93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia 0

3301. From previous messages reporting your conversations with Djuanda, Subandrio and Nasution, not clear what specific action government or Nasution intends take against Communists or whether what they say is more than talk. It would appear that they wish some definite action by us without at the same time taking concrete measure to check the rising tide of Communist influence. We are also not clear what you mean by “Nasution plan” in these messages.

You are, however, authorized to speak along following lines, preferably to Sukarno himself, after previously informing in your discretion [Page 165] Djunda, Subandrio and Nasution of your purpose. Outline of verbal statement follows:

U.S. policy toward Indonesia proceeds from the premise that it should be a vigorous independent member of the society of free nations. This policy led us to give support to the desire of the Indonesians for independence. Our policy in this respect has never wavered and under it we have given moral, political and economic support to the Government of Indonesia.

We have, however, become deeply concerned at the growing influence and ambitions of the Communist Party in Indonesia. We are convinced that here as elsewhere the Communist Party is an instrument of International Communism, and that it takes its direction from Moscow. The recent statement by Mr. Nehru that the Communist Party in India is guided from without applies equally to the Communist Party in Indonesia. The influence of that party, coupled with the large degree of Indonesian military dependence, both in terms of equipment and technicians on the Soviet bloc, cannot but cause deep concern to all who had such high hopes for Indonesia as a truly independent nation. It has been demonstrated time and again, most recently by Soviet action in Hungary, and by its present policy toward Yugoslavia, that it is intolerant of genuine independence if it is able, directly or indirectly, to impose its will.

This situation is inevitably of deep concern to peoples of the free world who are in close proximity to Indonesia. This vast archipelago, projecting from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific, is geographically close to many free countries, the peoples of which cannot but have deep concern lest there be a militant Communist regime in their very midst.

The Government of Indonesia complains that a few people from the surrounding areas are as individuals helping elements within Indonesia who are in rebellion against the Communist trend to which we allude. No one could realistically expect that Indonesia should be moved into the Sino-Soviet orbit with the total good will and acquiescence of all the neighboring peoples who would be greatly endangered thereby. There is no rule of international law to stop this.

The United States Government itself has exercised the greatest circumspection in this matter. It is not possible for us to control the activities of all Americans, some of whom are “soldiers of fortune” and interested in freedom, and there is no international obligation on our part to do so. If there are any, the number must be insignificant and the rumors of large participation by Americans are wholly without basis in fact. We have to this date ignored repeated pleas by the rebels that we recognize their belligerent status.

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We suggest that the Indonesian Government must realistically recognize it as a fact that there cannot but be at least a minimum of reaction on the part of all those, Indonesians and neighbors of Indonesia, who see in rising Communist influence the prospect of alien domination, so long as the Central Government seems to be moving in a Communist direction.

If the Government takes definite measures for the elimination of the Communist threat which would in itself greatly enhance the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the present struggle, we would use full extent of our influence everywhere including our influence with neighboring states to try to compose the situation which now threatens to disrupt the normal life of the Indonesian Republic. Furthermore, under those conditions, the United States would be prepared to extend substantial economic aid, and such military aid as would seem appropriate to maintain internal order as against any Communist subversive threat.

The United States seeks for itself nothing whatsoever from Indonesia other than that it should be a genuinely independent nation. We are deeply distressed that events jeopardize that independence and impair the economic prospects of Indonesia, whose people deserve an improving rather than a deteriorating social and economic prospect. We would eagerly welcome knowledge of any concrete measures with which the United States might cooperate, if this be the wish of the Government of Indonesia.

Instructions for talk with Nasution follow separate cable.1

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1358. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Mein and Dulles, initialed for Robertson by Parsons, and approved by Dulles. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. Apparent reference to Document 92. In a telephone conversation with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd at 12:50 p.m. on May 13, Dulles spoke of “a rather important message we are thinking of sending to Indonesia,” referring evidently to Document 92 and telegram 3301. A memorandum of that telephone conversation, prepared by Bernau, reads in part as follows: “The time has probably come to put maximum pressure on for a political settlement. The Sec does not think it will work but no harm in trying. L said he thinks he knows what it is and will agree.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)