302. Letter From the Ambassador in Laos (Smith) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)1
Dear Jeff: I am greatly relieved to know that the Department [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] deeply disturbed by the continuing evidence of a CDNI–Phoui split and recognize that the CDNI is actively competing for political power and is assuming the role of an opposition party. The fact that the CDNI was in large measure assuming the role of an opposition party to the U.S.-encouraged “solid conservative front party,” LHL, was recognized and reported by me [Page 691] during the course of its original negotiations with Prince Souvanna Phouma when he tried to bring five members of the CDNI into his cabinet at my request, and later during negotiations with Phoui for the original organization of the present government in August last year and again in its maneuvering during the December-January reshuffle and Phoui’s battle for full powers instead of a coup. It then pretended, as it still does, to be a “non-partisan patriotic organization” rather than a political party seeking power for itself or for front men it controls. While I feel sure that several of its controlling members are sincerely devoted to strengthening anti-communist elements for the preservation of Laos’ independence, there are very few of them who in practice have been willing to place this general objective above the advancement of individual or partisan interests. Largely by grace of American help and advice, this organization has built up a rival conservative political organization in the provinces and has seemed to me to seize alertly on every possibility either by action on its own or by dragging of feet in the cabinet designed to prevent insofar as possible the LHL from strengthening or building up its organizations in the provinces.
In the face of this more and more obvious partisan rather than patriotic motivation of actions on the part of the CDNI, it has been surprising to me that Phoui has so seldom descended to partisan acts and has had such tolerant patience in his persistent efforts to persuade the LHL–CDNI–Army cabinet to work effectively together in the national interest. In this, he has been rewarded by the strong contributions made by Thao Leuam under Eisenberg’s guidance in assisting him toward fiscal reform and by Colonel Phoumi in Army reorganization and training. As the man who gave Khamphan his original start in Foreign Affairs by taking Khamphan with him to the Geneva Conference, it is not to me surprising that Phoui has found it difficult to go to Khamphan on his own initiative to explain matters when Khamphan has with such studied arrogance refrained from consulting Phoui or informing him on subjects and decisions of great import to Laos in the foreign relations field. Phoui considered that Khamphan’s action in encouraging the King, against Phoui’s strenuous protest in cabinet meetings presided over by the King, to order that the RLG request to the UN for military assistance be sent without any consultation with friendly powers, prevented the request from being reshaped into one which could have been fully and positively supported by the findings of the UN Security Council Subcommittee instead of one which may make any future Lao requests for aid somewhat suspect in international circles. Phoui also considered that Khamphan made a serious error in uncoordinated and unauthorized action instructing the Lao UN delegation to abstain on the Algerian vote, a serious and unjustifiable blow to France whose full support is needed in both UN and military and economic assistance areas. He considered that if Sisouk [Page 692] had stopped to think or consult the cabinet or the Prime Minister before issuing some of his contradictory press releases, the international posture of Laos would have been much stronger in world opinion.
It has been in attempting to act as a national leader instead of an LHL partisan that Phoui has risked more and more of his basic political support with the LHL, which he persuaded to grant monetary reform, to approve inclusion of the CDNI in his cabinet and to support his reform program with a grant of full powers and permission to use deputies in civil service positions to help strengthen administrative efforts of the government to win the loyalty of the people. The LHL supported him reluctantly on the inclusion of the CDNI in the cabinet and later of Army representation in the cabinet on the basis of our assurances that although they had had no experience they would serve in the government unselfishly and cooperate honestly and frankly on a completely non-partisan basis with the Prime Minister in implementing energetically the plans already broadly outlined by and with the Prime Minister. It quickly became apparent to the more discerning members of the LHL that the CDNI was fanatically devoted to the promotion of the partisan interests of the CDNI rather than in forwarding programs of the reform government they had been permitted to join. It became more clear each day that their principal objective was to replace most if not all of the LHL with candidates of their own choosing. Yet Phoui continued to accept our assurances that “this could not be true” because it was not our policy to support the CDNI against the LHL but only as a part of a joint LHL–CDNI–Army conservative front under Phoui’s leadership. Being convinced that our assistance and guidance was the lifeline of the CDNI, Phoui accepted our assurances and continued patiently though not brilliantly, to try to act as a national rather than a partisan leader. I pointed up the apparent dichotomy in American policy here [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and in Washington, with the help of State Department representatives, obtained corrections in the final draft of a policy paper on Laos, which should have eliminated, through our influence on the CDNI, any continuation of partisan CDNI rather than of joint national government support. Despite highest level assurances in Washington [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the dichotomy of approach did continue here with what promised to be disastrous consequences until December 11. [9 lines of source text not declassified]
So our assistance has continued “to be used in such a way as to intensify domestic political rivalries.” Unless there is a change in the way this support is used, there is no question but that “the perpetuation of these rivalries will obviously so involve the RLG in internal squabbling as to impede any progress this dry season.” There is also now no question that “the dichotomy of U.S. policy,” which I have [Page 693] reported for so many months past, “is a reflection of the above problem.” In our separate support of Phoui and of the CDNI and of certain LHL members, it is only to Phoui that it has been adequately made clear that the purpose of our assistance is to insure adequate support of our basic policy of strengthening the total effectiveness of all anti-communist elements for the preservation of Laos’ independence and not for the advancement of individual or partisan interests. I have long and painfully maintained [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it seemed apparent that the manner in which we were supporting the CDNI and encouraging it to stand as a unit against all other conservative groups was “tending to deepen the split rather than effect the unity of anti-communist elements, which is the basic U.S. objective.” [12½ lines of source text not declassified] Again on this occasion the word of an Ambassador quoting explicit directives from Washington did not prevail against the contrary advice of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] self-appointed strategist to the CDNI. This action was in the face of clear-cut instructions from Washington [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that I was to be the sole voice of the U.S. in this matter and in the face of my own specific directive that every effort be made to encourage the CDNI and the Army to cooperate with Phoui in his plans to comply with official U.S. policy suggestions in the matter.
