Office of the Historian

303. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, December 16, 1959—7 p.m.

1648. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference Department telegrams 991 and 1051.2 Department telegrams 991 and 1051 outlined in some detail Department’s presentation US objectives in Laos. This telegram analyzes present situation against background these objectives.

External (numbered paragraphs correspond Department telegram 991)

1.
RLG by response to SYG’s personal intitiative, its official statements and general reception treatment accorded UN representatives and staff recently sent here has shown most friendly sympathetic disposition towards UN and its programs. (G–73)3
2.
Firm assurances been given by Foreign Minister Khamphan Panya that Laos will consult and coordinate in advance, especially with US any contemplated resort to SEATO. (Embassy telegram 1221)4 King also indicates slightly greater receptivity this need for advance consultation during meeting with Admiral Riley (Embassy telegram 1578).5
3.
In addition Phoui’s statement Paris, he took advantage official dinner for SYG November 13 (Embassy telegram 1364)6 to reaffirm RLG neutrality stance. Lead article official Daily News Bulletin Lao press December 3 (Embassy despatch 204)7 further elaborated this theme.
4.
RLG continues seek all sorts foreign aid from friendly powers, and has indicated full willingness readiness accept UN economic, technical assistance as long Communist powers not directly involved. With eye US Congressional, popular attitude towards aid, Phoui has sought continue firm democratic facade, keep in cabinet ministers we support (Thao Leuam) and try get out politicians with dishonest reputations (Katay).
5.
Statements and posture adopted to satisfy requirements paragraph 1 also fulfill this point.

Internal

(Here below numbered paragraphs Department telegram 1051 are referred to in parentheses following 991 references.)

6.
(1) Here is sorriest showing of Lao leadership. While Phoui and virtually all LHL (albeit few Cabinet members and deputies somewhat reluctantly) ready to follow closely all essential points 1051, principals CDNI (except for one or two in Cabinet) and King adamant on support of positions which cause present division, instability and disunity. Reference 2–a and 2–b, CDNI–King opposed deferral of election until December 1960 and convocation National Congress to vote at least extension of Assembly.
7.

(2–a–b) In pious defense constitution and democracy, CDNI–King insistence that assembly mandate and consequently life present Parliamentary government irrevocably must end December 25 really means after that date government becomes provisional and subject strictly to whim of King without any reference to parliamentary control—a situation as unconstitutional and undemocratic as could be imagined—even for Laos.

(2c) CDNI also opposed National Congress at this time “tinkering” with constitution, saying it preferred wait until after elections when “voice of people” could be followed by newly-elected deputies in thoroughgoing rewrite of constitution which would give King considerably increased powers.

(2d) Phoui’s effort continue in reshuffled cabinet present LHL–CDNI–Army setup been thwarted by stubborn CDNI group discipline over perhaps most indefensible issue, i.e., retention Khamphan Panya as Foreign Minister. As late as December 13, Phoui for second time sought through individual meetings with CDNI members present cabinet work out solution. But his untiring efforts promote Lao national unity under his leadership so far thwarted by CDNI bloc tactics. No matter how logical in nation’s interest Phoui’s arguments CDNI place loyalty to group unity first. Though they freely give solemn assurances they all for Phoui as Prime Mininster, current tactics make it appear CDNI trying maneuver Phoui into King-appointed provisional government where he would be unsupported by lawfully elected Assembly and at mercy CDNI–King maneuvers.

8.
Trial8 postponed by RLG until early next year. Prosecution case may be stronger then and timing better. Parenthetically, CDNI–King pushing drastically harder line. One of their principal reasons oppose convocation national congress or assembly was desire keep accused [Page 698] NLHX deputies from being seated and possibly being heard. Phoui had idea that giving them chance to talk, however circumscribed, would not only have helped show RLG not authoritarian but might also have cut into Communist propaganda reference trial and given opportunity CDNI relieve them legally of protection afforded by status under law as deputies.
9.
Minority problem, while attracting greater attention lately from US agencies, still relatively untouched by RLG. One cheering note was recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report [document number not declassified]9 that CDNI favors in new post December 25 cabinet creation of secretariat of state for minorities.
10.
Training of FAL proceeding with celerity. General atmosphere full cooperation among Lao, French and Americans directly involved even better than anticipated and FAL units impress our trainers with their desire and ability to learn.
Smith
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–1559. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC.↩
  2. Documents 285 and 292.↩
  3. In this airgram, December 18, the Embassy transmitted the text of an interview with Sisouk Na Champassak, who had been a member of the Lao Delegation to the United Nations, in which he praised U.N. and Hammarskjöld’s handling of the Laos question. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/12–1859)↩
  4. The reference is in error and should be to telegram 1321 from Vientiane, November 11, which reported that Khamphan Panya gave Smith a firm assurance that Laos would not appeal to SEATO without prior consultation with the United States. (ibid., 751J.00/11–1159)↩
  5. See Document 301.↩
  6. Dated November 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 315/11–1759)↩
  7. Dated December 11. (ibid., 651J.00/12–1159)↩
  8. Reference is to the trial of NLHZ leaders.↩
  9. Not found↩