Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, March 8, 1958, 10 p.m.

2969. Manila pass COMNAVPHIL and 13 AF. Department pass AFCIN–1A1, ACSI, CNO. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Manila for MLG. Deptel 2501.¹ In view of rapidly moving events here prior receipt of reference telegram I had already requested informal appointment with Djuanda and reference telegram was handed to me during conference with him at his home at which I reviewed points previously made as well as arguments in reference Department telegram and investment and market considerations emphasized by Arnold of CALTEX. Every effort was made to impress Prime Minister with serious repercussions military action this area as well as necessity for prior evacuation dependents in event thereof, but to no avail. Decision had been made as to military action, Djuanda said, and plan outlined in Embtel 2961² was only feasible evacuation program under circumstances obtaining.

I was accompanied by Arnold of CALTEX and Cottrell and Foreign Minister Subandrio was also present. Upon arrival Prime Minister greeted me cordially as an old friend and both he and Foreign Minister waved aside questions of protocol under current urgent circumstances. Prime Minister ushered group into living room and then took me aside in small sitting room for private talk. After exchange of appropriate courtesies he inquired as to whether I was familiar with the plan for evacuation and whether this plan was satisfactory to us. I pointed out that primary responsibility for this decision rested with CALTEX but that I had discussed plan thoroughly with Arnold and that we both considered it unsatisfactory in that if there were to be military action in area, dependents should be evacuated not merely held in camp at location which might become involved in hostilities. More satisfactory plan in CALTEX view with which I concurred was orderly evacuation of dependents by tankers down Siak River.

I underlined serious risks involved to dependents and consequently to US-Indonesian relations in leaving dependents in area which might become battleground. Djuanda replied that he too would have much preferred to have moved dependents out of the area but that timing of military action was such that this was impossible. He pointed out further that evacuation via Siak River tanker would (present) opportunity for rebels either to (a) sink tanker and thus obstruct passage on river or (b) follow along behind tankers and meet opposing forces farther downstream.

I then urged postponement or cancellation of proposed military action in accordance with point (1) reference telegram.³ I said my government found it very difficult to understand why Pakanbaru had been singled out as target for first military action against rebels.

Prime Minister then launched into long exposition of central government philosophy in which he made points that (1) government’s authority must be established on Sumatra; (2) solution must be reached which would preserve Sukarno from appearance of actual defeat yet reestablish authority and influence of Hatta in an anti-Communist government; (3) main reason for action thus was psychological though obviously economic reasons played part; (4) no damage should occur in Pakanbaru oil fields since they would not be military target and would not be occupied; (5) he did not wish CALTEX to close down and was confident that entire matter would be resolved within a week or two.

There was no disposition on anybody’s part to put any of dissidents in jail or even punish them, he said, except that dissident colonels would not be permitted to rejoin army.

When I pressed further point as to how much time we had in which to evacuate dependents under his plan or any other which CALTEX was willing to accept, he shook his head and replied, “Not much—you must start at once.”

We then adjourned to living room to join others where with permission of Prime Minister I outlined briefly points he had made. Arnold said time element was such it would be impossible to evacuate dependents in tankers using river except to extent tankers were already up river at Prawang. He also emphasized that unless tankers could continue to use river, operations would have to be shut down. Questioned by Prime Minister as to seriousness of a week or two shutdown, Arnold replied that unless there were damage to installations, principal problem was one of markets. With a surplus of crude currently on the market any introduction of uncertainty in Indonesian supply would result in purchasers seeking sources elsewhere and market would have to be rebuilt from scratch. After further discussion, Arnold concluded that in view of Prime Minister’s assurances and lacking any alternative, there was nothing to do but accept situation and under protest implement GOI evacuation plan. He informed Prime Minister he would get out instructions immediately to this effect and order his tankers to proceed down river to Pakning.

After conference with Djuanda both Arnold of CALTEX and Berlin of STANVAC dispatched instructions to carry out evacuation plan in accordance GOI.

Comment: After careful consideration of all elements that can be assessed here, I believe CALTEX and STANVAC are following best available course of action to ensure protection of both American lives and property. Least satisfactory feature of plan is concentration of dependents in Rumbai camp but if Prime Minister’s assurances can be accepted, they should be safe there. Only alternative course of action I can see at moment would be helicopter lift for which preparations might be made in event of further deterioration in situation.⁴

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 856F.2553/3–85S. Secret; Niact. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Manila, The Hague, Canberra, Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and CINCPAC.
1. Telegram 2501, March 7, requested Jones to bring a number of additional points to the attention of the Indonesian Government with regard to the planned occupation of Pakanbaru in an effort to dissuade the Indonesian Government from undertaking any military action. (Ibid., 846F.2553/3–758) See Supplement.
2. Telegram 2961, March 8, reported on a conversation that day between Subandrio and Cottrell during which Subandrio outlined the Indonesian Government’s plan for the evacuation of Americans from Pakanbaru. (Department of State, Central Files, 256F.1122/3–858) See Supplement.
3. Point 1 of telegram 2501 reads: “Military economic psychological reasons for singling out Pakanbaru for target first military action against rebels remains unclear Washington.”

4. In a March 9 letter Acting Secretary Herter informed Dulles of recent developments with regard to Indonesia. The letter was transmitted in telegram Tedul 5 to Manila where Dulles was for the SEATO Council meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 256F.1122/3–958)

   In telegram 3264 to Manila (sent to Djakarta as telegram 2522), March 9, the Department requested that Jones inform Djuanda that as a precautionary measure it was taking the necessary steps to ensure that U.S. facilities would be available for the immediate evacuation of all Americans from central Sumatra. (Ibid.) See Supplement.