253. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
3180. CINCPAC for POLAD. Paris for USRO. Polto 3 sent Department Polto 2227, sent The Hague Polto 88, sent London Polto 482.1
Assume reference cited in reference Polto telegram is Djakarta’s 31072 to Department rather than Djakarta’s 3071.
Embassy fully appreciates difficulties which attempt obtain NATO statement might create, recognizes that most which may be obtainable might be Dutch unilateral statement plus selection of non-provocative route for naval visit.
Embassy does not believe there is anything to gain by private statement to Indonesians as to US confidence in peaceful intentions of Dutch. Most serious aspect of problem is not, of course, assuaging fear within GOI that Dutch may be planning aggression. Real problem is to minimize opportunity for Indonesian Communists to exploit issue to their own advantage and to detriment of other major political elements within Indonesia which just now are in process of uniting against them for first time. Issue is creating diversion for Communists just when they most need one. Foregoing does not mean that fear of Dutch aggression is entirely artificial. Indonesians won independence in 1950 only after [Page 490] years of bloody fighting with the Dutch. Dutch are proposing to send naval force to West Irian which will for time being change entire balance of military power in Indonesian area. Dutch force apparently superior in fire power to both Indonesian Navy, Indonesian Air Force which possesses no carriers and only squadron or so of operational jets which have no base near enough to do battle in eastern reaches of country. Embassy’s impression is projected cruise force would in fact comprise naval, air power which may well rival or surpass anything Dutch could have brought to bear during fighting phase of Indonesian revolution. Any US statement to Indonesians that need have no worry in this situation likely to be ignored at best or more likely treated as evidence of partiality to Dutch in West Irian disputes.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–960. Confidential. Also sent to CINCPAC and repeated to The Hague, London, and Paris.↩
- This telegram of May 5 recommended that, from NATO’s point of view, any statement to the Indonesians should, in view of the likelihood of its becoming public, be limited to the following two points: “(1) Dutch, as NATO members, retain sovereign right to withdraw forces from NATO area, and (2) US has confidence in Dutch commitments re peaceful settlement disputes as UN member and NATO member just as it has confidence in Indonesian assurances.” (Ibid., 790.5856/5–560)↩
- Telegram 3107, May 3, reviewed the Netherlands position in the West New Guinea dispute. (Ibid., 656.9813/5–360) See Supplement.↩