Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

211. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)⁰

Washington, July 1, 1959.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Attitude towards Present Political Crisis in Indonesia

Summary

I understand that Mr. Karl Harr¹ will ask you at the July 1 OCB luncheon how U.S. policy towards Indonesia may be affected by the outcome of the current political crisis in Indonesia. It is not possible to state categorically how the U.S. would react to each of the many possible solutions of this crisis. In general, however, none of the probable solutions is likely to require any change in our present policy towards Indonesia.

Discussion

Indonesia’s political crisis stems from refusal of the Islamic political parties to support President Sukarno’s April 22 proposal to the Constituent Assembly that Indonesia reinstate its 1945 Constitution (see background at Tab A).² Our Embassy reports that the Indonesian Government is considering four alternative means of reinstating the 1945 Constitution:

1. Resubmission of the proposal to the Constituent Assembly with necessary concessions to the Islamic parties to secure their support.

2. Submission of the proposal to Parliament, where the Government has a majority and presumably can assure a favorable vote (it is not clear that this procedure would be legal since the Constituent Assembly is the body charged with drawing up a constitution).

3. Imposition of the 1945 Constitution by Presidential decree (this procedure, too, may be of questionable legality).

4. A national referendum.

The Embassy’s guess is that Sukarno will proclaim the 1945 Constitution by Presidential decree, probably incorporating in the preamble some reference to Islam which would at least partially meet the Moslem parties’ demand for preferential status for Islam. Sukarno might ask Parliamentary endorsement of his decree to meet the letter of legality.

There is no apparent reason for the U.S. to view with alarm the return to the 1945 Constitution in Indonesia. In fact, there is some hope that this change might bring increased political stability and more effective measures to check the deterioration of the economy, developments the U.S. would welcome.

Ideally the U.S. would like to see the return to the 1945 Constitution accomplished by legal and democratic means. None of the means thought likely to be employed is fundamentally undemocratic, and the Indonesians will probably make every effort to meet at least the letter of the law. In any case, the hoped-for gain in political stability might well counterbalance the disadvantage of any departure from wholly legal procedure as far as overall U.S. interests are concerned.

It is the practical steps which might be taken after the reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution, rather than the act of reinstatement itself, which could ultimately lead the U.S. to consider modification of its policy towards Indonesia. However, the actions we expect the Indonesian Government to take are generally those which would further our objectives. It is anticipated that the new government under the 1945 Constitution, would be heavily weighted with representatives of anti-Communist elements, notably the Army.

Inasmuch as it is the Moslem parties which have opposed Sukarno’s proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution, Sukarno will continue to depend in part on Communist Party (PKI) support in his move to reinstate the 1945 Constitution. This is not expected to result in PKI participation in the Government, but it could result in the PKI continuing to enjoy its substantial popular influence and relative freedom to pursue its ends.

Even if the PKI remains in this advantageous position, however, the U.S. would gain nothing by a change in existing policy. Our Embassy strongly recommends that, whatever the outcome of the present crisis (short of marked Communist gains or general civil disorder, of course) the U.S. should simply maintain its present policy of strengthening non-and anti-Communist elements (1) in a material sense through judicious economic and military assistance, and (2) in a psychological sense by showing the U.S. to be a dependable friend of Indonesia. The Ambassador recommends further that we should continue to exploit Indonesian fears of international Communist expansionism.

I concur in these recommendations.³

0. Source: Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Indonesia. Secret. Drafted by Moore on June 30 and cleared with Mein.
1. Acting Chairman of the OCB.
2. See Document 198.
3. The question of U.S. arms supplies to Indonesia was discussed briefly at the OCB luncheon meeting of July 1. During the discussion, both Gates and Murphy offered the view that the supply of arms to Indonesia should continue. (Memorandum from Jeremiah J. O’Connor, Operations Coordinator, to Parsons, July 1; Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Indonesia) See Supplement.