44. Editorial Note
On March 20 at the 359th meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles opened his intelligence briefing with a discussion of developments in Indonesia:
“The Director of Central Intelligence indicated that he would first go over briefly the strategic developments in Indonesia over the last week. These were hard to evaluate. Our intelligence sources describe the events as something like a chess game. It was in any event a strange kind of war. After Mr. Allen Dulles had dealt with the situation at Medan and at Pakanbaru, Secretary Dulles inquired whether there was any solid evidence that fighting was continuing in the Medan area. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that there had apparently been little contact fighting on the ground, and that such losses as the dissidents had sustained had been occasioned by strafing from the air.
“Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that there had been no change in the situation on the southwest coast, which was still held firmly by the dissidents, with no attempt yet at a landing by Djakarta forces. In South Sumatra, Colonel Barlian, the commander, was still proclaiming his neutrality. Mr. Dulles felt that he might have gone over to the rebels if they could have held Medan after they captured it. Turning to the Celebes, Mr. Dulles indicated that the northern areas were still strongly held by the dissidents under Lt. Col. Sumual.
[Page 81]“The President inquired whether any portion of Borneo had been affected by the civil war. Mr. Dulles replied in the negative, and stated that the Djakarta forces still held Borneo, although they held it somewhat thinly. He then went on to point out that in recent days the dissident leaders had become very belligerent in their public statements, despite their difficult military situation. These statements did not, of course, help in realizing the possibility of a negotiated peace. Nor was there very much evidence of real fighting. Very poor communications facilities made it difficult for the dissidents to mount and sustain a concerted military operation.
“The President inquired about the character of the terrain in the area where the fighting was occurring, and asked Mr. Dulles to provide a brief report on this subject at the next Council meeting. Apropos of the comment that the dissidents lacked the means of effective communication, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Mr. Dulles replied that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the great need of the dissidents was for aircraft, which they totally lacked. The President found it difficult to grasp what use aircraft would be in jungle fighting. Mr. Dulles pointed out that aircraft could be used against the very few roads in Sumatra. The President replied that he would have imagined that the kind of roads to be found in the fighting area could readily be repaired after they had been bombed.
“Mr. Dulles concluded his comments on Indonesia by indicating that the Soviets have already delivered to Djakarta ten small merchant vessels. Moreover, Djakarta expects from Prague early in April IL–28 light bombers and MiG–15 and –17 fighter aircraft. The crews to man these planes were already being trained in Egypt and Czechoslovakia. Receipt of these aircraft, together with trained crews, could produce a serious change in the military balance in the near future.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, March 21 ; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)