193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan0
125. For Ambassador. We assume that at early date you will have opportunity for serious talk with Ikeda and that he will be interested in discussing problems affecting US-Japanese relations. We recognize that Prime Minister faces formidable task in stabilizing political situation in Japan and particularly unifying conservative elements at present crucial juncture and we do not wish intrude unduly or prematurely. At same time, we believe that if Ikeda gives you suitable opening it would be most helpful if he could be made aware of developing trends in US opinion resulting from cancellation of President’s visit to Japan.
We have been watching closely impact on US opinion of cancellation of President’s visit to Japan. One result to which we believe GOJ should give most serious consideration is reaction of business and financial community that political stability in Japan, which was once assumed, has been brought into doubt. US business leaders will be watching future developments in Japan very closely in effort determine reliability of Japan as field for investment and source of imports.
Furthermore, there is now far greater awareness and concern in US re specific ills in Japan, i.e., factionalism, penetration of mass media, educational institutions and key unions, as well as fuzzy thinking and apathy in many parts of body politic. We of course agree with you that these must be cured if Japan’s future as a great independent nation is not to be jeopardized. We recognize at same time that any pressure on our part to seek early solution of these ills could be unhelpful and misconstrued as undue interference. Nevertheless, Ikeda should be aware that his leadership in handling these problems will be closely watched here.
A second major aspect of US concern relates to possible drift of Japan toward neutralism. While we have been seeking counteract speculation along these lines, there remains body of considerable opinion both in and outside US interpreting events surrounding cancellation President’s visit as indication of move towards neutralism. As result, there is far greater sensitivity in US toward GOJ moves in direction improving Japanese relations with Communist Bloc. For example, reports in US press that Ikeda favors restoration of trade relations with ChiComs have attracted considerable interest. We had anticipated prior [Page 388] to May–June crisis pressures in this direction would be intensified in Japan following coming into force of new treaty and had felt that any GOJ action would have been placed in context of intercourse with ChiComs by other Free World allies and generally accepted on this basis provided no political strings attached. However, in aftermath of cancellation President’s visit we believe GOJ should be aware that moves in direction of trade or technical agreements with ChiComs may be interpreted by US opinion as further evidence drift toward neutralism. In addition, new concerns are now being expressed re repatriation program to North Korea which some circles interpret as move to appease Communist elements and weaken ROK.
You should of course reassure Ikeda that we have every interest in maintaining closest possible ties with Japan. Nevertheless, he should be aware trends in US opinion noted above could inevitably affect economic ties and total US-Japanese relations if favorable image of Japan not restored.
We are concerned basically here, as you are, by tendency both Japanese business elements and conservative political leaders to act on basis “business as usual” and downgrade effect of developments during May-June in Japan. Although immediate effect of these developments on our crucial economic relations with Japan has not been too serious, we feel that it will become increasingly difficult to hold the line if public image in US of Japan not improved. That image which perhaps attained all-time high this past winter has as result unfortunate events June dropped disturbingly and comments have taken on critical to unfavorable caste. We have taken care point out Embassy officers here that setback suffered June may in perspective turn out to be only an ephemeral although unhappy experience if the Japanese take necessary steps prove they have not lost sense direction or political orientation and if they bear in mind considerations set forth preceding paragraphs.
Therefore, while we wish avoid placing any direct pressures on Ikeda, we hope you can quietly lead him and other Japanese leaders to awareness of potentially serious public opinion problem facing Japan in US and fact that his actions, which will be closely observed and fully reported here, could have important impact on future ties between US and Japan. We also discussing situation along foregoing lines with Japanese officers in Washington.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/7–1860. Confidential. Drafted by Steeves, Sneider, and Kingdon W. Swayne of FE/NA; cleared with Thomas J. Dunnigan, Chief, S/S–RO; and approved by the Secretary.↩