Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

196. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, July 28, 1960, 8 p.m.

318. CINCPAC and HICOMRYIS for POLADs, Adm Felt, Gen Booth. COMUS/Japan for Gen Burns. Ikeda asked me to lunch privately with him and Yoshida today. Only Diet member Kitazawa (Embtel 200)¹ was also present, to serve as interpreter. Our conversation paralleled and covered same general ground as my talk yesterday with FonMin Kosaka (Embtels 307–310)² and I made same general points that I made to him.

Ikeda and Yoshida listened intently to my exposition of impact of recent Japanese developments in US (Deptel 125).³ I concluded by saying while we fully understood Ikeda’s policy of seeking better relations with ChiComs and Soviets, any overt moves on part of GOJ such as negotiating technical agreements with ChiComs or extending long-term credits on very favorable terms to Soviets at same time Japan is seeking capital in American money markets, could be subject to serious misinterpretation. I also mentioned problems which could arise if Japan started large-scale purchases of Soviet oil in replacement of free world oil.

Ikeda assured me that he understood considerations we had in mind and I gather that FonMin Kosaka had briefed him after our meeting yesterday. Referring to Soviets, he went on to say that two former Vice Parliamentary Ministers of MITI had desired also to proceed to Moscow with Ishii (Embtel 295)⁴ but since neither of these gentlemen was very dependable, he had strongly urged them not to do so, as he was afraid they might start dickering with Soviets on behalf of certain Japanese industrial interests, which would not be helpful and would create additional pressures for favorable credits to Soviet Union. I mentioned that former Vice Parliamentary MITI Minister Harada had told me this morning that he planned to go to Soviet Union and I had poured cool water on idea. Ikeda said Harada had talked to him following his call on me and had tentatively decided to cancel his visit to Moscow as result of Ikeda’s opposition. Ikeda also said that Tatsunosuke Takasaki had recently approached him and said that when he was in Moscow (Embtel 2580)⁵ he had invited Mikoyan to visit Japan and now wished to reaffirm his invitation. Ikeda replied that Takasaki was not representative of new GOJ and that latter had no present intention of inviting Mikoyan to visit Japan.

I told Ikeda that I thought his Govt had made excellent first impression both in Japan and abroad. He expressed appreciation and said that most important first step was to have substantial victory in next elections. He was stressing policy of his Govt to improve social welfare of people and strengthen democracy in Japan. He believed he was well qualified to handle Japan’s domestic problems in way calculated to obtain maximum support. Recent elections in Aomori, Saitama, and yesterday in Gumma, were tangible evidence of basic stability of Japanese people and their orientation toward US and free world. He believed his Govt would gain victory in elections next autumn, following which certain corrective measures would have to be initiated by GOJ re Japan’s internal deficiencies and weaknesses. While actual dates of Diet dissolution and elections next autumn were “secret” he implied that elections might occur as early as October but more probably November. Between now and August 20 GOJ would be developing its policies for coming elections, following which GOJ would take its case to people. Ikeda and Yoshida said they fully recognized importance of developing effective means of acquainting Japanese people with basic issues involved in great struggle going on in world today and whys and wherefores of Japan’s various domestic and foreign policies. Ikeda added that while he felt quite expert re Japanese domestic political issues, he looked to Yoshida as his main advisor on all foreign policy matters. He wished to assure us, however, that Japan’s foreign policy was based on strengthening US-Japan relations, Japan’s firm membership in free world and its total opposition to neutralism.

When I spoke about ROK-Japan relations, particularly importance of finding some way of dealing with repatriation to North Korea short of full one-year extension of Calcutta Agreement,⁶ Ikeda said this was very difficult problem and he frankly did not know what would be possible. He had considered fixing cut-off date on registrations some time next autumn. However he and his advisors believed this might result in great inflation of registrations, with over one hundred thousand, which would mean it would take at least two years to complete physical movement of these persons to North Korea which might be worse than one-year extension of Calcutta Agreement. Politically, it was impossible for any GOJ to abruptly terminate repatriation to North Korea as long as there were substantial numbers of persons desiring to proceed there. He was sympathetic and understood ROK emotionalism on repatriation, but Japan had its own problems with respect to this matter which were every bit as serious as ROK feelings.

I also spoke about Okinawan problem in somewhat less detail than I had spoken to Kosaka (Embtel 310) and mentioned Kosaka’s constructive reaction yesterday. Neither Ikeda nor Yoshida made any particular comment on Okinawan matter, although they listened to all I had to say and agreed that Okinawa must not become problem of serious contention between us.

My impression is that Ikeda is concentrating most of his time, thought, and energy on Japan’s domestic problems and on what his posture should be with respect to them, and is looking to Yoshida to keep eye on foreign policy matters. When I mentioned my very favorable impression of Kosaka, Ikeda smiled and said Kosaka was one of Yoshida’s “pupils” and it was quite natural that he should make favorable impression. Ikeda seemed quite confident and sure of himself and was particularly happy about LDP victory in Gumma prefectural election yesterday, since it was first election since he took over.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 694.00/7–2860. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Seoul, Moscow, Taipei, CINCPAC, HICOMRYIS, and COMUS/Japan.
1. See footnote 1, Document 194.
2. Document 195 and footnotes 1 and 3 thereto. Telegram 309, July 27, is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Central Files, 694.95B/7–2760)
3. Document 193.
4. In telegram 295 from Tokyo, July 26, MacArthur reported on a courtesy call by Ishii, the new MITI Minister. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/7–2660) See Supplement.
5. In telegram 2580 from Tokyo, February 10, MacArthur described his meeting with Takasaki, MITI Minister in the second Kishi cabinet, who informed MacArthur of his pending visit to Moscow. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.9446/2–1060)
6. Because of election politics in Japan and a large number of Koreans in Japan apparently desiring to be repatriated to North Korea, the Calcutta Agreement was extended another year to November 12, 1961. (Telegram 1293 from Tokyo, October 28; ibid., 294.9522/10–2860) See Supplement.