Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

321. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, August 17, 1963, 7 p.m.

721. Deptel 394.¹PriMin received me 6 pm Aug 16 in his small Parliament House office just off floor of Lok Sabha. I gave him President’s letter² which he read with care.

As he looked thoughtfully out of window I remarked that I had last talked with him in this office in late June 1952, to report on a conversation with PakPriMin Nazimuddin in Karachi; oddly enough it was on precisely same subject—how do we settle Kashmir.

Nehru remembered questions involved in previous discussion accurately and remarked on long weary course of debate and subsequent negotiation.

I then said that before he commented on President’s letter I wished to make two or three personal observations:

1. Pres Kennedy, who is himself old hand at facing political pressures, was aware of personal difficulties PriMin faced at this particular moment; Chicom attack last fall, continued concentration of Chinese troops along border, high taxes, rise in prices, shortfalls in the five-year plan, and emergence of strong non-communist opposition had combined to bring about first no confidence debate in Lok Sabha since independence.

2. We could justify adding explosive Kashmir question to his already difficult agenda at this moment only on basis of most unusual and pressing circumstances. There were in fact two urgent questions which in my opinion provided such justification.

A. In US the Kennedy Administration was now facing serious problems regarding aid program which would be debated in House of Representatives next week; this plus heated discussions over VOA agreement and conflict over Bokaro were creating grave uncertainties about our efforts to support India in way we are anxious to do. If we are to win legislative strength at home, we badly need at least some progress towards easing tension in subcontinent.

B. In Pakistan situation was explosive with a strong note of irrationality which concerns us. Indeed we are seriously considering sending high-level US official to Rawalpindi within next two or three weeks for frank, forthright discussion of Pak attitudes toward China and related subjects.

If progress could be made towards agreement with Pakistan on wording we proposed last week (or on some other wording), a powerful moderating influence could immediately be brought to bear in Karachi. Since it would take three or four months to select a mediator and allow him time to do his homework, and since our proposal did not contemplate a report for another six months after that, we could secure nine or ten months of relative calm on an intensive divisive and explosive subject.

In this atmosphere Pakistan would be less able to embarrass India in event of Chinese attack, as some nervous Indians thought she might do; she would also be inhibited from renewing embittering and unrewarding dialogue in UN. However our strong support for mediation at this time should not be interpreted as device to sweep difficult subject under rug. In the more moderate atmosphere we felt could be created by genuine effort of mediation, the conflict could be discussed in calm confidential setting with no need for publicly adding up the score at regular intervals as during the six rounds of talks last winter.

3. Although we regretted political circumstances which compelled him make his strongly negative statement in Lok Sabha Tuesday, we were encouraged by restraint which he had demonstrated since then, namely:

A. Instead of reading his provocative speech in Lok Sabha which would have given fire-eaters an opportunity to introduce embittering questions he had cabled it, thereby keeping the question in lowest possible key.

B. On Independence Day before crowd of 100,000 at Red Fort he had rejected opportunity for applause-getting demagoguery over Pakistan in favor of temperate presentation of India’s problems.

C. In Lok Sabha this afternoon he had emphasized that door was open for mediation of Kashmir at an opportune moment.

Impressed that while all of this was helpful an additional move by GOI was now urgently required which, taken in present context, might enable US persuade Paks to adopt equally moderate approach which in turn could lead to beginning of mediation process.

PriMin’s response both to President’s letter and to my presentation was moderate.

He first emphasized his understanding of difficulties Pres Kennedy faced in Congress and also in dealing with Pakistan. He added he was grateful not only for substantial aid American Govt had given India, but for way in which Pres Kennedy, ever since he first sat in Senate, had personally supported India’s efforts and had demonstrated an understanding of India’s problems.

However as I myself had recognized he was now faced with an extremely serious political predicament. As I could see balance of political forces within India had changed radically in the ten years since last served here. Opposition now calling for his downfall was mostly group which could not agree on anything. Nevertheless its ill disguised appeals to communal emotions were dividing country while its irresponsible attacks were threatening tax and other programs which are essential to growth of Indian economy and to military security vis-à-vis China.

C. Nehru said there was no question of closing the door in regard to Kashmir. Indeed, regardless of what Paks might say or do, door would remain open for discussions when there was reasonable hope for sober conversations and possible agreement.

Even taking into account difficulties we faced at home and in Karachi, he questioned that this was an opportune time for mediation. Again he wished make clear this did not mean he was turning his back on mediation concept. As he said in May he thought mediation would be most hopeful way to approach issue which had divided India and Pakistan for so many years.

However, if he were now to appear to be bowing to US-UK pressure (and everyone knew that he was under such pressure) he was fearful of reaction from irresponsible opposition group which was ready to seize on any sign of Congress Party weakness.

I said it was not question of one-sided US-British pressures. Our Amb in Karachi was pressing hard on Paks and as I had pointed out we were now considering additional pressure in near future. Fact of matter was that we are deeply and genuinely worried and if this were not the case present conversation would not be taking place. In my opinion I said, time is running out. Would he therefore agree to make further moderate statements in Lok Sabha and to assure US privately, that provided angry comments could be prevented in Karachi, he was prepared—say at close of Lok Sabha session—to proceed seriously to negotiate basis for meaningful mediation arrangement? We are already striving against great difficulties to keep situation quiet in Karachi and this would give us something tangible to go on.

Although Nehru did not respond directly, he looked thoughtful and after few moments said he would reply to President; in meantime would carefully consider what I had said. I asked when we might expect some word. He replied he was now urgently concerned with organization of government’s case for debate early next week on no-confidence motion, first he had faced in his long years as PriMin. He would be in touch with us as soon as he had chance further to consider this complex problem coming at inopportune time.

Comment: Since previous two meetings there has been striking change in PriMin’s appearance and attitude. Nehru looked and acted much as he did ten years ago. His face was expressive, he was full of bounce and had much of his old charm and humor. Gore-Booth commented to me on same phenomenon.

Undoubtedly explanation lies in fact that during last few days he has been doing what he most enjoys—debating, planning, and maneuvering for high political stakes within Indian political system—much as he may complain about it.

Although we face uphill struggle I see glimmer of hope that with restraint in Karachi as well as Delhi we may conceivably get mediation operation under way. From point of view here best development for next two or three weeks would be benevolent silence in Rawalpindi. If Paks refuse to go ahead we will of course face a new impasse. If they suddenly rush to embrace US-UK proposal GOI will feel it is being deliberately embarrassed and even if Paks go along mood may not be constructive.

We must be realistic about mediation effort itself. Its most immediate contribution in India will be to paper over our own present difficulties with AID bill, VOA, Bokaro, etc. Beyond this expedient result, it will serve to moderate divisive and embittered actions in both countries thereby reducing tensions. The major hope would be that it would create some modus vivendi acceptable to both countries which over a period of years could gradually evolve into a permanent solution.

Bowles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi and London.
1. See footnote 1, Document 319.
2. See Document 319.