Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

43. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, March 19, 1958, 9 a.m.

3230. At Bogor Palace this morning I had approximately an hour and a half’s conversation with President Sukarno during which he complained vigorously regarding lack of understanding in US of him and his position, particularly with ref to communism.¹ Sukarno had nothing new or startling to say, replaying old records to large extent, but I am reporting conversation fully because of nuances and shifts of emphasis which may have significance.

President seemed his old enthusiastic, jubilant self, albeit he looked older than when he visited US, his face more rugged and lined although not so haggard as in Time, cover portrait.² He welcomed me with great cordiality, extended both hands and chatted volubly during first few moments while coffee and cake were being served.

After coffee he grew suddenly serious and asked, “Well, how are things?” I parried by answering in a personal vein and turned question back to him.

President referred to his response to my credential presentation,³ then quoted Frank Graham⁴ as saying, “Indo is strategic in place and in time—politically, militarily and economically”. US should recognize importance of Indo. Relations between our two countries are not and have not been what they should be, he said. There is a lack of understanding between us that I regret. He cited failure of US to support Indo on West New Guinea and general impression that people in US had that he was Communist and that present govt was Communist-inclined. He referred specifically to Minister of Education Prijono and said he was no Communist, that he received the Stalin Peace Prize because of his educational work in the field of peace; Minister of Vet Affairs Saleh, he said, was a left-wing nationalist but no Communist; Minister Hanifi was only one in Cabinet who could really be called fellow traveler, though not, he felt certain, a member of PKI.

Another factor in this lack of understanding, he said, was Indo request for arms to which there had been no response.

As for himself, he was no Communist. He stood firmly and Indo stood firmly on the Pantjasila.⁵ (As defined in preamble of constitution: (1) divine omnipotence, (2) humanity, (3) national consciousness, (4) democracy and (5) social justice.) He said he was referred to as “Creator of Pantjasila”, that was an exaggeration—the Pantjasila “had been dug out of the soil of Indo”. He, it was true, had been the instrument. He said he recognized there were two political elements in Indo endeavoring to destroy the Pantjasila: (1) Fanatical Moslems and (2) Communists.

There were three basic policies under which Indo was operating: these were (1) Pantjasila, (2) neutralism as we called it or active independence as he called it or policy of non-alignment as Nasser of Egypt called it, (3) restoration of West Irian to Indon Republic. These three policies he could assure us would “never, never change”.

Indo was endeavoring to stride across centuries in few years, he said, and then reviewed his trip to US, Soviet Russia and Commie China in 1956.⁶ He pointed out that US was so far advanced economically and industrially that Indo had no hope of catching up, that Soviet Russia too was in an advanced state of development industrially, but that Commie China, which had been “a miserable country” only 8 years ago, had made tremendous advance and that he had been greatly impressed by what he had seen there. His conclusions, he emphasized, were also the conclusions of Hatta and Minister of Public Works Noor of the Masjumi Party, who had visited Commie China after his recent visit to US.

“When I say that methods adopted by Commie China in achieving this development may hold lessons for Indo, I do not include their political doctrine,” he said. “This I reject.” But rejecting of their political philosophy did not mean he could not gain ideas on economic front.

“Americans do not seem to understand this” he complained. “I am called a Communist by American press and even Secretary Dulles said that Indonesia was drifting towards Communism. I am not a Communist. Every word I said in America I still stand by. I tried to point out that Nationalism was the fire that was sweeping Asia and this is true. I am a Nationalist but no Communist”.

At this point I interjected and made two points:

(1) that Communist-China was country in which individual freedom had been lost—Merdeka had been destroyed—and where only 1-3/4 percent of people were Communists, led by handful of leaders and this small handful was forcing its will upon the vast majority. I was confident that Indonesians did not want to follow this road.

(2) that I did not think His Excellency was a Communist and neither did most Americans—certainly none of those who knew him did, but I said it is difficult for Americans to understand growth of Communism within your country and to understand why steps are not taken to reduce Communist influence.

