Office of the Historian

35. Memorandum of Conversation0

US/Del/MC–2
Manila, March 12, 1958, 8 a.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FOURTH COUNCIL MEETING OF SEATO

Manila, Philippines

March 11–13, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • Secretary Dulles
    • Assistant Secretary Robertson
    • Ambassador Bohlen
  • Philippines
    • President Garcia
    • Acting Secretary Serrano

SUBJECT

  • Indonesian Situation

During breakfast this morning with President Garcia and Secretary Serrano, at which Assistant Secretary Robertson and Ambassador Bohlen accompanied the Secretary, there was a general discussion on the Indonesian situation.

[Page 64]

President Garcia and Secretary Serrano were very much concerned at the developing situation in Indonesia and were inclined to be extremely pessimistic as to the outcome. They appeared convinced from their information that Sukarno would succeed in crushing the rebellion by military force in a relatively short period of time and that as a result: (1) he would feel a deep debt of gratitude towards the Soviet Union and Communist China for the international support they had given him; and (2) for the same reason would feel very beholden to the Indonesian Communist Party for its support; and (3) that having successfully quelled by force a rebellion he would be disposed to use force against any form of opposition in the future to his personal power and policies. President Garcia on this point said that from his knowledge of Asian psychology he believed that a military victory over the rebels would swing most of the uncommitted masses of Indonesia to the Sukarno bandwagon.

The Secretary and Mr. Robertson, while agreeing that this was a possibility not to be excluded, felt that there were other factors in a confused situation which might work against that result. For example, it was by no means clear that Sukarno would be able to dispose of the rebels so easily, and an extended period of guerrilla warfare might ensue. If this happened there was a distinct possibility that Sukarno would be disposed to find some form of compromise which would in effect limit his personal power and force him to eliminate the Communists from the government. They pointed out that Hatta, who had consistently and stubbornly refused to cooperate with Sukarno unless he cleaned out the Communists from his administration, was a key factor in the situation. The Secretary mentioned in the conversation that it was clear that the rebels did not have much military equipment since they were receiving no help from any government, but were forced to pick up what they could from the commercial market. He also said that he thought that the support of the rebels in the Masjumi Party was strong and that this might be a factor to produce the compromise deal to which they had referred.

It was apparent that President Garcia and Secretary Serrano were both extremely concerned and worried about the possible outcome of the Indonesian developments on the situation in the Philippines and the entire area of Southeast Asia.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 989. Top Secret. Drafted by Charles Bohlen and approved by Joseph N. Greene. The meeting was held at President Garcia’s residence.↩