Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

197. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, August 9, 1960, 1 a.m.

427. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 4393.¹ In the period since the political upheaval in Japan last May and June, there has now been sufficient time for intellectual, business and political leaders to reflect on the situation in Japan which underlay the use of force, violence and illegal action and to reach certain conclusions.

Many of them have now concluded that Japan badly needed a psychological shock to awaken it from its torpid complacency: (a) with respect to the nature of basic struggle going on in the world today between the forces of communism and democracy; (b) regarding the extent to which international communism not only influenced or controlled “mass organizations” in Japan such as Sohyo unions, Zengakuren, etc. and could bring to bear in a revolutionary type uprising, but also had infiltrated the universities, intellectual circles, and the press; and (c) the wishful hope that the Japanese could quietly sit out the struggle going on in the rest of the world between communism and democratic forms of government without having any real concern about the objectives or effect of world-wide Communist offensive on the internal prosperity and stability of Japan.

While regretting deeply the cancellation of the President’s visit (and particularly its effect on Japan’s international standing) a number of intellectual and other leaders feel that the cancellation of the visit was what actually provided the shock necessary to arouse responsible Japanese in all walks of life to an awareness of and a determination to do something about what is and has been actually going on in Japan. In this connection they point out that the pro-Communist forces in Japan have in the past two years twice resorted to peaks of force, violence and illegal actions within and outside of the Diet, and that on neither occasion were Japanese press, public or leaders seriously concerned over the basic implications involved in the substitution of force and violence for the rule of law and parliamentary democracy. (These previous peaks occurred during the abortive police bill debate in October-November 1958 and in November 1959 when Zengakuren stormed the Diet. Additionally throughout entire period there have been steadily increasing efforts by left extremists to discredit Diet and judiciary, to frustrate court processes, to engage in illegal strikes, demonstrations, trespasses and coercive measures.) Just as the Japanese had been complacent about the illegal actions of “the young officers” as they prepared to take over Japan to lead it to destruction in the nineteen thirties, similarly the Japanese had been complacent in 1958 and 1959 over the illegal actions and preparations for a take-over by the extreme left.

Had not the President’s visit been cancelled as a result of force and violence, many Japanese are convinced that responsible leaders in all sectors of the national life, would have been prone to shrug off both Communist inroads into the schools and public opinion media and the recent illegal actions as being either exaggerated or partly justified as a result of the “bad” or “unwise” actions of the Kishi govt. Had this occurred there would have been no national awakening, such as has actually taken place, as to the dangers which both (a) democracy and (b) prosperity in Japan face from the pro-Communist elements in Japan which while a minority demonstrated conclusively that they are very well organized and directed and in fact are a real threat to democratic government in Japan. This would have meant that force and violence as a substitute for democracy and the rule of law in Japan would have been further accepted as the norm thus greatly strengthening the potential of the Communist forces in Japan for an eventual take-over.

Another important conclusion reached by many Japanese is that the recent events demonstrated conclusively that the policies of the forces of the left who spearheaded the disorders, including both Sohyo and the Socialist Party, are indistinguishable from those of the Communists. Although overt communism in Japan is very unpopular today (less than 2 percent vote Communist) the appeals of crypto-communism working behind a front of mass organization and individuals with non-Communist “cover” has had a much wider effect. The abrupt switch in the JSP line after Khrushchev’s intolerable behavior at Paris, the use of force and violence, including all of the preparations for street revolution, convinced many hitherto trusting Japanese that much of the so-called non-Communist left was actually the captive of international communism. In retrospect for many thinking Japanese the events of May and June in Tokyo have brought Czechoslovakia in 1948 very close.

A third conclusion reached by many responsible leaders is that the cancellation of the President’s visit was not in itself a primary objective of the pro-Communist forces in Japan. The basic objective was the overthrow of the Kishi Govt as a means of blocking and eventually killing the new security treaty. They maintain that the extreme leftists believed that if they could have forced a cancellation of the President’s visit sufficiently in advance of June 19 when final Diet approval became automatic, Kishi would have had to “assume the responsibility” and in the classical Japanese way of thinking, this could have been used publicly with a good probability of success to “force him to resign immediately.” The fact that the visit was not cancelled until three days before the treaty ratification was completed by the Diet frustrated this strategy as Kishi, although virtually alone, was able courageously to hold out for this brief period without being forced out of office over the cancellation of the visit.

The practical results of these lessons have already begun to have effect, although there is obviously a great deal to do. The new cabinet has quietly but effectively begun to arrest, prosecute, and restrict the leaders of the union, student, and Communist-front mobs. Whether convictions can be obtained in all cases is perhaps less important in Japan where the social and professional stigma of arrest and prosecution is unusually severe. Moreover, the government is carrying out this program skillfully and with due care for public opinion and civil liberties, so that there has been little opportunity for the apparatus to maintain that either a witch hunt or martyrdom is involved. Plans are being laid for an expansion of police forces, and the emphasis is on the enforcement of existing laws before additional security legislation is sought. Balancing its restrictive measures, the new cabinet is planning, and has adequately publicized its intentions, to deal with causes of discontent by providing assistance for university salaries, employment, social security, and civil service benefits. The press has not only begun to give the government a fairer hearing and to treat Ikeda and his associates sympathetically, but it has also, and almost for the first time, started to criticize both Communist interventions into Japanese affairs and the immaturity and irresponsibility of Japanese socialism. In the more sober mood of the country, Communist exploitation of this year’s Hiroshima anniversary was limited and controlled (Embtel 419),² and leftist agitation over the Grayback submarine incident curtailed (Embtel 423).³

How far these present highly favorable trends will be pressed and whether or not responsible leaders in all sectors of the national life will carry through on their present determination to correct the situation inside Japan remains, of course, to be seen. The root cause of Japanese vulnerability remains the factionalism of the conservatives and this is the great task confronting Ikeda in the period ahead. However, there is no doubt that as of now many for the first time see clearly and have begun to understand that there are basic internal weaknesses which must be corrected if Japan is to prosper in freedom. The fact that many of them attribute their awakening in large measure as a result of the deep shock and psychological soul searching resulting from the cancellation of the President’s visit without which it would not have occurred, is also of very considerable interest.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/8–960. Confidential. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to COMUS/Japan and CINCPAC.
1. Document 190.
2. Telegram 419 from Tokyo, August 8, contained a report on the August 6 Hiroshima anniversary celebrations. (Department of State, Central Files, 894.424/8-860)
3. Not printed.