Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

23. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 8, 1958, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Security Arrangements with Japan

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador MacArthur¹
• FE–Mr. Robertson
• FE–Mr. J. Graham Parsons
• S/S–Mr. Cassilly
• S/P–Mr. George Morgan
• H–Mr. White
• NA–Mr. Howard L. Parsons
• FE–Mr. J. Owen Zurhellen
• NA–Mr. James V. Martin

Ambassador MacArthur opened the discussion. He told the Secretary that on August 25 when he had met with Foreign Minister Fujiyama and Prime Minister Kishi, the Prime Minister had made a formal proposal for a mutual security treaty and had requested that this proposal be brought to the President’s attention. Tokyo’s telegram 444² containing the proposal was handed to the Secretary and he read it.

Ambassador MacArthur said that two courses of action were open to the Japanese: (1) to retain the present security treaty with all its unilateral aspects and to have a side arrangement covering consultation prior to the introduction of nuclears and to the operation of United States forces from bases in Japan; or (2) to negotiate a new mutual security treaty with provision in exchange of notes or a communiqué to take care of the same two points.³ Opinion was divided among the Japanese as to which course was desirable. The Conservatives were split. Some thought Japan should serve as a bridge between the East and West; to these people, a mutual security treaty was undesirable because it would commit Japan to the United States and would alienate Asians. Some conservatives thought that a mutual security treaty would anger the Chinese Communists. Still other Conservatives, including the Foreign Minister himself, were afraid that the signing of a mutual security treaty would result in a knock-down, drag-out fight and that this ought to be avoided.⁴

It would have been a mistake, said Ambassador MacArthur, for us to have pressed the Japanese for a mutual security treaty. Fortunately, we do not have to because Prime Minister Kishi himself proposed such a treaty a month or two after Ambassador MacArthur, on the basis of the Secretary’s instructions, had opened the matter with him last spring. In this connection, said Ambassador MacArthur, failure on our part to grant a new treaty and in doing so to be able to propose our own language on the two points concerned, would make inevitable an approach from the Japanese on these two points, obliging us to agree not only to the principle but to their specific language. The Socialist party at the present time was preparing two draft resolutions for the forthcoming regular session of the Diet, one concerning the non-introduction of nuclears without the agreement of the Japanese Government and the other concerning the operational use of United States bases in Japan without Japanese consent.⁵

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Kishi would be able to prevent the passage of these resolutions if we agreed to negotiate a treaty. Ambassador MacArthur said that Prime Minister Kishi had told him that he could forestall the passage of the resolutions if a treaty were under negotiation. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He remarked that the Australian Ambassador to Japan had expressed to him the greatest surprise and pleasure that the Japanese Government was voluntarily seeking a mutual security treaty with the United States.

Ambassador MacArthur said that the Japanese were ready to move now. If we ourselves did not act quickly the situation would deteriorate. We would be faced with a formal request to refrain from introducing nuclears and to refrain from operating out of our bases prior to Japanese approval; and we would be saddled with an unpopular unilateral treaty as well. Admiral Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific, had expressed his thorough approval of entering into negotiations for a mutual security treaty, Ambassador MacArthur stated, and he read from a telegram prepared by Admiral Felt⁶ to this effect. He concluded by saying that the Admiral agreed that we would “lose our shirt” if we did not move now. By avoiding a new treaty we would risk ending up with nothing three or four years hence, and at that time the atmosphere for negotiating a new treaty would be very bad. However, armed with the present United States draft (draft originally prepared by the Embassy in Tokyo and amended in the Department)⁷ Ambassador MacArthur would be prepared to press Prime Minister Kishi for joint consultation, in accordance with a similar formula governing the use of our bases in the United Kingdom. This formula would be interpreted by the Japanese Government to the Diet as meaning that the Government would deny the United States the right to use its bases in Japan operationally or to bring in nuclear weapons. However, this formula was much better for us than such terms as the Japanese Government would have to demand of us if the two Socialist resolutions passed. There was a 50–50 chance of getting our own language if we proposed it as part of a package including a new treaty. If the Japanese Government formally asked for our agreement to refrain from bringing in nuclears or using our bases operationally without their prior consent as opposed to consultation, we would have to do it, as we did in the case of the British and French and as Australia had to do with respect to Malaya; if we did not we would face a break with Japan.

