Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

45. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, March 21, 1958, 4 p.m.

3300. Embtel 2978.¹ During course hour’s talk this morning Prime Minister made following points among others:

1. Government timing military program had been somewhat upset Medan affair but was still proceeding generally according to plan.

2. Prime objective continued to be Padang and GOI would immediately move toward settlement when this objective reached. He said he personally would do utmost to bring pressure on Hatta and Sukarno to get together as he saw no satisfactory alternative to Sukarno–Hatta government if Indonesia was to move forward. He said he himself was willing to resign as soon as Sukarno–Hatta agreement could be reached.

3. He said considerable political maneuvering was going on behind scenes these days to accomplish this objective. Wilopo of PNI was being very active in effort to bring about conference of party leaders with Sukarno and Hatta with view to laying basis for settlement. NU leadership was also working toward same end but Prime Minister indicated thinking somewhat different as to timing of settlement, PNI wishing to bring about settlement soonest, NU interested in some delay, primarily, he hinted, for reasons of political patronage.

4. He reverted to period before rebel ultimatum and proclamation establishment revolutionary government. On February 8, he said, he had sent a message via Roem to Padang leaders pleading with them not to take overt action which would prevent satisfactory compromise from being reached. He had informed them, he said, that within two weeks after return of Sukarno he would resign and pave way for Hatta–Sukarno government. He was confident this could have been done because, he said, it was only with great reluctance that Sukarno had yielded to pressure to take military action. He said he himself was as much responsible as anyone for military action after ultimatum because he said he felt it was necessary to establish for all time in Indonesia that open rebellion was not way to accomplish objectives.

5. I expressed appreciation my government for advance notification and careful planning of GOI to insure adequate protection US persons and property. He said it was a great relief to him that things had turned out as they had. He also informed me that unit of General Sukanto’s mobile brigade would be assigned to CALTEX area to assure continuance such protection.

6. Since this was first opportunity since receipt Deptel 2545,² March 10 to bring up point re SEATO directly with Prime Minister I took occasion to do so, emphasizing I was certain in his mind this was water over dam, but I nevertheless wished to record with him personally my government’s assurances SEATO character along lines outlined in reference Department’s telegram. Prime Minister expressed appreciation.

7. In moving against Communists within Indonesia, Prime Minister expressed importance build-up of Democratic Trade Union make possible clip SOBSI claws.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/3–2158. Top Secret; Limit Distribution.
1. In telegram 2978, March 10, Jones reported on a conversation he had that day with Djuanda. During their talk, the Prime Minister stated that an agreement had been reached between Hatta and Sukarno on the formation of a new government with Sukarno as President and Hatta as Vice President. He explained that this agreement would not be announced for 2 weeks in order to give time for the Central Government to exert authority in Sumatra. (Ibid., 756D.00/3–1058) See Supplement.
2. In telegram 2545, March 10, the Department noted that recent private and public statements by Sukarno and Subandrio indicated “underlying area of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of U.S. policy towards Indonesia.” It suggested that Jones should stress to Sukarno that the “U.S. had no desire draw Indonesia into SEATO. This policy remains unchanged.” Jones was also to remind Sukarno that “History of U.S. relations with Indonesia, as well as with India and Burma, bear ample testimony on sincerity this policy. SEATO has no objective other than mutual defense. It is not and cannot become an instrument of interference in the domestic affairs of any nation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/2–2858)