96. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Indonesia
PARTICIPANTS
- Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
- The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
- The Secretary
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Mein, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs
The Secretary said that in light of developments in Indonesia and the situation facing the dissidents it appeared that this might be the psychological moment when we might be able to get the most by seeking a political solution in Djakarta. General Nasution has made several approaches which would seem to indicate that he feels he might be able to swing the government into taking action against the communist threat. He has indicated, however, that to do so he must first liquidate the rebels. It is necessary, therefore, to find a way to have the two things, cessation of hostilities and anti-communist action, move concurrently, especially since Sukarno may not be a party to these approaches and there is no indication whether he will associate himself with such a solution. It would appear, therefore, that this is the best time to move.
The Secretary said that we are instructing our Ambassador to see Sukarno and to make a statement along the following lines: The Indonesian Government alleges that assistance is being given to the rebels; that he cannot move his country to the communist camp without expecting reaction from the free world and that some of the free peoples are bound to help the rebels; that the only way to avoid that is to stop the trend to communism; that if he takes action to stop this trend we are willing to discuss the allegations with the Philippines, ChiNats, etc; also that if the trend shows any real significance we would then be prepared to give economic and military assistance but only if we were convinced by the actions of the government that such would happen.
The Secretary said that we would also inform Nasution, Djuanda and Subandrio of this approach to President Sukarno with the thought that they might reinforce our position.
Mr. Robertson stated that we were also proposing to the government a cease-fire to give Nasution time to carry out such action as he [Page 173] might contemplate against the Communists. Nasution is extremely anxious for some indication of sympathy from the United States.
The Secretary said that it is important that there be no build-up during a cease-fire period if one is accepted, and that such must be a condition to such a proposal. He said the Indonesians must also realize that what is happening in the area is the inevitable counterpart of what they are doing. They cannot expect to turn over their country to communism without something being done about it by the free world.1