The significance of Japan going into a long-term defense treaty with us was incalculable psychologically and politically. Moreover, it had definite practical benefits. For example, without Yokosuka and Sasebo we would have to employ 2-1/2 times the number of ships to maintain and supply the 7th Fleet.

Under these circumstances, Ambassador MacArthur believed the United States position should be as follows:

(1) To listen to the Japanese proposal which would be set forth by Mr. Kishi and which Foreign Minister Fujiyama would repeat.

(2) To respond by saying that we favored the proposal in principle, but that it raised difficult problems; we would be glad to give the matter urgent study but we must consult the leadership of the Senate and this we would do expeditiously.

If the United States adopted this position, we could tell the Japanese that we would hope that Ambassador MacArthur would be ready by October at the latest to enter into discussions. (He himself would rather bring the matter directly to Prime Minister Kishi before Foreign Minister Fujiyama could return to Tokyo. Ambassador MacArthur would be returning to Tokyo September 17.)

Mr. Robertson brought out that Tokyo telegram 444 had not been brought to the President’s attention because the President had been preoccupied at that time by the Quemoy situation, and that he himself (Mr. Robertson) and the Secretary had been out of the Department. It had seemed best to get a more unified opinion before submitting the matter to the President. The Secretary said that no harm had been done, though it would not be right for the Department of State to hold up indefinitely a message which the head of a foreign government had transmitted to our President.

With respect to our present Security Treaty, we had taken great precautions, said the Secretary, to avoid giving the impression that it was being forced on the Japanese. We had signed it only after the Peace Treaty had been signed and we had taken the chance that the Diet would ratify only the Peace Treaty and not ratify the Security Treaty. (Ambassador MacArthur pointed out that the leaders of the conservatives were committed to the security arrangements at that time.)

The Secretary then asked Ambassador MacArthur whether he had any reason to think that a future Japanese Government and Diet might not think of the mutual security treaty now under contemplation as but a step in the process of breaking Japanese shackles to the United States. Would it not be reasonable to assume that they might regard it in the same light psychologically as the old Security Treaty? Ambassador MacArthur regarded this as unnecessarily apprehensive. The Secretary pointed out that he had mentioned this possibility in order to demonstrate that we had to deal with the present situation so as to forestall the development of such a point of view later on. For example, Ambassador MacArthur had said that he had discouraged the Japanese from presenting their own draft so as to be able to present our draft first, but if our draft were presented first, how would this support the thesis that the Japanese were pressing us for this treaty?

Ambassador MacArthur read aloud a Japanese newspaper editorial which demonstrated Japanese desire for a new treaty to strengthen their defensive arrangements with the United States and their desire to include the two points concerned. The general reaction of the press of Japan was very gratifying. However, if it were necessary for the record to provide evidence of Japanese initiative, it would be best to ask the Japanese for a piece of paper. Secretary Dulles said that a piece of paper would not mean much psychologically. A treaty to be acceptable would have to demonstrate the solidarity of Japan and United States in the Far East. Ambassador MacArthur asserted that the Japanese would not commit themselves to a common policy if that meant only a United States policy; however, they would want a long-range defense tie-up with the United States.

The Secretary said: the question was, what was the national sentiment behind treaty revision? Was the primary drive to tie up Japan with the United States or to disengage Japan from the United States? Ambassador MacArthur said that the Prime Minister would tell the Japanese Diet and Japan that Japanese defense was dependent upon a long-term durable security relationship with the United States. Prime Minister Kishi, he said, does not want Japan to be neutral nor Communist. However, it would not be possible in the Ambassador’s estimation to guarantee how the Japanese press would react. The Secretary asked whether Mr. Kishi could get the treaty ratified and adopted not so much as an escape but as a step toward closer cooperation. Mr. Morgan referred to a Tokyo telegram which used Mr. Kishi’s own language and stated that a treaty of this sort could be used to lead Japan to a closer alignment with the United States. The Secretary said that when he went to Congress to sell this treaty he would have to do it on the ground that Japan was casting its lot with us; he could not say that it was because the Japanese were becoming rebellious against the present treaty. Mr. Robertson said that the Japanese complaint that the treaty was one-sided was a relatively new complaint just within the last few years, and principally under Prime Minister Kishi; former Prime Ministers had been happy to accept the arrangement which it provided.

