159. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Statement for the Netherlands Foreign Minister

PARTICIPANTS

  • Dr. J.H. van Roijen, Netherlands Ambassador
  • Mr. David Ketel, Counselor, Embassy of the Netherlands
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Young
  • FE—Mr. Robertson
  • EUR—Mr. Jandrey
  • WE—Mr. Stabler

The Secretary handed to Ambassador Van Roijen the attached letter and statement for transmittal to Foreign Minister Luns in New York.1 [Page 295] The Secretary said he thought that the statement met the points in which he understood Mr. Luns was interested. We had really tried to be helpful.

After reading the statement, Dr. Van Roijen said that the first thought which occurred to him was what would the United States do if Indonesia did in fact use force against New Guinea. The Secretary replied that he could not give an advance commitment on what we would do if force were used without prior consultation with Congress and Congressional authorization. However, he could say that if force were used, the Dutch could undoubtedly count on our following the same pattern in dealing with that situation as we have followed in comparable cases elsewhere. However, since it was not possible at this time to get Congressional authorization, he could not make a formal statement to that effect. He recalled that the United States had acted vigorously to prevent territorial shifts by force. He said that our action in Lebanon, although it was primarily directed against indirect aggression, was an example of what he meant. He had told the Israelis, who had also sought advance commitments in the event force should be used against them, that they could take comfort from our actions in Lebanon. The Secretary said that in cases where we have taken military action we have had advance Congressional preparation and sanction. He did not doubt that we would help the Netherlands to the limit of our legal authority, but he could not put that in the statement. He believed that the statement, as now drafted, provided a good indication to the Netherlands and to Indonesia what our attitude would be with respect to the use of force.

Ambassador Van Roijen agreed that the statement clearly set forth our interest and concern with respect to the West New Guinea situation but he said that it was as if we were merely saying that we were against sin. He had doubts whether the statement would serve to quiet the fears which exist in the Netherlands, particularly in the Labor Party, that the Netherlands stands alone with respect to West New Guinea. Dr. Van Roijen recalled to the Secretary the background of the resolution on West New Guinea recently introduced into the Netherlands Parliament by the Labor Party2 and said that although the resolution had been defeated, the Labor Party had fully supported it. The Secretary said that he thought that the statement carried the clear implication that the Dutch do not stand alone with regard to West New Guinea. He stated that many people in Europe do not seem to realize that the Executive in this country is much less free than in other countries to make promises or [Page 296] take action in the absence of Congressional authorization or sanction. He said that at the time of the Suez situation the US could not have acted militarily because there was no Congressional approval. He recalled that there had been considerable controversy over the legal authority of the Truman administration to act with respect to Korea. He said that although nobody disagreed with the action itself, there were those who felt that no action should have been taken until Congress had been consulted and had approved. He said that President Eisenhower might be termed “conservative” in relation to this point since he was most reluctant to give promises which might strain the Presidential authority. The Secretary stressed that we have always made our opposition to the use of force recognized by more than mere words of condemnation. We have always acted on the principle that force should not be used to settle disputes and he recalled the strong diplomatic stand we took at the time of Suez against our two oldest allies. The Secretary said that it would be unthinkable that we would not do something if force were used against West New Guinea, but he emphasized again that he could not make a formal statement to this effect without Presidential approval, and he did not think the President would give his approval without Congressional sanction.

Dr. Van Roijen said that he thought that Mr. Luns would have to explain the background set forth by the Secretary to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Netherlands Parliament in private sessions. He did not think that the statement by itself without the private explanation would suffice. He said that the real problem was that there were those in the Netherlands who felt that West New Guinea should be given up. He thought that a serious situation would be created if pressures in the Netherlands to give up West New Guinea should increase. The Secretary agreed that if the Dutch should give up West New Guinea, a serious problem would be created, especially if Sukarno should go to the Communists. He said that Australia would be particularly concerned in view of the importance of New Guinea to Australian security.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.56/10–858. Confidential. Drafted by Stabler on October 14.
  2. Neither printed. In the letter, dated October 7, Dulles informed Van Roijen that, in response to a request by Luns for a statement of the U.S. position on the possible use of force by Indonesia against West New Guinea, he was enclosing a draft statement. The letter and the draft statement are ibid., 756D.00/10–758. See Supplement.
  3. Reference is to the so-called Burger motion, introduced in the Dutch Second Chamber on September 30 by representative J.A.W. Burger. The motion called for consultations with a number of friendly powers concerning the feasibility of a UN trusteeship for West New Guinea.