Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan⁰

Washington, July 13, 1963, 3:51 p.m.

99. Joint State-Defense-AID. We are now giving priority consideration to possible three-year MAP commitment ($143.9 million) for Pakistan. CHMAAG Pakistan has probably discussed preliminary details since his return Karachi. In presenting program we would make clear arms supply is in context of a continuing alliance relationship and would also make point continued military aid conditional on Congressional appropriations which in turn will be affected by Pak-Chicom relationships. In bilateral relationship with Pakistan, we see several advantages as well as some potential disadvantages in changing from present year-to-year practice. We would appreciate your views and recommendations on substance and timing at earliest convenience.

Possible Advantages

1. In present strained political climate US-Pak relations three-year program may be important ingredient in slowing down further deterioration. GOP leadership would have concrete evidence that Pakistan remains high priority in US policy and that US has confidence GOP’s continued adherence to alliance relationship. In particular, top military officers who influence Ayub would, perhaps, be somewhat less concerned by moderate program for India.

2. US would be in better position dissuade Paks from seeking nonessential or incompatible equipment from third countries if Paks had long-range commitment.

3. Even if we continued on year-to-year basis we would probably have to face problem this year of discussing replacement F-86F’s. GOP would justifiably be very concerned if we continued avoid discussing this aspect our general commitment to modernize; supersonics are major prestige factor and serve as benchmark for GOP when viewing US military policy in area. Three-year program providing two additional squadrons (total 24) F-104A/B’s with first increment delivered in mid-1965, permits us handle supersonic problem with greater ease and effect.

4. Impact of our current program probably somewhat vitiated by its piecemeal nature. Three-year program would also help counterbalance some unfavorable aspects our future plans, e.g., decision not to provide destroyers, and possible provision fewer M-1 rifles.

5. On purely military terms, integrated multi-year program presents both US and Pakistan with fewer administrative and logistic problems and permits more rational military planning.

Potential Disadvantages

1. Three-year program could serve as beginning point for negotiations, with Paks seeking additional materiel as part over-all package. This particularly true in light open-ended nature of our annual India program. (Could we in fact expect 3-year program would remain firm ceiling?) Indeed, GOP might view three-year proposal as evidence that its pressure of last few months had forced us make this conciliatory effort thereby encouraging GOP continue these tactics.

2. Three-year program would be “all eggs in one basket” and psychological impact might rapidly lose force.

3. Multi-year program would have tendency tie our hands in presently fluid situation regarding Pak intentions toward Chicoms and USSR; for this or other reasons we might wish change content program within three-year period. Would be harder to retreat from firm commitment than present open-end commitment.

4. Since program does not represent increase our arms aid beyond Aide-Memoire commitments, Pakistan leadership might conclude we were not very forthcoming, were perhaps trying place low ceiling on Pakistan program, and were essentially motivated by desire gain elbow room in dealing with India.¹

For New Delhi

Since our military aid program to Pakistan is old hat now in India, three-year program would appear, with probable exception of F-104’s (as you know Paks already have 12 F-104’s), cause relatively few problems. Three-year program would involve no greater expenditures than would three one-year programs. Ambassador’s recent conversations with M.J. Desai, B.K. Nehru, and TTK indicate some Indian leaders now have more sophisticated understanding of contribution our aid to Pakistan makes to stability and security of subcontinent.

Provision of additional supersonics to GOP would, of course, create some problems. In present context Indo-US relations these may relate more to prestige factor and domestic political repercussions than any actual fear of Pakistan. Additionally, Indians would probably consider we were guilty of reverse logic. In their view India has immediate need for supersonics and we have refused; Pakistan has no urgent problem, is in fact courting Chicoms against whose threat we are supposedly allied, and yet we are giving F-104’s. Our answer to this argument would be that our alliance relationship with Pakistan is still valid, and its purposes place certain requirements on both Pakistan and the US which must be fulfilled in large interest of Free World. However F-104’s would not be scheduled for delivery before mid-1965. Within next one-two years we and UK will need to work out ways of meeting Indian requirement for aircraft; decision would possibly cause less reaction in Pakistan if Paks had prior intimation their needs being met.

Would appreciate your views.²

For Bonn, London.

Above info strictly FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-PAK. Secret. Drafted by Naas and Laise; cleared with NR, BNA, GER, G/PM, DOD/ISA, and AID; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi and repeated to Bonn, London, and CINCEUR.
1. In telegram 243 from Karachi, July 31, the Embassy responded that the proposals contained in telegram 99 represented a positive step forward in putting the military assistance program for Pakistan on an orderly basis, and that a helpful impact upon U.S. relations with Pakistan could be expected as a result. (Ibid.)
2. On July 30, Bowles, who replaced Galbraith as Ambassador to India on July 19, warned that the proposed military assistance program would have a “highly unfavorable” effect upon U.S. relations with India. He argued that a decision to provide more advanced weaponry to Pakistan at the same time that such weapons were being refused to India constituted a decision of pivotal political importance, and he urged that it be reconsidered. (Telegram 476 from New Delhi, July 30; ibid.)