Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

42. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, March 15, 1958, 9 p.m.

3174. Taipei for Robertson. Embtels 3172¹ and 3173.² Foreign Minister two-hour interview this morning continued outline of Indonesian thinking with respect to problems facing country begun in first interview (Embtel 2998).³ He expressed appreciation for American aid but said most important thing to develop was mutual confidence between us and our two countries and he hoped we should be able to accomplish much in this direction over period of time. He reverted to question of West New Guinea and pleaded for some “leniency” in our position on this question. This was especially important, he said, because of its emotional content within Indonesia and also because Sukarno has fixation on subject and laid greater emphasis on it than almost all other questions. He said Dutch had misjudged Indonesian reaction and had showed little imagination in their approach to this and other problems. Indonesians actually like Dutch people, he said, and even now it was not too late to restore Dutch-Indonesian economic relationship. He said he was not asking me to comment at this time but hoped that in my conversation with Sukarno I might be able to handle this question in such a way as to give Sukarno at least some hope that US might be able to do something in present impasse.

He then turned to subject of communism, referred again to his conversation with Secretary Dulles which apparently made a great impression on him, and reiterated strongly what he had said earlier to effect that he and others in government were alert to communist threat in Indonesia. Leaders of present government as well as political party leaders in Indonesia viewed with trepidation approaching elections toward end of 1959 because of growing communist strength indicated in local elections. There was no doubt, he said, that in Indonesia Communists did not have “balance of power” but they did have what he termed “balance of solidarity”. PKI was a vigorous, well financed, shrewdly directed, hard-hitting organization and that so far none of the non-communists political parties separately could boast of such effective organization.

Foreign Minister reverted to question of mutual understanding between our two countries which he had very much on his mind. He pleaded for appreciation on US side that Indonesian way might be different from US way but our objectives were same in respect to their desire to establish and maintain free and independent republic in which communism represented no threat. He indicated settlement between Hatta and Sukarno was in making. He emphasized that this would not mean that Hatta and Sukarno saw eye to eye on situation, but in his view this might well prove to be virtue. If successful compromise were reached, there would have to be some face-saving on both sides, he said, touching then on sensitive subject of guided democracy. Since this had never been defined, he indicated that phrase might be preserved but interpretation altered. It would no longer be democracy guided by Sukarno but, recognizing that Indonesian people had much to learn, it would be altered to educational concept in which all Indonesian leadership would participate. This still is fuzzy but what he was obviously trying to say was rose by any other name smells as sweet and to convince me that in their own way Indonesians would tackle problem of communism and come out on top.

As I was about to depart Foreign Minister again said earnestly, “Let us work to achieve a meeting of the minds between us. We should be able to understand each other. America was once a colony too.”

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/3–1558. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Taipei.
1. In telegram 3172, March 15, Jones reported on other aspects of his conversation with Foreign Minister Subandrio that morning. The telegram primarily concerned their discussion regarding the military situation in Sumatra and its effect on the American oil companies. (Ibid., 756D.00/3–1558) See Supplement.
2. Document 41.
3. Document 34.