Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

46. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, March 21, 1958, 10 p.m.

3312. Dr. Hatta welcomed me warmly when I called at his home at 5 p.m. today.¹ We talked for more than an hour covering most of current issues at least briefly. In summary Hatta appeared optimistic as to possibility of reaching agreement with Sukarno on formation of new government on terms satisfactory to himself but somewhat pessimistic as to bringing about early cessation of conflict in Sumatra. Sukarno had written him recently saying he wanted third meeting in near future, he said. Hatta displayed none of fuzziness of thinking indicated by quotations available here from his Foreign Affairs article.²

Hatta said he and Sukarno had fundamental disagreement on how to cope with Communist problem. Sukarno was deeply worried about PKI’s growing strength and believed that Communist gains made entirely on basis promises which they not required fulfill. Sukarno therefore thinks Communists should be brought into government and be forced accept responsibility for their promises. Their failure would weaken them by showing them up. Hatta said he entirely disagreed with Sukarno’s view and repeatedly pointed out to him that PKI not conventional political party and would use position in government to burrow into army and bureaucracy.

Nevertheless Hatta said he believes Sukarno even willing to yield to him on this critical point and is prepared in principle to give him power and responsibility for forming government. I asked Hatta about current status his personal relationship with Sukarno. Hatta indicated there was no personal acrimony in his relations with Sukarno and spoke of latter in dispassionate and understanding terms.

Issue on which previous Sukarno–Hatta talks have floundered, [foundered?] Hatta said, was constitutional framework for next government. Hatta stated that this was no mere legal quibble but reached down to basic power factors in Indonesian politics. Hatta said he unwilling to form government if he must clear important questions with political party leaders in Parliament since parties in their present state development tend to place patronage above other issues. Therefore unless Hatta can bypass parties he thinks he will be unable to take necessary steps to eliminate corruption and lay foundations for orderly development of economy. Hatta said that Sukarno did not seem personally opposed to “presidential” Cabinet envisaged by Hatta as opposed to Parliamentary form, but was representing PNI objections which Hatta said are strong.

While Hatta seemed convinced that restoration of his partnership with Sukarno based on exclusion of Communists from government was possible, he said that military problem much more difficult to solve. Hatta said he does not know how long military struggle will last but fears it will be protracted. He believes that Padang group will put up a great resistance on one hand, and army headquarters is adamant on necessity for re-establishing what it considers primarily problem of military discipline.

Hatta said he thought Djuanda Cabinet should remain in office until he and Sukarno agree on next Cabinet. In this connection Hatta said that in his earlier talks with Sukarno they had not reached point of agreeing on personalities for next government. Although Hatta did not respond to my query as to what parties would be represented, he indicated that certain types of politicians in present Cabinet would be excluded.

On subject of National Council, he had told Sukarno he had no objection to use of term but would not agree to presidential appointment of members. He was willing to have council in form of pre-Senate with, However, purely advisory powers (since no such body provided for in constitution) and with member selected from regions by provincial legislatures. Sukarno, he said, had agreed to this.³

He said Indonesia would be faced with many problems when stable government was finally established because printing press had been running so freely. Also there was considerable hoarding of currency in country due to lack of confidence in present situation and lack of goods to buy. Under stable government this money would come out of hiding and create additional inflationary pressures, he believed. He was currently working on a plan to solve this problem, he said.

Second immediate problem would be that of rice. He emphasized that most difficult aspect this problem was distribution rather than supply. Third major problem area was economic development with a view ultimately to raising standard of living. He said he had had many arguments with Sukarno on this subject, having advocated that way to fight Communism was with positive program so that people could see accomplishments rather than negative approach favored by Sukarno in past and described above. He indicated substantial outside assistance would be required.

Hatta emphasized several tragic aspects of current situation:

(1) Division of country with anti-Communist fighting anti-Communist, thus giving greater opportunity to Communists. He pointed out that one of strongest anti-Communists in country was Nasution. He said Communists referred to Dr. Hatta as enemy number one and Nasution as enemy number two.

(2) Wasting of resources in military conflict that were so badly needed in solution serious economic problems of country.

(3) Sacrifice of outstandingly capable leaders such as Sjafruddini, Natsir and others. He said somehow these men must be re-integrated into public life.

(4) Split in Masjumi Party and serious weakening in Masjumi Party on Java resulting from conflict.

Commenting on PKI infiltration army, Hatta said despite clever approach it had not succeeded in reaching more than 10%. PKI method in dealing with army, he said, was not to ask soldiers to join PKI or preach Communism to them or seek support but to do exactly reverse—tell soldiers that PKI was interested in them, that it knew all about their poor pay and bad living conditions and that its program was to remedy these.

I raised question with him as to possibility united front of non-Commie parties. Repeated efforts had been made to accomplish this, he said, but each time clash of personalities had prevented. However, he planned to continue such efforts and was receiving much encouragement from younger Party leaders, particularly in PNI, who believed this essential to save their party and prevent further PKI gains.

Re General Sukanto and mobile brigade I asked him whether he thought its divorce from politics included neutrality in event of Commies resorting to open violence. He replied emphatically in the negative. Mobile brigade could be counted on in event of trouble of this kind, he assured me.

Hatta indicated he would like to see me again soon to discuss economic problems and program in greater detail.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/3–2158. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections.
1. Jones summarized this conversation in Indonesia: The Possible Dream, pp. 126–127.
2. Reference is to Hatta’s article, “Indonesia Between the Power Blocs,” Foreign Affairs, XXXVI (April 1958), pp. 480–490.
3. [text not declassified]