President picked this up immediately and said that US must share responsibility, that our position was major factor in growth of PKI, Indonesian people did not understand America’s failure to help Indonesia achieve one of its basic national aspirations—that of regaining West Irian—whereas Soviet Russia and other Communist countries supported Indonesia on this issue right down the line. He then repeated what he has said frequently in the past—if US would change its position on West Irian he could change this situation in a moment, snapping his fingers to emphasize point.

“This is true and yet America stands mute!” he said. “Mute! and why? Why can’t America change its position on this one issue?”

I observed I knew he understood our position quite well—that this was a bilateral dispute between two of our friends, Indonesia and The Netherlands, and that this was one issue on which we must assume a position of neutrality. “This I do not understand,” he shouted “if you changed your position little Holland would be annoyed—yes, but how do you balance that against the annoyance of Indonesia?”

I admitted that Indonesia was a bigger country of greater resources but I said there was a principle here that one did not desert one’s old friends. I pointed out that our position had not won US popularity with the Dutch either. However, President must understand our position clearly—cases of this kind in which it is very difficult for a country to take sides in a bilateral controversy occur not infrequently. I referred to Kashmir and pointed out in this dispute Indonesia had, despite much pressure from both India and Pakistan, refused to take sides.

President quickly changed subject and reverted to Communism within Indonesia. Indonesian people are not Communists, he said. Even most of those who vote PKI are not Communists. They are left-wing nationalists. He cited case of what is called the “Holy City,” that section of Surabaya in which is located the Sacred Mosque of Ampel. “These people are 100 percent Moslem,” he said. “They pray five times a day. But the Holy City voted 100 percent Communist!” He also cited case of two leaders he knew in PKI who were strict Moslems. I observed that Islam and Communism seemed to me as oil and water and I found it difficult to understand basis on which PKI leaders referred to could rationalize their position. In case of Surabaya Moslem, I could understand because they had no idea as to meaning of Communism. I pointed out that PKI orators in Surabaya carried copies of Koran with them and quoted it in their speeches. This, I emphasized, came under heading of deception rather than conviction.

I observed further that I was prepared to agree with him that most Indonesians that voted PKI were not Communists but Nationalists. This, However, did not reduce danger of Communist takeover since party could equally well exploit vote for PKI whether cast by Commie or non-Commie and I assured him US Government did not believe that Indonesian people would ever willingly go down road to Communism. Instead it was our fear that if Communists’ power within country was permitted to grow, ultimately time would come when, even with minority, Communists might stage coup and take over. This was not new to history of Communist expansion.

I then cited Eastern Europe’s experience, using Czechoslovakia as prime example. I pointed out that President Benes had felt it necessary in reconstruction of Czechoslovakia after war to have represented in government all elements of political community including Communists. In period from 1945 to 1948, I emphasized, Communists posed as champions of national freedom and independent foreign policy, took great care to operate within framework of Czechoslovak national psychology and appeared to make no moves which were not generally politically acceptable, but when time came Communists believed they were strong enough they moved quickly to take over. I was sure he knew that Jan Masaryk was found dead in Foreign Office, generally believed to have been assassinated by the Communists and that President Benes, broken body and spirit, his influence gone, retired to country. Sukarno nodded soberly at this point and it was clear parallel was not lost upon him.

He then raised question as to why we were so worried about Indonesia’s percentage of Communist votes. “You aren’t worried about France and Italy yet theirs is higher.” I pointed out that at present time Communist vote in France and Italy is decreasing as compared with earlier years.

“We were worried about communism in these countries,” I said. “That is what the Marshall Plan was all about: to enable these European countries to rehabilitate themselves after the war, regain lost standards of living and give people hope once more. We think it accomplished its purpose. But in Indonesia, the strength of the Communists is increasing, not decreasing.”

President turned to his well-known concept of guided democracy and referred to Secretary Dulles’ remarks on this subject, complaining that his idea had been generally misunderstood in US. “This is no Communist conception”, he insisted. “This is my idea to correct a trouble from which we suffer—over-democracy”. He claimed that there are 47 political parties in Indonesia, each representing special points of view or special interests. “This is nonsense”, he said, emphasizing that no country can function with its people divided like this. No government can act. His concept of guided democracy was one which would correct some of these evils, reducing number of political parties. It was designed to correct evils in body politic not destroy democracy.

