Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, March 10, 1958, 3 p.m.

2998. Manila pass COMNAVPHIL and thirteen AF; COMNAVPHIL pass CINCPAC 92. Department pass AFCIN–1A1. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Manila for MLG. Instead of my first courtesy call on Foreign Minister Subandrio Saturday morning March 8 being confined to usual amenities he utilized occasion to outline his philosophy as to development of Indonesian Republic, to comment on current situation, and make a strong plea for US understanding and cooperation in critical days ahead. He covered briefly in turn principal elements in current Indonesian situation: Growth of Communism, position of Sukarno, West New Guinea, and rebel government, without However referring to Dutch.

Indonesia must work out her own solution to her own problems without outside interference and his nation would not be cast in image of any other nation, he said. America must also understand that Indonesia’s foreign policy of active independence was just that. He referred to Secretary’s and Walter Robertson’s comments to him on subject of Communism on occasion his visit to Washington¹ and said that he did not need to be warned against Communism. “We recognize that if Communists’ strength continues to grow here they will destroy us,” he said earnestly. “No Indonesian wants to live under Communism.” He blamed selfishness and corruption of many politicians of non-Communist parties for increase in Communist strength, saying in critical period they had been more interested in lining pockets than in developing strong republic thus creating situation ripe for Communist exploitation. Finally, political parties had awakened to situation and he indicated united front was developing on this subject.

With amazing frankness he turned to subject of Sukarno, pointing out that US press was characterizing him more and more as Communist. “Let me be frank,” he said. “Whether we like it or not, Sukarno is an element in situation that must be reckoned with. He cannot be gotten rid of. But Indonesia is bigger than Sukarno, Hatta and all the others.” He sketched portrait of Sukarno as a sensitive man, a brilliant orator with strong hold on masses, but a man who loved fleshpots. “Let him remain and have his pleasures,” he said. “He is no Communist. He is first, last and always Indonesian Nationalist.” But he indicated Sukarno’s reaction to being called Communist was one of indignation at the name calling and he said this plays into Communist hands. They are shrewd enough to exploit this and other US actions in such way as to drive Sukarno emotionally away from west.

Reading between these lines partly in light of what Djuanda told me subsequently, it seems clear Foreign Minister was spelling out hoped for solution to present impasse in which Sukarno would retain titular title but would be less of power factor.

Turning to West New Guinea for moment, he related this issue primarily to Sukarno’s emotional reactions in such way that he seemed to be saying something might be done about this except for Sukarno. Or, he might have been simply appealing delicately for further US consideration of Indonesia viewpoint. But I have never noted delicacy in Indonesia approach this subject and inclined to view this was effort give indication that door might be opened by Indonesian Government if Sukarno could be calmed down.

On rebels Foreign Minister was less tenuous and more forthright. He said government had made up its mind its authority must be reestablished on Sumatra and military force would be used to quell rebellion. He spoke in uncomplimentary terms of rebel colonels calling them adventurers who were feathering their own nests financially.

Aside from appropriate remarks regarding my pleasure at returning to his lovely country et cetera, I made only two substantive points in our exchange:

(1) As to Sukarno, I said I too believed he was not a Communist [and?] experts at this game had been using him. Foreign Minister nodded, saying PKI were past masters at playing up to Sukarno and giving him what he wanted.

(2) US had no desire to remake Indonesia in our own image; it was our policy to help in any way we could without interfering in internal affairs of Indonesia, we did believe strongly that it was in interest of Indonesian people, US, and free world—“indeed”, I added, “all mankind”—for your important country to remain free and independent (I referred to magic word of Indonesia—“Merdeka”) and said it was US objective to help Indonesia retain Merdeka. I believed that this created strong identity of interest between our two countries.

Foreign Minister expressed satisfaction with my response and then observed significantly that it was a pleasure to talk with Americans because one could speak frankly and discuss problems with viewpoint of both sides being taken into consideration. He said he had found in his experience as Ambassador to Soviet Union and subsequent relations here that one could not do that with Soviets. “Soviets know what they want, say what they want and that ends it,” he said. One cannot discuss matters or have free exchange of views.

Comment:Subandrio, whom I had not met before, is most intelligent, articulate man. While above may have been skillfully designed purely for American consumption, he spoke with great earnestness and fervor and seemed sincere. His references to Sukarno were most surprising, indicating attitude of mind, even as between Cabinet members of this Sukarno-appointed government, that Sukarno himself represented real problem from their point of view. Recognizing that Asians frequently say what they think one wants to hear, nevertheless these personal allusions to President went much farther than anything I have ever heard from Indonesians in past and may well have significance.²

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/3–1058. Secret. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to The Hague, Manila, Canberra, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore.
1. Dulles and Subandrio met in Washington on October 4, 1957; a memorandum of that conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXII, pp. 471–475.
2. Jones met with Subandrio again on March 12. Their conversation primarily concerned military aspects of the situation in Sumatra. According to telegram 3058 from Djakarta, March 12, the discussion in part was as follows: “Ambassador then said US Government deeply appreciated cooperation to date in form advance information and assurances that effects, lives and property are being and would be protected and asked this be conveyed Prime Minister as well as other points in conversation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/3–1258.) See Supplement.