Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

95. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 13, 1958.

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea: “Denial of U.P. Report from Copenhagen”

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. J.H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands
• Mr. David Ketel, First Secretary, Embassy of the Netherlands
• The Secretary
• FE—Mr. Robertson
• EUR—Mr. Jandrey
• WE—Mr. Cameron

Ambassador Van Roijen opened the conversation by expressing his appreciation for the opportunity of seeing the Secretary so soon after his return from the NATO Meeting in Copenhagen. The Ambassador explained that Foreign Minister Luns had asked him to express urgently to the Secretary the Dutch Government’s concern at the effect in Indonesia of the denial of the UP story from Copenhagen which had reported the Secretary to have said at the NATO Meeting that an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea would have most serious consequences for South-east Asia and the Western Alliance. The Dutch Government feared that the Indonesian Government and military would interpret this denial to mean that the United States would be indifferent to such an attack. The Secretary replied that when he had considered the problem of denying the UP story he had had very much in mind the possibility that the Indonesians might place such an interpretation on the denial. He had, therefore, instructed the Department that the story be denied in such a fashion that the Indonesians could not draw this inference. He was satisfied that this had been done. He did not believe that the Indonesians were under any illusions about our position. They were aware of the fact that the United States opposed the use of force for the resolution of differences. In this respect he believed that the situation was being handled as the Dutch would want. Whatever the Indonesians may say publicly, they know that the United States would not be indifferent to the use of force against West New Guinea.

The Secretary recalled that the possibility of an Indonesian attack on New Guinea had been mentioned in the corridors at Copenhagen in a brief exchange between him and Foreign Minister Luns.¹ The Secretary said that he had jokingly remarked that it might perhaps be a good thing if Indonesia should try to attack West New Guinea. Foreign Minister Luns replied perhaps so, adding in the same vein that the Dutch had proved themselves good soldiers in the past and the Indonesians were still far from successful in demonstrating this capacity.

Ambassador Van Roijen said that the Dutch Government, of course, understood that the United States was opposed to the use of force against West New Guinea. Foreign Minister Luns, however, was going before the First Chamber of the Dutch Parliament today to defend the Foreign Office Budget and he expected questions based on the denial of the UP story. He added that there had been considerable public reaction in The Hague and speculation about the possibility that the Indonesians might conclude from the denial that the United States would be indifferent to an attack on West New Guinea.

The Dutch Ambassador and Mr. Ketel left the Secretary’s office for several minutes while the following statement which the Secretary drafted was discussed:

“The Netherlands Ambassador called upon the Secretary of State to inquire whether the denial by the United States of the Secretary’s alleged statement at the NATO Council Meeting at Copenhagen with reference to West New Guinea meant that the United States would, in fact, be indifferent to an armed attack against West New Guinea. The Secretary said that the United States had no reason to anticipate any such attack. The Secretary went on to affirm that the United States, as its conduct had shown, was dedicated to the principle of the United Nations Charter that situations which might lead to a breach of the peace should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.”

The Ambassador and Mr. Ketel rejoined the Secretary and he gave them copies of this statement. After studying it the Ambassador said that in all frankness he must point out that he did not believe that the statement would entirely meet Foreign Minister Luns’ needs since it did not contain a specific warning to Indonesia against the use of force. The Secretary replied that that was quite true but that the inference could be drawn that we would not be indifferent to the use of force against New Guinea. The Ambassador again said that the absence of a specific warning would make Foreign Minister Luns’ task in answering questions in Parliament more difficult. The Secretary replied that the Dutch were in effect asking for us to change our policy and issue a public warning to Indonesia. He recognized Foreign Minister Luns’ problem but he said that he would not agree to issue such a warning to Indonesia when we have no reason to anticipate an attack on West New Guinea. It was not good international practice to issue such a warning when there was no evidence to justify it. In addition, the Secretary said that Indonesian Government and military leaders know our position on this question. They were informed of it, Mr. Robertson remarked, when we refused to sell them arms last November. The Secretary said that we are trying to maintain a position in the area so that elements in Indonesia opposed to communism can take control and unite the people of Indonesia. It would be in our opinion an act of folly to inject at this time the issue of Western New Guinea into the delicate Indonesian situation. If this was done, the Communist versus non-Communist character of the present struggle would be destroyed and the conflicting forces in Indonesia united in an anti-colonial campaign. The danger of increased Communist control would thereby become much greater. If the Communists did gain control the threat would not only be against West New Guinea but against Singapore, Philippines and Australia.

Ambassador Van Roijen again returned to the likelihood of questions in Parliament and said that Foreign Minister Luns would be asked whether the United States was in fact indifferent to an attack on West New Guinea. In reply to these questions the Ambassador asked whether the Foreign Minister could say that he was convinced that the United States was opposed to such an attack. The Secretary said that he could not agree to the Foreign Minister’s making such a statement.

The Ambassador said that he would transmit the Secretary’s statement to the Foreign Minister. He asked what the Secretary had in mind about releasing the statement. The Secretary replied that he thought it might be released immediately after this conversation by the Department’s spokesman. It was agreed that in replying to press questions Ambassador Van Roijen would say that he had discussed the denial of the UP story with the Secretary and that the Department was releasing a statement. The Ambassador then said that Foreign Minister Luns had requested him to inform the Secretary that neither the Foreign Minister nor Dutch sources had leaked the story. The Secretary commented that because of the great Dutch interest in this problem we had thought it might have been Dutch sources, or press speculation on something which some Dutch source had said. The leak had indeed created a very awkward situation and he appreciated receiving the Foreign Minister’s assurances.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656C.56D/5–1358. Confidential. Drafted by Cameron.
1. See Document 82.
2. In telegram 4165 from Djakarta, May 12, Jones reported that, according to UP representatives, Foreign Minister Luns was the source of the UP story, and suggested that Robertson might wish to pass the information to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/5–1258)