PAK. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted on August 8 in DOD/ISA by R.J. Murray and in SOA by Schneider; cleared with NR, BNA, FE, G/PM, DOD, and AID; and approved by Grant. Repeated to Karachi and London.
1. See footnote 2, Document 309.
2. See footnote 1, Document 309.
3. Printed as telegram 99 to Karachi, Document 309.
4. In telegram 771 from New Delhi, August 23, Bowles vigorously reiterated his opposition to the proposed military assistance program for Pakistan, as detailed in telegram 423. He noted that if Pakistan were offered a 3-year program including additional supersonic aircraft, he did not see how the United States could maintain its position in India unless the Indian Government was also offered an assurance that the United States would respond to its request for supersonic aircraft. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-PAK)