Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

265. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, January 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Political Situation in the Republic of Korea

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Walter Dowling
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, Northeast Asian Affairs

Ambassador Dowling described briefly the current political situation in the Republic of Korea. He indicated that members of the Liberal Party (President Rhee’s party) apparently have decided that they can not stand to have another election as free and open as that in May 1958. These individuals are divided into two groups: (1) those who want to retain their power at any cost and (2) those who are sincerely convinced that the country can not be run by the opposition party. He explained that the Liberal Party did well in 1957, with economic stabilization, a large crop and other favorable factors. They also did well in the May 1958 elections, when they succeeded in electing a clear majority in the National Assembly even though the Democratic Party more than doubled the number of seats it held. However, in recent weeks the Liberal Party has lost heavily in terms of public opinion. Ambassador Dowling concluded his evaluation by saying that he is convinced that the United States must take actions to deflect the Liberal Party from pursuing the course which it started on December 24, 1958 (the date of enactment of the National Security Law).

The Secretary asked whether the problem in Korea was similar to that appearing throughout the world in many of the new countries, where the people seem not to be ready, in terms of education particularly, to operate under the very fine constitutions which had been written for the countries in question. In several countries in the last few months military dictators had taken over as a result of lack of popular support of the government in power.

Ambassador Dowling responded that, except for the Japanese, the Koreans are among the most literate of all Asian peoples. In addition, democracy was working well in Korea until the recent excesses. He explained further that the situation can best be described as one in which the party in power wants to retain its power and is willing to go to considerable lengths to serve that end. Ambassador Dowling explained that analyses of the election in May showed those Assemblymen who had the reputation for serving their constituents well won reelection almost without exception. However, if the immoderate elements of the Liberal Party are permitted to continue a course which enables them to retain their position in government without regard to the type of actions which must be taken to accomplish such purpose, the Korean people will become so disillusioned that they will become susceptible to extreme solutions. He explained that in spite of President Rhee’s assertions that the Democratic Party is a communist party, in fact it is probably less infiltrated than is the Liberal Party. However, President Rhee has obviously been convinced by individuals wishing to retain power that the Democratic Party does have communists in it.

The Secretary asked whether the opposition members in Korea were afraid for their lives.

Ambassador Dowling indicated that the leaders were; in fact, at one time there had been an attempt made on the Vice President’s life. In addition, Mr. Cho Pung-ok, leader of the Democratic Party, is in a position of possible danger to his life. Those members of the Democratic Party who do not stand to lose their lives stand to lose hope. Ambassador Dowling reinforced his conclusion that the Koreans were capable of operating a democracy by referring to the devotion and earnestness of the Korean youth. He added, however, that these are the individuals who can be most affected by a continued deterioration of the democratic processes in Korea and they are the group that could quickly turn to violence. The Ambassador concluded by referring to his personal conviction that if we are determined it is possible to deflect the Liberal Party from its present course. However, we must be prepared to use all the resources at our disposal if necessary.

The Secretary asked whether Ambassador Dowling had a program. When answered in the affirmative, he asked to see it.¹

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the absence of a normal relationship among the various agencies in Korea was an obstacle to efficient and effective operation of the United States Government in Korea and to any effective implementation of a program to cope with the current and prospective political situation in Korea if it is decided to take such action. He further commented that had we had a normal relationship in Korea the alleged irregularities in the GAO report² could have been dealt with before now. He indicated that it is highly desirable to get this problem straightened out with Secretary McElroy during Ambassador Dowling’s consultation.³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795A.00/1–1959. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Howard Parsons and approved by Robertson.
1. See Document 266.
2. on January 8, the General Accounting Office presented a report on the Korean Military Assistance Program to the House Subcommittee on Review of the Mutual Security Program. Walter Robertson summarized the report in a January 18 memorandum to the Secretary, noting that the report had been characterized by a member of the subcommittee as the most damaging on any program he had ever seen. The report revealed serious deficiencies in MAP planning, programming, and deliveries, and highlighted problems of diversion and pilferage of MAP matériel, and lack of control over the use of local currency provided from U.S. economic assistance for support of the Korean military budget. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5–MSP/1–1859) See Supplement.
3. On March 20 President Eisenhower reestablished a normal Country Team relationship in Korea by endorsing an agreement developed through extensive negotiations between the Departments of State and Defense that restored control over economic assistance programs to the Ambassador while leaving the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command with the authority to deal directly with the Korean Government on military programs. (Memorandum for the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense, and attached Memorandum of Agreement, March 10; Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/3–2059) See Supplement.