Office of the Historian

212. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Mein) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)0

Washington, July 8, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • Indonesia’s Return to the 1945 Constitution

His proposal that Indonesia return to the 1945 Constitution having been defeated in the Constituent Assembly by the Moslem parties, on July 5 Sukarno proclaimed by Presidential decree (1) reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution, (2) abandonment of the Provisional Constitution of 1950 and (3) dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Thereupon the government of Prime Minister Djuanda resigned but was kept on by Sukarno in a caretaker capacity.1

The 1945 Constitution is a less complete and detailed document than the 1950 Constitution, but Sukarno (with Army endorsement) recommended returning to it as a means of increasing the stability of the government. Under the 1945 Constitution, the formal power of the executive will be increased, in part through the medium of a Presidential cabinet replacing the unstable parliamentary cabinets that Indonesia has suffered for ten years.

Because it provides for a stronger executive, the 1945 Constitution has been loosely described by the press as a device employed by Sukarno to acquire “dictatorial” powers. This description is misleading on several counts:

1.
The proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution is not Sukarno’s private brainchild but has had the consistent backing of the Army and the cabinet since the plan was hatched earlier this year in the hope of ending chronic political instability.
2.
The 1945 Constitution places numerous checks on the President’s power, as may be seen from the underlined portions of the Constitution (Tab A).2 Sovereignty rests with the people, the Presidency is an elective office, laws may only be enacted with the concurrence of a Council of Representatives (parliament), etc.
3.
No powers the President could legally assume under the 1945 Constitution would equal in scope those possessed since March 1957 by the War Administrator (General Nasution, Army Chief of Staff) under [Page 410] the State of Danger Law. Nasution’s authority under this law to act to maintain order and internal security is virtually unlimited.

There is no apparent reason for the U.S. to view with alarm the reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution. In fact, if this change produces a more stable, non-Communist government and results in firmer measures to check the deterioration of the economy, U.S. objectives in Indonesia will be served. As a matter of internal political reorganization in Indonesia, the change of constitutions as such need have no effect on U.S. policy towards Indonesia.

It is true, of course, that political developments in Indonesia attendant on implementation of the 1945 Constitution could necessitate a reexamination of U.S.-Indonesian relations. The Communist Party (PKI) has supported Sukarno consistently in the matter of the 1945 Constitution so he remains to some extent dependent on PKI support, particularly if the Moslem parties remain uncooperative. However, we do not expect Communists to be included in the new cabinet, and we do expect the anti-Communist Army leadership to be substantially represented therein. And we have been led to believe that the Army and certain civilian elements of the government intend to use the increased executive power provided by the 1945 Constitution to curb the influence of the PKI.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.03/7–859. Secret. Drafted by Moore.↩
  2. The Embassy summarized these developments in despatch 10 from Djakarta, July 7. (Ibid., 756D.03/7–759) See Supplement.↩
  3. Not printed. See Document 198.↩