Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

251. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Istanbul, May 3, 1960, 7:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Dutch Military Reinforcements for West New Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

• For the Netherlands
  • Dr. Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister
  • Dr. H.R. van Houten, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
• For the United States
  • The Secretary
  • EUR—Mr. Kohler
  • EUR/RA—Mr. Fessenden

Foreign Minister Luns opened the conversation by reviewing for the Secretary the history of Dutch actions in West New Guinea from the time of the 1949 Round Table Conference. Emphasizing the inadequacy of the Dutch defense forces in West New Guinea, Mr. Luns said that the Dutch Government had no choice but to dispatch the Karel Doorman and to send additional military and air force equipment and personnel.

Under these circumstances, the Dutch were concerned at what Mr. Luns termed the US lack of response and sympathy for the Dutch action. The Dutch did not like but were now resigned to United States policy toward Indonesia. Dutch acceptance of American military and economic support of the Indonesian Government did not mean, Mr. Luns said, that the US could ignore the interests of its ally in New Guinea. He recalled his conversation with Secretary Dulles in October, 1958,¹ and the Dutch belief at that time that Indonesia planned to attack West New Guinea in March, 1959. Mr. Luns said that Mr. Dulles had assured him that the last thing the US wanted was to see the Netherlands turn over West New Guinea to the Indonesians. Mr. Luns said that the United States had been convinced then of the danger of such an attack and that Secretary Dulles’ stem talk with Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio had deterred the Indonesians from taking overt action.

At the present time, Mr. Luns continued, there was absolute evidence of an Indonesian plan to take over West New Guinea by means of infiltration and subversion. The Dutch had clear evidence of six recent infiltrations by small bands of Indonesians, two of which had occurred in 1960. These infiltrations and subversive activities, in conjunction with the lack of Dutch defense forces, were undermining the morale of both the indigenous Papuans and the 15,000 Dutch resident in New Guinea.

Mr. Luns remarked that because the US had given the Dutch no military guarantee for New Guinea and because the territory was not covered by any regional security treaty, the Dutch had no recourse but to divert national forces to meet the imminent threat of Indonesian aggression.

Mr. Luns said that he had discussed the WNG problem with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and that he had emphasized the Dutch concern over the British sale of 1500 parachutes to Indonesia. [2-½ lines of source text not declassified] He noted that Foreign Minister Wigny had made a full statement on the Congo. Mr. Luns said that he had, however, been dissuaded from making such an exposition by Mr. van Houten.

Mr. Luns said that the Dutch Government was particularly disturbed by the reaction of a Departmental officer who had said that the Dutch action in reinforcing West New Guinea defenses was provocative and that the Dutch were “asking for trouble.” The officer reportedly had gone on to say that the Dutch were over-reacting and were over-excited because of the “barking of a few Indonesians.”²

The Dutch Foreign Minister appealed for a firmer US stand on the principle of the Dutch presence in West New Guinea. He remarked that both the UK and Australia had been firm on this point and the Dutch saw no reason why the US could not strengthen its position regarding Dutch sovereignty. He also asked that the US approach the Indonesians to set forth in clear fashion the limits beyond which the Indonesians could not go and to repeat Secretary Dulles’ warning against the use of force.

The Secretary replied that we had taken every opportunity, including reiteration at the time of each arms sale, to spell out to the Indonesian Government that the arms being sold them were to be used for internal security and legitimate self-defense. We had also repeatedly warned the Indonesians against the use of force. In view of the recent Indonesian propaganda regarding WNG, the Secretary said that he did not believe that the Dutch announcement of military reinforcements was inflammatory. With respect to Mr. Luns’ report of the comments of a Departmental officer, the Secretary said that these reported remarks should not be considered the policy of the United States Government. The Secretary assured Mr. Luns that we would again clearly state our position to the Indonesian Government and said that there had been absolutely no change in our West New Guinea policy which Secretary Dulles had stated to Mr. Luns in late 1958.

Mr. Luns said that he was very gratified to receive the Secretary’s reaffirmation of US policy. He asked whether he could summarize the US position at the moment by saying that the United States follows the situation with an open mind and an awareness of the dangers of the phased plan of the Indonesians for obtaining West New Guinea. The Secretary did not reply directly to this question but asked the best means by which the Department could obtain the latest Dutch intelligence information. Mr. Luns replied that this could best be effected through the Central Intelligence Agency.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656C.98/5–360. Secret. Approved by S on May 16. Secretary of State Herter and Foreign Minister Luns were in Istanbul for the NATO Council meeting May 1–4.
1. See Document 159.
2. No record of this conversation has been found.