Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

252. Special National Intelligence Estimate⁰

SNIE 65–60

Washington, May 3, 1960.

THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK IN INDONESIA

The Problem

To estimate the likelihood and consequences of a coup in Indonesia during the next two or three months.¹

Conclusions

1. Political power in Indonesia has become increasingly polarized between the Army and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The economy is in a sad state and popular discontent, particularly in urban areas, is increasing. Sukarno, after nearly a year of complete formal power, has made no constructive move to solve the country’s problems. He has taken some steps which tend to weaken Nasution’s position and to increase the political potential of the PKI. An increasing number of political leaders, and some military leaders as well, believe that Sukarno’s power must be greatly reduced or eliminated if Indonesia’s economic and political decline is to be halted and an eventual Communist takeover averted. (Paras. 6, 8–11, 16)

2. Since Sukarno’s departure for a world tour on 1 April, Nasution has almost certainly been seeking to organize public support and backing from military and political leaders. He probably hopes to build enough strength to prevent a diminution of the Army’s position and to force Sukarno to accept restrictions on his monopoly of political power and a parliamentary formula which would bolster the anti-Communist elements in the government. He may also be attempting, in this process, to ascertain the backing he would have for a move to seize power. (Paras. 21–23)

3. Nasution may find that he has created a situation, wittingly or unwittingly, in which he will have to move to seize power or face dismissal. Thus the odds favoring a coup attempt by Nasution during the next two or three months have probably gone up, but we believe that the chances are still less than even that a coup will take place. In any event, relations between Sukarno and Nasution will probably be marked by growing suspicion and tension.² (Paras. 22–23)

4. If Nasution should attempt a coup in the near future with the support of most of the Army, we believe that he would probably succeed. (Para. 26)

5. In the absence of firm and unified opposition from Army and political leaders, President Sukarno will probably proceed to reorganize his cabinet, giving stronger representation to the Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU). He may also include one or two PKI members. Although Sukarno will continue to rely upon the Army to counterbalance the PKI and to play an important administrative role, he will seek to diminish the Army’s political influence and will probably attempt to curtail Nasution’s power. (Para. 27)

[Here follows the Discussion section; see Supplement.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, this SNIE was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the IAC concurred with the estimate on May 3, except representatives of the AEC and the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

   Parsons recommended in an April 21 memorandum to Cumming that a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Indonesia be prepared in “view of the current political tension in Indonesia and the seeming possibility that a move to depose the present government might occur.” Parsons believed that the estimate should be prepared within a week “to be of maximum usefulness.” (Ibid., SPA Files: Lot 64 D 469, Memoranda, Jan/June 1960)

1. In telegram 3052, April 28, the Embassy offered its analysis of Indonesian internal developments. (Ibid., Central Files, 798.00/4–2860) See Supplement.
2. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that since Sukarno’s departure 1 April 1960 on a world tour, there have been evidences of political maneuvering, primarily below the Nasution level. Conflicting reports have been received regarding prospects for a move by Nasution with Army support to seize power. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that while the temptation to take direct political action may exist, such a move by Nasution is unlikely at this time. [Footnote in the source text.]