I had long been strongly urging [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with leading members of the CDNI and LHL the concept that the CDNI could only avoid seriously splitting the conservative front by working as a part of the Rally of the Lao People. It had always been denied [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the CDNI had any intention of becoming a separate political party, at least in the foreseeable future, and it had been repeatedly and indignantly promised [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that every effort was already being made to bring about closer CDNI cooperation with the LHL, with the idea that individual members of the CDNI could merge with the LHL and encourage honest and effective policies from within by example and pretext rather than set themselves up as a rival political party or group. Nevertheless, as is finally unquestionably apparent this last is just what they have done [5½ lines of source text not declassified].
At the present CDNI-promoted impasse, it has at last become unmistakably apparent to all, what has long been apparent to Phoui and to me, that the best solution would be an honest merger of CDNI into LHL. In fact the situation requires it if the NLHX is not again to win most of the seats in an election.
However, it will not be a simple matter, even if the CDNI drops openly its “holier than thou” attitude as it has done privately in its recent cooperation with individuals tainted with corruption and as it [Page 694] might better do in view of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the known corruption of some of its own members and accepted advisers.
If CDNI takes the “healthy” move of admitting that it has openly assumed role of a political party, there would seem to be no reason why a committee consisting of an equal number of members from each side under Phoui’s chairmanship could not discuss methods of merging that would be fair and satisfactory to each side. I believe that the LHL would justifiably insist that if Army leaders wish to continue in politics and hold electoral office, they resign their Army positions as required by the electoral law and take their chances with other civilian candidates. I believe there would also have to be some arrangement for determining the conservative front candidates most suitable for the single lists, as, for instance, by a party primary, if there is to be real cooperation, for under past separatist policies the CDNI has been promoting the idea that no more than 10 to 15 LHL can hope to win in the next election and LHL holds the belief that very few of the CDNI have a chance. Thus unless there is a primary or a two-stage election, there appears to be little chance that an arrangement for a single list can be reached without splintering the solid conservative front and having at least as many “rump candidates” running as official ones. This plethora of candidates would of course be a great advantage to the Communists as it was in the May 4 election. It has been for the specific purpose of meeting this problem and of permitting a merger in good faith of the CDNI with the LHL, that I have been urging the importance of including in the new electoral law two-stage elections ever since last May 4. With this proviso, I agree wholeheartedly with your suggested steps 4A and B. However, I do not believe we can hope for too much from the King in this connection. For him to even appear sympathetic after the partisan role he has been almost openly playing might be very difficult for him. I suggest therefore that we reverse the timing in the matter and go first strongly to Phoui, the principal members of the CDNI and responsible LHL members and then promptly appeal to the King for his support through my presenting a letter from the Secretary. Thus, he would only have to accept and quietly encourage and not too openly or actively support something which would in effect be a reversal of his almost universally known present position.
The staff of the Embassy Political Section [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are working on some suggestions as to methods of merging the CDNI and the LHL into a single group with no undue hardship on either side. They will suggest both strategy and timing and I will send their thinking to you under cover of a letter of comment from me.
[Page 695]Now that we have eliminated the local dichotomy of U.S. approach, if Saccio is able to deliver on his promises to make USOM aid here more apparent quickly, particularly in vital road construction, and if we can continue to have the benefit of solid British and French support, I still believe we can persuade the Lao to take the actions they need to take politically, financially, socially, administratively and militarily to save themselves from a “peaceful” communist takeover. With these provisos, I think we still have better than a fifty-fifty chance; without them, we may soon see ourselves maneuvered into a position where our present collective defense arrangements through SEATO will not be enough to keep Laos from sliding behind the curtain.
I am sorry to have felt required to send so many long and complicated reports by telegram but we have been on the brink of disaster here for many months and I have had increasingly the feeling that Washington had somehow failed to recognize this fact fully enough to react strongly and quickly enough to save situation. It is a relief that dangerous CDNI partisanship has at last been brought out into the open so that there can no longer be any doubt that the relatively nebulous evidence thereof which so disturbed me did indeed warrant urgent top level U.S. consideration. Having lapsed under pressure of limitations of time and staff and my concern over the urgency of the subject matter, from the brevity so desirable in telegraphic communications in the Foreign Service, I intend to try earnestly to retrieve my reputation in this respect. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]
With thanks for your continuing patience and the hope that, now that the dichotomy that I have reported and that all had previously doubted has at last become clearly evident, you may feel that I have been justified at being so disturbed.
Most sincerely,