Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

94. Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

Washington, May 13, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Indonesia

1. This morning General Twining and I talked over the views I expressed in yesterday’s conference in regard to Indonesia.¹

2. We both feel, and I believe the remainder of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would concur, that the Indonesian situation as of this date presents as favorable an opportunity for the U.S. to influence the turn of affairs as we are likely to get.

3. In summary, my views are:

a. The maximum the rebels can attain by themselves is an independent Celebes government, but, since they have no civilian leadership, even this appears unlikely.

b. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

c. The recent successes of the rebels in the Celebes have caused elements in the GOI to consider compromise negotiations.

d. The solution to attaining U.S. objectives and keeping the Communists from gaining control of Indonesia is to influence elements of the GOI to establish a communist-free government, control the PKI, and minimize the influence of the Soviets in Indonesia.

e. The Indonesian Army, under Nasution and other leaders, appears to be the only anti-communist element in the GOI which is possibly strong enough to persuade Sukarno to establish a communist-free government.

f. Nasution has stated that his success in bringing about political changes in the Cabinet, moving against the PKI, and solving the developing economic crisis depends on whether or not the U.S. will support him.

g. The U.S. has been reluctant to promise support to Nasution because of his possible lack of ability to deliver and also because of the possibility of trickery.

h. It is my opinion that although an approach to Nasution might very well fail, he represents the only means available to the U.S. for influencing the GOI. Therefore, I believe that it would be profitable for Ambassador Jones to approach Nasution with a statement that the U.S. could not be expected to support the Indonesian government unless it were assured that the GOI would discontinue its trend towards communism. Specifically, the U.S. would expect Nasution to bring about:

(1) Negotiated settlement with the rebels.

(2) Cabinet changes eliminating all leftists.

(3) Exercise of control over the PKI.

i. Perhaps Nasution could be persuaded to move before actually receiving other than a general promise that the U.S. would support an anti-communist government.

j. Should Nasution insist upon specific support before he moves, it is my opinion that the Ambassador could promise such support including specific funds and specific military aid as listed in the Token Military Aid Program for Indonesia.

k. If an approach is made to Sukarno, I believe that, because of his wavering and susceptibility to communist control, he should be made fully aware that the U.S. will support the GOI on the basis that Nasution and the Army are able to control the communist elements.

Very respectfully,

Arleigh Burke

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/5–1358. Top Secret.
1. Possibly a reference to a meeting that was held in Dulles’ office on May 12 at 4:19 p.m. According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, the Secretary, Robertson, Mein, Arneson, Herter, Reams, Allen Dulles, Cabell, Ulmer, and Irwin met to discuss Indonesia. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Dulles Appointment Book, 1958–59) No record of the meeting has been found.