Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

20. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, August 1, 1958, 6 p.m.

238. Sent COMUS/J by other means. Embtels 223 and 224.¹ Whole Japanese proposals for adjustments in US-Japan security arrangements require very careful study and analysis, following are my preliminary reactions:

I. First, it is essential that we recognize need during forthcoming months to make some vital adjustments in our existing security arrangements with Japan, if we do not wish over period of next several years to have existing arrangements undermined and crumble away with nothing satisfactory from our viewpoint to replace them. Kishi desires to make adjustments which, having our own long-term security and other interests in this vital area in mind, will, in my judgement, serve to strengthen and make more durable our security ties with Japan. If we reject this overture, Kishi, I am afraid, may gradually be forced to move in contrary direction. He does not wish to do this and believes he can work out acceptable adjustments in spirit of new era of full equality and partnership which the President enunciated to him.

It should be understood clearly that in seeking adjustments in our security arrangements, Kishi Govt is not acting only under pressure of opposition and press criticism which crops up every time Socialists agitate this question in Diet, but also on pressure from elements within Conservative Party. Fact is that Kishi is trying to act before such public pressures develop to intensity which would make negotiations with US much more difficult. Kishi Govt is also acting on basis that Japan has now in fact reacquired its sovereignty and that its national interests dictate that it be in a position to exercise its sovereign power over decisions vitally affecting Japan’s interest. This is same attitude that has been consistently taken by our NATO Allies and which we have fully accepted, particularly insofar as introduction of nuclear weapons or use of our forces stationed in their countries. Failure of Kishi Govt to seek equal voice with US on security decisions vitally affecting Japan’s interest would be considered derogation of its responsibilities to country and people and serve to undermine Kishi. And let me emphasize again that there is nobody in sight here with whom we can work as well or as frankly as with Kishi.

Furthermore, adjustments desired by Kishi Govt are basically recognition of realities of current US-Japanese security relations and not new departures. If we attempted to exercise the so-called “right” to use our military forces in Japan to conduct military operations from bases in Japan in hostilities outside Japan without first seeking Japanese consent or to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan without Japanese consent, not only would our whole security relationship with Japan collapse but Japanese Govt would undoubtedly take effective steps to inhibit any further use of our bases in Japan. Whether we like it or not, this is reality of Japanese-US relations today and we are going to have to live with it.

II. Re proposed adjustments, my preliminary assessment of principal advantages and disadvantages of two courses of action suggested by Fujiyama is as follows:

1. Course I. Maintaining the existing security treaty hut giving the Japanese satisfaction on the two points which they are insisting on (i.e., disposition and use of US forces in Japan and introduction of nuclears).

Advantages:

A. We would not have to go through complicated process of treaty renegotiation with eventual Senate hearings, consent, and ratification at this time.

B. This procedure would probably take the heat off demands for new treaty for next two or three years.

C. This procedure would probably mean we would not have to renegotiate the existing administrative agreement for two or three years, although we might have to adjust it in certain ways.

D. Also, this expedient would enable us to gain time in hope Japanese Constitution would be amended thus giving us chance to negotiate mutual security treaty permitting overseas despatch of Japanese troops. (However, while Kishi hopes to amend constitution, this will not be possible unless he obtains two-thirds majority in both upper and lower houses of Diet, which in turn does not seem possible in reasonable future without modification of electoral law.

It now seems clear electoral law will not be modified till 1960 at earliest and next elections for lower house do not have to be held till 1962. Even then, we cannot be sure that Govt will obtain two-thirds majority or if it does that circumstances will permit amendment of constitution. Therefore, constitutional amendment of Article 9 does not seem feasible within next few years, and as practical matter we cannot be sure constitution will ever be modified. Even with modification we cannot be sure Japanese would commit themselves to sending troops overseas, although if public opinion were favorable it might eventually be possible to despatch Japanese forces overseas by interpretation rather than amendment of constitution.)

Disadvantages:

A. While satisfying Japanese on two major points they have raised we will still be saddled with treaty whose language is one-sided and which is universally considered in Japan to have been imposed on Japanese by US as condition for entry into effect of peace treaty by which their sovereignty was restored. As a result, criticism by leftist, socialist, neutralist and even some conservative elements will continue. It will thus remain open invitation to unfriendly elements and minority elements within conservative party which desire greater degree of independence from US, to press for disengagement from US.

B. While this solution might last for several years, it is basically temporary expedient and obviously does not provide basis for durable and long-term security relationship between two countries we will only be postponing inevitable and perhaps to time when circumstances are less favorable, and pressures build up for disengagement.

2. Course II. Replacing existing security treaty with mutual security treaty covering “Japan area”.

Advantages:

A. We would be able to get rid of existing treaty, which is extremely vulnerable because of its one-sided character.

B. We may never again have as favorable a government or time as the present to negotiate new treaty.

C. A new treaty based on concept of mutuality and acceptable to Kishi Govt would help stabilize and strengthen our security ties with Japan. Thus Japan’s participation of her own volition in such a mutual security pact would make efforts of those urging disengagement much more difficult.

D. We would engage for first time Japan’s responsibility on voluntary (and not imposed) basis in mutual collective security arrangement with US, and indirectly with free world. This is important since there is no prospect of Japan joining in any multilateral collective security treaty for foreseeable future.

E. Negotiation of new treaty acceptable to Japanese people should react to strengthen Kishi’s position very substantially since he would get credit for having been able to negotiate elimination of unequal aspects of existing treaty arrangements.

F. At present when there has been tendency among some of Afro-Asian countries to seek disengagement from US and West, Japan’s voluntary action to join in mutual security treaty with US might have important psychological effect.

Disadvantages:

A. Japan would not be committed in principle to sending her forces abroad in event of hostilities in which she was engaged by virtue of her treaty commitment. (For present this, however, in a sense may be more hypothetical problem than real one, for it is quite clear to all of us here in Japan that for some time Japan will have her hands full trying to raise and maintain forces she needs to protect and safeguard her own territory and sea approaches, let alone having military forces to send abroad for defense of other areas. A new treaty need not be drawn in such a way as to specifically exclude Japan later joining multilateral security arrangements or sending troops abroad if time ever comes when she would be disposed to do so).

B. US would be undertaking a treaty commitment to come to Japan’s assistance if it were attacked. (While Japanese recognize that we do not have such commitment legally now, they are convinced we would come to their assistance if attacked. Indeed this is one of reasons Govt has felt able to take position on side of free world and for closer cooperation with US. If, however, time ever came when Japanese felt we would not join with them to defend Japan, this country would rapidly feel forced to take neutralist stance.)

C. Treaty revision would also require a revision of the existing administrative agreement. While we are in any event going to have to adjust some arrangements in existing administrative agreement, replacement of present security treaty with mutual security treaty would probably require US to move swiftly to a renegotiation on the administrative agreement.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/8–158. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to CINCPAC.
1. Documents 18 and 19.