Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

22. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ⁰

Honolulu, August 19, 1958, 12:43 p.m.

4335. Ref:

(A) CINCPAC ltr with enclosed staff study, ser 00346 of 1 July 1958¹

(B) CNO 021349Z²

(C) AmEmb Tokyo to State 223, 31 July 58 pasep³

(D) AmEmb Tokyo to State 238, 1 Aug 58 pasep⁴

(E) AmEmb Tokyo to State 224, 31 Jul 58 pasep⁵

(F) AmEmb Tokyo to State 784, 17 Sep 57 pasep⁶

(G) CNO 141947Z⁷

I. Ref (A) not intended deal specifically with base rights question. CINCPAC preparing and will forward consolidated list long range base reqs in Japan. Purpose of list to indicate specific base and reentry rights desired by U.S. for possible use in future treaty renegotiation. Recommend use staff study ref (A), and additional material part II this message, for formulation strong DOD–State position in preparation talks with Fujiyama and development U.S. negotiating position when required. Recommended “minimum negotiating position” contained part III.

II. Additional CINCPAC views re revision of Japanese Treaty follow:

1. Question has arisen whether revision, amendment, or totally new treaty is desirable. Although there are possible political advantages of negotiating new treaty, as pointed out by Amb MacArthur, ref (D), CINCPAC concludes that U.S. interests better served by revision current treaty. Following significant considerations support conclusion:

A. GOJ has thus far expressed but minor interest in a mutual defense treaty but has emphasized need for “adjustments” in “existing joint security system.” This probably due to recognition that Japan is not ready undertake responsibilities which “mutual defense” treaty would impose, and to its recognition that negotiating and ratifying a new treaty would be much more hazardous political undertaking than would be revision of current treaty. To encourage Japan to ask for more than she is inclined to seek does not appear wise in light of those disadvantages to US listed in ref (D) as likely to result from new treaty. Renegotiation of admin agreement for example, would pose major problems. The present agreement was difficult to hammer out and none of concessions granted therein should be given up lightly. Furthermore any liberalization of treaty relations with Japan may lead to acrimonious and harmful debate in U.S. Congress. Therefore a revision not requiring congressional ratification would be preferable to a new treaty.

B. Methods of approaching adjustment of security relations are not confined to the 2 alternative procedures listed ref (D). A fully satisfactory solution will not be found by “maintaining existing security treaty but giving Japanese satisfaction on the 2 points,” not by replacing existing security treaty with mutual security treaty covering “Japan area.” It would not be to U.S. interest to make only piecemeal adjustments, nor to substitute, “one way” mutual defense treaty covering a new area. Inasmuch as Japs are making the request for adjustment, it would appear to be a sound tactic to inquire if the paper presented to the Amb by Fujiyama represents all aspects of security relationship for which adjustment desired. When complete list of desired adjustments is received, U.S. could propose discussion agenda covering Japanese requirements insofar as practicable without jeopardizing vital aspects of U.S. position. By following this procedure, many articles of present treaty could be revised to obtain new look of mutuality and equality desired by Japs without hazards that formulation and ratification of new treaty entail. Most advantages listed para 2; ref (D) as achievable through new treaty could be also gained through proper focussing of publicity concerning “revised” treaty.

C. Since true mutuality between U.S. and Japan in security matters is out of the question, avoidance of term “mutual defense treaty” is desirable. Among other reasons, so to dignify Jap treaty would be viewed as unfair by governments of other allies which have made far more significant efforts toward own defense. GOJ and LDP have been ineffective in providing leadership which could bring home to the Japanese people the formidable Communist threat facing Japan. Instead, political and budgetary considerations have been given first priority with result that Japan’s needs for self defense have been neglected in reassuring certainty that they would be met by U.S. and that GOJ would thereby avoid onus of an unpopular defense burden. Had not substantial U.S. forces been present in Japan the past decade, Japan probably would be, at best, a full fledged neutral, giving little heed to U.S. diplomatic overtures. Today finds Japan asking that U.S. guarantee to assist in her defense and to contribute substantially to support of her military forces. Only return offered for this not inconsiderable request is the use of a limited number of bases with restrictions on their use involving armaments and employment of U.S. forces. Inasmuch as the most effective defense of Japan would result from military action far from her shores, her desire to limit weapons and areas of employment for U.S. forces represent unacceptable restrictions. The U.S. could not adequately discharge its obligation to Japan if these restrictions were accepted. In view of the Japanese attitude it is clear that to grant Japan a “mutual defense” treaty is unrealistic. However it may be possible to use the words “mutual security” within the treaty in such a way as to satisfy the Japanese.