Mr. J. Graham Parsons remarked that Mr. Kishi would have to defend the new treaty for Diet ratification as getting rid of the “old, unequal treaty”. This was a public fact of life. Japan was moving back into an important role in international life and Prime Minister Kishi wanted Japan to play that role in association with the United States. The new treaty would provide a catalytic effect. As an island country, Japan had always found it difficult to commit itself closely for an indefinite period with any foreign country. However, the Anglo-Japanese alliance had established a useful long-term relationship. A new mutual security treaty in that respect could be expected to do the same thing in our case.

Ambassador MacArthur pointed out that a little over a year ago Mr. Kishi had been here. He had wanted the Bonin Islanders repatriated and he had wanted Japanese participation in Ryukyuan administration. Finding us immovable, however, he had given up these requests; he did not wish to cause us trouble.

At this point, there was a discussion to clarify the difference between “operational use of bases” and “deployment of United States forces”. Ambassador MacArthur pointed out that the Defense Department was not interested at all in the new treaty language, but only in the two points concerning the operational use of bases or the introduction of nuclears and in the terms of the administrative agreement.

(Reporter absent a few minutes to obtain a document.)

Ambassador MacArthur said that Japan would represent no predatory danger unless it were absorbed into and became part of Sino-Soviet bloc, in which case, as one of the four primary industrial areas of the world, it would present a danger to us.

The Secretary said he was less interested in what we might get technically in a mutual security treaty than what we could win in Japanese psychological alignment with the free world. Japan had been slower than Germany in regaining its pride and national spirit. He had felt for a long time that when the spirit did re-emerge the Japanese would recognize the indispensability of a security relationship with the United States against the neighboring Communist area.

Ambassador MacArthur pointed out differences between Japan and Germany. It had been possible to bring Germany into alliance through a collective approach both economically and militarily. Japan was historically isolated not only from the West but also from the remainder of Asia. With the recent experience of alienation from other Asians by its military adventure preceding and during World War II Japan was not susceptible to (and would not be drawn into the free world orbit militarily speaking through) a collective approach. The only possible approach was through alignment with the United States.

The Secretary expressed his concurrence and remarked that he would have to proceed with the practical arrangements for getting a unified United States position. Ambassador MacArthur said that it seemed to him that we must consult with Defense. The Secretary asked if we had a draft mutual security treaty. It was presented to him and he read it. Ambassador MacArthur said that it followed the pattern of our other mutual security treaties in the Pacific area. The operational article was Article V. As the meeting broke up, it was agreed that Defense representatives would be invited to confer with State Department representatives in Mr. Robertson’s office the following day.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/9–858. Secret. Drafted by Martin on October 7.
1. Ambassador MacArthur arrived in Washington for consultations September 2.
2. Dated August 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/8–2658) See Supplement.
3. According to telegram 444 Kishi preferred the second alternative, principally on the ground that the one-sided nature of the existing treaty made it a vulnerable target for Socialist attacks.
4. An expanded analysis of divergent views with the LDP is in telegram 357 from Tokyo, August 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/8–1858) See Supplement.
5. MacArthur reported these moves by the Socialists in telegram 407 from Tokyo, August 22. They were part of a strategy to create problems for Kishi during the extraordinary Diet session tentatively scheduled to open late September or early October. This coming session was unusually important, commented MacArthur, because the GOJ was planning to submit a large number of bills and all parties were preparing for the local and upper house elections next spring. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/8–2258) See Supplement.
6. Apparently a telegram from Felt to Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, which has not been found. A quote from it, however, is in telegram 522 from Tokyo, September 3: “Adm. Felt stated: ‘Negotiation is desirable to remove one-sided or unequal aspects of treaty. General language and particularly of preamble can be recast. US national policy recognizes Japan as equal in family of nations. New or revised treaty should reflect this policy. Consultation with GOJ re employment outside Japan of US military forces which are stationed in Japan, is one of main issues. I believe this can be settled on terms acceptable to both parties.’” MacArthur went on to say that “Adm. Felt raised certain other problems but none of them present any major obstacles as far as I can see.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/9–358) See Supplement.
7. See Tab A to Document 27.