Only time President showed violent emotional reaction during conversation was when he referred to Secretary Dulles’ observation on belligerent status of rebels.⁷ “This is way to Hell”, he said tensely, and repeated himself. Reaction to such a move would be serious throughout Indonesia but would not be confined to Indonesia, he said.

I took liberty of picking up Secretary’s cue in Dulte 11 from Manila,⁸ repeated information Djakarta unnumbered March 14, pointing out that early settlement of internal conflict would avoid necessity for facing this issue. Sukarno said nothing but looked thoughtful. I am confident planting of this seed served good purpose.

I then queried as to whether President had anything he wished to say on subject of possible settlement in current conflict, prefacing my question by emphasizing US desire to see cessation civil war and our strong conviction dismemberment of Republic of Indonesia against interest of entire free world. President reacted strongly to this, “yes”, he said, “this would be against interest of whole world”. He then said, “we will reach a settlement as soon as rebellion is quelled”. He pointed out that Central Government was not using great force or violence and did not wish to but that it must reestablish its position and authority on Sumatra. He had tried to settle controversy as soon as he returned from Japan but actions of rebels in proclaiming revolutionary government had made this impossible. He then said head of NU⁹ had last week come to him with request for a conference of all political party leaders, including the PKI, he added significantly, and Hatta. He was considering this but had not yet made up his mind.

I took advantage of appearance of President’s aide, indicating other visitors were waiting, to say to President that I felt we had great many things to discuss and I hoped this would be one of a series of conversations. President seemed pleased and readily agreed, adding that he had intended to suggest this had I not done so. I assured him that I considered most important aspect of my mission establishment of close understanding between our two countries, that I appreciated very much his frankness and I felt that as between friends this was the way to establish understanding and discuss matters on which even friends might disagree.

President smiled and said he wanted to see me often. Would I prefer to see him next in Bogor or Djakarta? I indicated this was a matter of his convenience. He replied Bogor and he would tell me when. As I walked out, he added, “keep close to me,” and repeated it for emphasis. Before my departure he introduced me to Indonesian Ambassadors to Pakistan and Yugoslavia who were visiting palace and then took me on inspection tour of palace and to view his collection of paintings. At entrance to palace under porte cochere were parked two bubble helicopters which President now uses to fly back and forth to Djakarta.

Comment: Some of immediate impressions I had of conversation were:

(1) Sukarno appeared eager to present his case fully and frankly, showed great cordiality and seemed to be demonstrating genuine interest in keeping door to US open.

(2) Snowed no indication of readiness to compromise current conflict; in this connection avoided subject of his relations with Hatta which is generally conceded to be key to solution.

(3) Showed great concern at possibility US recognition belligerent status for revolutionary regime.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/3–1958. Secret. Transmitted in four sections.
1. The Department transmitted suggestions for this talk with Sukarno in telegram 2635, March 16. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 990) See Supplement.
2. Reference is to the March 10, 1958, issue of Time magazine.
3. Jones presented his credentials to Sukarno on March 11. In response to his speech, Sukarno said that he took back no word of what he said when he was last in the United States in May 1956. (Telegram 3031 from Djakarta, March 11; Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/3–1158) See Supplement.
4. Former U.S. representative on the Good Offices Committee of the U.N. Security Council, 1947–1948, which had been formed to help settle the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.
5. The Pantjasila, or Five Principles, were first set forth by Sukarno in a speech of June 1, 1945, and were endorsed in the Indonesian constitution of 1950 as the basis for the Indonesian state.
6. Sukarno arrived in the United States on May 16, 1956, for a 3-day State visit, following which he made a 14-day tour of the country. Between late-August and mid-October 1956, Sukarno visited the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and several Eastern European countries.
7. See footnote 2, Document 41.
8. Document 38.
9. Probably a reference to Idham Chalid.