D. Any use of term “Japan area” in a manner which would encourage certain Japanese elements to seek additional Japanese responsibilities in the Ryukyu and Mariana–Bonin Islands would be detrimental to U.S. security interests. Although phrase “Japan area” is used in art 24 of the admin agreement, it should be remembered that at time agreement was drawn, “Japan area” was clearly recognized as being limited to 4 main islands as defined by Treaty of Peace. Only in such a context is the phrase acceptable. CINCPAC feels strongly that the U.S. should encourage the Japanese to accept the principle of progressively expanding collective security with other free Asian nations, rather than to restrict Japanese security interests to island groups toward the defense of which they can contribute little or nothing at the present time.

2. Certain specific adjustments which Japanese probably will seek are listed in para 3D of CINCPAC staff study, ref (A). Additional changes which Japs may seek include:

A. Rewriting of preamble to imply greater mutuality and equality.

B. Rewriting art II clause requiring prior U.S. consent before making certain agreements with third nation.

C. Establishment of an expiration date.

D. Specific recognition that treaty is consistent with principles of UN Charter.

3. Above listed amendments considered acceptable to U.S. provided:

A. Art II revision provides for prior consultation with U.S. or parallels art 8 of NATO treaty.

B. Expiration date provisions approach as closely as possible the terms of art 13 NATO treaty.

C. Linking of treaty and U.N. Charter is consistent with exchange of notes on this subject, dated 14 Sept 1957 (ref (F)).

4. Para 3. C. (4) of CINCPAC staff study, ref (A), lists actions which the Japanese should be encouraged to take in order to attain a military posture more in accord with the “mutual” responsibilities they seek. Inasmuch as accomplishment of all of these actions in the near future is unlikely, the U.S. negotiators should take into consideration the debilitating effect of their non-accomplishment upon Japan’s defense capabilities. Following comments are supplementary:

A. U.S. concessions normally regarded by Japs as vindication of their demands and usually generate additional demands. This attitude of Japs has been demonstrated following U.S. return of Anami Islands in 1953, withdrawal of bulk of U.S. Forces in 1957, and recent acceptance of reduced yen contributions. To continue practice of not obtaining an adequate quid pro quo is a doubtful tactic, especially in Orient.

B. Specific recognition of need for U.S. re-entry rights to Jap bases in event Communist aggression in Far East would constitute an improvement in current arrangements. It is recognized that willing Japanese cooperating at time of need is key to the situation. Nevertheless problem is an acute one as result of withdrawal of Forces and liberal return to Japan of many facilities and installations which would be required to assure CINCPAC capability of carrying out limited and general war tasks assigned by JCS. Explicit right of reentry to such facilities or guarantee of equivalent base grants would be most desirable in a revised security treaty. Kishi, in conversation last year with MacArthur indicated understanding of these U.S. needs. CINCPAC considers U.S. should seek facilities, on an exclusive U.S. or combined occupancy basis, adequate to provide for U.S. missile, manned aircraft and supporting units essential to defense of Japan; and combined occupancy or future entry rights on installations necessary to provide for rotational deployment of U.S. Ready Forces and logistic activities in event limited or general war.

