Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

323. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State⁰

Karachi, August 23, 1963, 9 p.m.

421. Embtel 412.¹

1. In handing August 23 Kashmir aide-mémoire to me, Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed said that GOP had given most mature consideration to issues involved, recognizing great importance of matter and appreciating US willingness to give GOP all the time needed. He said President had participated in all deliberations and had personally reviewed each of the three successive drafts of aide mémoire. He had expressly approved document as now delivered.

2. After quick perusal of aide-mémoire I said I would of course not voice definitive USG reaction at that moment. However, as interim reaction, I could not refrain from voicing US disappointment that aide-mémoire did not move in direction of definite agreement to mediation proposal. I did not construe it as flat rejection, but the various non-concurring positions taken by the GOP would necessarily lead to further negotiation and possible complications. I said that at outset I must question numbered paragraph three of aide memoire, to effect that none of concessions asked for on May 21 by Foreign Minister, with one partial exception, had been accepted by USG. I noted that we had made a major effort to accommodate the essence of the Pak views, not only on duration of the mediator’s mandate, but also on mention of the UN, identification of Kashmir as the principal issue to be dealt with by mediator, and scope of the terms of reference. We felt that our proposed text met the basic requirements of the 30, and indeed went so far we would have difficulty in inducing the Indian Govt to agree. We doubted if there would be any hope whatever of winning Indian acceptance of any language which went farther to meet Pakistani desires. I expressed the hope the GOP would look to the practical significance rather than the verbal dressing of the text. From this standpoint, we were convinced that the essentials of the GOP viewpoint had been protected.

3. Foreign Secretary said GOP view was that terms of our proposed joint communique were “far too imprecise.” It was necessary for mediator’s terms to be nailed down very explicitly. This might require an agreement of some sort, rather than just a joint communique. In absence of well-defined terms of reference, there would be ambiguity, uncertainty and unpredictability. Indians would put many pressures on mediator to get off the main Kashmir track and to make recommendations on matters which would not have any direct bearing on settlement of Kashmir. If framework within which mediator would operate not firmly established, his work would be delayed and he might come up with irrelevant recommendations or judgments, which would be embarrassing for Pakistan.

4. Foreign Secretary dwelt emphatically on imperative need for evidence that GOI is now receptive to an equitable and honorable Kashmir settlement. Said GOP increasingly convinced that Indo-Pak relations too fragile to stand shock of another Kashmir failure. It would be dangerous to buildup expectations of Pak people again, only to dash their hopes. Government would be subject to heavy criticism for leading people down illusory path once more and govt would be dangerously vulnerable to the assaults of the opposition. GOP saw no shred of evidence of any disposition on part of GOI to give an inch on Kashmir. In fact attitude of GOI had conspicuously hardened in recent weeks as evidenced by tone of Nehru’s recent public statements and the withdrawal of imaginary “concessions.” Assessment of GOP is that deliberate action of GOI in arousing people of India against Pakistan and against the idea of conciliation on Kashmir constitutes positive proof that GOI had no intention of budging at all. Obviously GOI would have to prepare public opinion well in advance for concessions on Kashmir and record of govt in doing just the opposite amply verifies the absence of any intention to seek an accommodation. Estimate of GOP is that only a correlation of Kashmir settlement with continuation of the defense assistance program for India will soften the Indian attitude on Kashmir.

5. As to terms of reference, Foreign Secretary asserted GOP convinced specific references to UNCIP resolutions as basic guidelines for mediator is essential. UNCIP Resolutions have been accepted by UN as a whole, by US and UK, by Pakistan, and by India, although India in recent years has been making vigorous effort to resile from its commitment to the UNCIP resolutions. The idea of self-determination inherent in UNCIP resolutions is only basis for workable solution. It is the only settlement principle which Govt of Pakistan can justify to its people and it is the only basis on which the Govt of India can win the support of the people of India for a solution. Principle of the peoples determination of their own destiny is one which all mankind intuitively recognizes as fundamentally and inherently just and right. No nation can really rise in indignation against it because it is in accord with deepest human instincts, whether admitted or not. If verdict of Kashmir people should go against Pakistan, GOP can reconcile Pak people to this outcome. In same way people of GOI would abide by verdict of the people of Kashmir. On other hand any partition formula which might be devised would open up divisive controversies and recriminations. Each govt would be accused of treasonable forfeiture of area surrendered.

6. As to limitation of mediation effort to Kashmir, Foreign Secretary thought that inclusion of “other related matters,” would open up arguments, and make it difficult for the mediator to concentrate on the business at hand which was Kashmir, and only Kashmir. He argued that traditionally in diplomatic history the assignment of a mediator has been to one and only one carefully defined dispute. He saw no reason for departing from this tradition. GOP was convinced that vague general directive, with the extent of mediator’s brief not sharply delineated would not work. He was aware that “Kashmir and other related matters” was the language of the agreed announcement of November 29, 1962. But he argued that this broadening out of scope was more appropriate for direct bilateral discussions between representatives of the two Govts than it would be for a mediator. Govt representatives had to be prepared to take cognizance of various issues involving their country. But this was not the case with a mediator who did not represent either country. It was not practicable or appropriate for him to deal with anything more than the specific international dispute which brought his role into being.