5. Use and disposition of U.S. Forces, and introduction of nuclear weapons remain 2 most critical issues. Additional comments on these items follow:

A. Use and disposition of U.S. Forces: U.S. can accept “consultation” with Japs before operational employment of U.S. Forces stationed Japan, and can accept provision that any operational use of such Forces will be consistent with principles of U.N. Charter. “Consultation” however, should be construed only as U.S. acceptance of a responsibility to consider policies, welfare and security of Japan before undertaking operations supported by U.S. Forces or bases in Japan. U.S. cannot accept any Japanese veto over U.S. operations which U.S. considers essential to its security commitments or requirements. Jap leaders must recognize that U.S. bases in Japan for sole purpose of a static defense of Japan would be of limited value to U.S. It is recognized that careful negotiation will be required to achieve phraseology which will restrict U.S. freedom of action as little as possible, curb Jap tendencies to seek to influence matters beyond their capability to control, and still recognize legitimate Jap fears of involvement in someone else’s war.

B. Introduction of nuclear weapons: CINCPAC has no solution which will meet fully Jap and U.S. desires. With the advent of sealed pit weapons, the need for complete weapons at aircraft sites will become immeasurably greater. The U.S. policy of neither affirming nor denying the location of atomic weapons in any particular area must be maintained. The U.S. cannot, therefore, make any treaty commitments in this regard. Alternative courses of action then open to the U.S. will be:

(1) To maintain the status quo with respect to weapons in Japan even though other stocks are converted to sealed pit weapons.

(2) To remove non-nuclear components from Japan when they become obsolete, without replacement.

(3) Secretly to replace non-nuclear components with sealed pit weapons when the former become obsolete. Although alternative (3) would be the most desirable militarily, alternative (1) appears the most practicable at this time.

6. Jap press reports have indicated that Japs may seek to have treaty revision become effective in 1961 when current phase of Japan’s military program is scheduled to be completed. Effective date of the treaty should be based not only on passage of time but insofar as practicable on Jap expression of willingness to improve their military capabilities along the general lines indicated in para 3. C. (4). (D) of ref (A).

III.

1. The following 2 paras represent a “minimum negotiating position” and summarize the commitments which the U.S. can accept and those which it cannot accept without critical injury to our defense posture in the Far East.

2. The U.S. can accept commitments to:

A. Come to Japan’s aid if she is attacked.

B. Maintain minimal air defense forces on Japan for possibly 3 or 4 years, providing there is a clause which with due consideration of Japanese defense needs, permits U.S. units to be withdrawn in the event of emergency elsewhere or in the event adequate support and cooperation are not provided by the Japanese.

C. Consult with the Japanese regarding the disposition of U.S. Forces in Japan, provided the limitations in the preceding paras are not exceeded.

D. Consult with GOJ concerning the use elsewhere in the Far East area of U.S. Forces based in Japan, provided that lack of Japanese agreement shall not be construed as preventing the use of U.S. Forces as necessary to meet U.S. security commitments.

E. Note without commitment, the views of the Japanese government with respect to atomic weapons.

F. Use U.S. Forces in Japan only in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter and the security interests of Japan (as determined by the U.S.).

G. Terminate the treaty in 10 years upon 1 year’s notice by either party, remove the “unequal” language in the preamble and art I, delete the “internal riot” clause in art I and relax the restrictions on 3rd nation agreements in art 119.

3. The U.S. cannot accept commitments which:

A. Require the U.S. to maintain more than minimum air defense forces in Japan over a substantial period of time.

B. Preclude the U.S. from removing any U.S. unit from Japan in event of emergency.

C. Reduce the urgency of the requirement for Japan to make more substantial efforts toward self defense.

D. Require Japanese consent to the use of U.S. Forces or bases in Japan to support operations elsewhere in the Far East which are consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter and are consonant with the security interests of Japan (as determined by the U.S.)

E. Indicate acceptance of a degree of security interest in the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands by Japan beyond that which Japan has in the collective security and other free Asian area.

F. Prohibit U.S. Forces in Japan from being armed with the weapons essential to the maintenance of their offensive and defensive striking power.

G. Markedly reduce the privileges accorded U.S. Forces in the current admin agreement.

0. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS .092 Japan (12–12–50). Top Secret.
1. See footnote 1, Document 17.
2. Not found.
3. Document 18.
4. Document 20.
5. Document 19.
6. Telegram 784 contains a verbatim text of an exchange of notes concerning the interpretation of the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement as they relate to the U.N. Charter. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/9–1357) For text, see 8 UST (pt. 2) 1571.
7. Not found.