7. Amplifying my preliminary reaction, I pointed out clear necessity for constructive move of some sort on Kashmir since GOP felt it could not permit issue to remain static. We were trying to help Pakistan to overcome the existing inertia on the question and there was obligation on GOP to help us in our effort to help them. Mediation effort was only constructive move we could see on the horizon. I invited him to name any alternative procedure which held promise. This he did not do.

8. I said of course we could not make any finding that GOI was now likely to agree to a Kashmir settlement which would be acceptable to Pakistan. No one would have temerity to make such official prediction. If India would agree to our draft formulation, this was the most we could hope for before the mediator started his work. No one could say what might come out of the mediation. It was our hope that the mediator’s work as he progressed would enable him to shape up his own terms of reference and perhaps open up hopeful settlement possibilities not foreseeable at the outset. A good mediator would carve out his own role for himself and he might be able to bring about a solution which would constitute a near miracle. At least the effort needed to be made. My govt did not think the risks involved in failure of a good effort were as great as portrayed by the Foreign Secretary. Even if the risks were appreciable, the dangers of hopeless inaction seemed greater.

9. I noted that traditionally “the war is on” the more violent forms of propaganda by tacit agreement between Pakistan and India during the course of a Kashmir settlement effort. The worst invective and diatribe are “out” for the duration of the negotiation and this in itself is a considerable, albeit temporary gain, at least in a negative sense.

10. I further urged that even if the mediator’s efforts should unhappily prove to be stillborn, his recommendations would be almost bound to have some nourishment in them for the Pakistan point of view, and Pakistan would not lose by keeping unsullied its record of cooperation and compliance with all responsible international moves looking to a Kashmir solution.

11. As to the Foreign Secretary’s argument that every abortive effort on Kashmir resulted in a serious political setback in Pakistan, I noted that Foreign Minister Bhutto himself had just set forth in a speech before the National Assembly that there were modest but important gains for Pakistan growing out of the ill-fated six rounds of ministerial level meetings on Kashmir from December to May. The Foreign Secretary had no effective rejoinder to this and he smilingly said the Foreign Minister had to make this speech for internal political purposes, pretending there were gains in order to protect himself from opposition attacks.

12. I told the Foreign Secretary that the attitude of India on Kashmir and on Pak relations in general remained one of various factors we were taking into account in determining the nature and pace of our defense assistance program. It was a complicated equation and of course our evaluation of the Chinese Communist threat had to be the largest single factor. But Indian policy toward Pakistan was not outside our area of consideration. The Foreign Secretary said he knew this factor had not been entirely ignored but his govt was eager to see it given much greater weight and to be told more about it. He conceded we could not disregard the dimensions or the imminence of the Chinese Communist military threat on India’s northern borders.

13. The Foreign Secretary ended by saying that his govt had made an earnest search for some additional initiative which would assist us in our search for a useful approach to the Kashmir problem. The GOP did not want to add to US burdens. Accordingly the GOP was now suggesting that the US might wish to consider the possibility of informally dispatching an acceptable prospective mediator for preliminary and exploratory personal conversations in Rawalpindi and Delhi as to the outlook for a successful mediation effort. The nature of the visit would not be divulged. The visitor would be as close to incognito as possible claiming merely a tourist status if questioned. The Foreign Secretary granted my point that this status would be exceptionally difficult to maintain, since the individual would be an outstanding personage. Foreign Secretary said that if the designee made a finding that the prospects for mediation were favorable, “we could proceed from there.” I said that I would prefer not to express any reaction to this final thought, since it would need to be studied. Foreign Secretary said President Ayub had again mentioned ex-President Eisenhower as representing the type of individual of world stature that he had in mind.

14. Foreign Secretary said he would give British Acting High Commissioner Hunt the same aide-memoire he had given me, with the deletion of numbered paragraph seven regarding the stature of the mediator, which did not directly concern the UK.

15. I told the Foreign Secretary I felt that the dialogue on the aide-memoire, which we had already usefully begun, would need to be continued. I hoped it could be carried considerably further before Under Secretary Ball’s arrival.

16. Analysis and comments follow in separate telegram tomorrow.²

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 6:37 p.m. Repeated to London and New Delhi.
1. Telegram 412 from Karachi, August 23, transmitted the text of an aide-mémoire of that date, which constituted the Pakistani reply to the proposed joint communiqué presented to Ayub by McConaughy on August 7 (see footnote 2, Document 317). The aide-mémoire noted that the mediation proposal contained in the joint communiqué took little account of the specific terms of reference stipulated by Pakistan as essential to a successful mediation effort (see footnote 2, Document 298). Pakistan insisted that the mediator’s terms of reference be agreed in advance, and that the scope of the mediation be confined to the Kashmir dispute. The conclusion drawn in the aide-mémoire was that, in light of the attitude of the Indian Government as reflected in the statement by Nehru in the Lok Sabha on August 13, any mediation effort would inevitably fail. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 429 from Karachi, August 24, McConaughy concluded that the Pakistani reply to the Kashmir mediation proposal was disappointing but not tantamount to a rejection of mediation. His assessment was that Pakistan had apparently decided to bring the Kashmir mediation proposal to a head at the time of Ball’s visit, placing pressure on the United States and India to produce meaningful progress toward a Kashmir settlement. (Ibid.)