Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

33. Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

August 18, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. National Security Implications of Future Developments Regarding Africa (NSC 6001;¹NSC 6005/1;²NSC Action No. 2219–b–(4);³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 12, 1960;⁴ Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 10⁵ and 16, I960⁶)

Mr. Gray introduced the discussion by describing briefly the background of the preparation of the Discussion Paper on Africa. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).⁷ In the course of this introduction, Mr. Gray noted that the Vice President was unable to attend the Council Meeting and indicated that he would see that the Vice President was briefed on the Council discussion. He then introduced Secretary Dillon.

Secretary Dillon stated that the State Discussion Paper had been prepared as a talking paper. It indicated pretty well what the situation is now and what problems we faced in Africa. When the State paper had been discussed in the Planning Board, the Board had developed sixteen questions on the basis of it. It would take too long, Secretary Dillon stated, to deal with all of these questions in detail and some of them were somewhat repetitive, but he would attempt to deal with three or four of the principal questions. The main point to be made about Africa, Secretary Dillon said, was the fairly obvious one that the continent is in a state of extreme flux at present and that if the U.S. was to react properly to the situation, we required maximum flexibility. In all of our security operations—in military operations through the UN or otherwise, diplomatic actions, and in economic and other activities—we should emphasize doing what needs to be done in a particular case rather than what accords with our basic ideas as to the ideal way of handling the situation. Another thing that was different in Africa as compared with other areas, Secretary Dillon suggested, was the need for and advantage of a multilateral approach. The U.S. had backed the UN in the development of its unique position in the Congo and we have to a large extent succeeded in keeping the Soviets out. Secretary Dillon thought the decision to provide aid to the Congo through the UN was the correct decision. As regards Africa generally, it was different from other underdeveloped areas in that the former colonial powers had a real interest in providing support. They are presently assisting the area to the extent of $500 million per year and are ready to continue such assistance. The U.S. position in Africa therefore was different from that in other underdeveloped areas in that we were supporting other industrial countries rather than assuming the main role. Another unique problem in Africa was the lack of qualified U.S. personnel for service there.

With these general observations for background, Secretary Dillon stated he would now take up three or four of the Planning Board questions. He read the first part of Question No. 2: “Should the U.S. and the Free World seek competitive or cooperative relationships with the Soviet Union in Africa?” Secretary Dillon stated that in several areas of Africa, the Soviets were trying to break in. To cooperate with them would only cause them to get in earlier and easier. We had to compete, although not on every program, country, or thing. We should pick out those things that we could do best and concentrate on them, getting together with other Free World nations on those things. The achievement of Free World cooperation could be accomplished through the UN or through the new assistance group. We should seek to prevent the Soviets from gaining a major position in Africa although we will have to adjust to some Soviet presence there.

Secretary Dillon next read the second part of Question No. 2: “If the U.S. is to compete, will our present techniques satisfy the need to help the new African governments to limit and control their contacts with the Bloc, including their development of relations with Communist China, and especially to prevent their acceptance of Bloc assistance in the military and other sensitive fields?” Secretary Dillon stated that U.S. techniques are too cumbersome. This was partly because of the need to have the same policy everywhere in the world and partly because of Congressional and General Accounting Office requirements. We had to live up to these requirements, but we also had to find ways to act quickly.

Secretary Dillon then read the third part of Question No. 2: “Should the U.S., in anticipation of Bloc efforts to overthrow pro-Western regimes by subversive means, help the Africans to develop adequate internal security forces, perhaps by increased emphasis on the NSC 1290–d type programs?”⁸ Answering this question, Secretary Dillon stated that 1290–d programs were desirable where they would work but that they should not be undertaken for all of Africa. They would work well in some countries, not in others. Moreover, Secretary Dillon indicated, it might be necessary in a few countries, as it had been in Ethiopia, to provide military assistance on a preclusive basis to keep the Soviets out.

Secretary Dillon then read the last part of Question No. 2: “Would it be feasible to apply the principles of a Free World “Monroe Doctrine” for Africa as a means of curbing Communist Bloc influence?” The answer to this question, Secretary Dillon indicated, was “no”. The African states would resent it very much if outsiders announced such a doctrine for Africa. Such action would promote the very things that we were against.

Secretary Dillon then proceeded to Question No. 3: “Is neutralism in this area necessarily undesirable from the point of view of U.S. interests?” Secretary Dillon stated that neutralism was not undesirable if the countries were genuinely neutral—that is, friendly to the West and to free enterprise. But if they went as far as Guinea, neutralism could be undesirable. In the UN the U.S. should seek the support of the African states on the majority of the issues in which we are interested. Secretary Dillon noted our success in obtaining African support for UN actions relating to the Congo. The African states believe that Lumumba has gone too far and are in this case supporting the UN against one of their own people. Concluding his discussion of this point, Secretary Dillon stated that neutralism was better than Communism.

Secretary Dillon turned next to Question No. 10: “It is U.S. policy to encourage and, to the extent feasible, rely on Western European nations to influence and support their respective dependent and recently independent areas so long as such encouragement and reliance are consistent with U.S. national interests. Is this an adequate, realistic policy and is it still feasible in the light of current developments in Africa?” Secretary Dillon said that the answer to the first part of this question, relating to the adequacy and realism of the policy, was “yes”. The answer to the second part was less clear. When the policy had been developed, Guinea and Liberia were exceptions. Now we were faced by the same thing in the Congo where we could not rely on Belgium. It was still our objective to get the Belgians back into the Congo, but whether this was practical we do not know. It is not practical at the moment, however. We hope that the situation in the Congo is a unique situation. The French have said that they can take care of their own ex-colonies. Whether these colonies, as they become independent, will continue friendly to France is a question. In particular, it is questionable whether they will consistently support France in the UN. If they do not, France may say that it will not support them. The U.S. was working with the French, trying to keep them in a position of supporting their ex-colonies; this was presently their own policy. The position with respect to the British areas was at present satisfactory. Nigeria was now independent and Sierra Leone would become independent early in 1961. This would leave only East Africa in a dependent status. Whether East African territories, as they become independent, will be as friendly to the British as West African territories was a real question, Secretary Dillon indicated. Summing up, Secretary Dillon stated that the answer to the Planning Board question therefore was that our present policy was the correct basic policy but that it might not work everywhere.

Secretary Dillon then read Question No. 12: “In view of the current use of the UN in the Congo crisis, should we now plan to give increased emphasis to multilateral economic aid and technical assistance throughout Africa? Is existing machinery adequate or are new agencies required?” Secretary Dillon stated that he agreed that increased emphasis should be given to a multilateral approach except with respect to development assistance. The expanded UN technical assistance program and OPEX were good programs. There were some real problems, Secretary Dillon noted, however, in having assistance to Africa going through the UN. For example, there was the 50-50 shipping problem.⁹ We might be able to work this out with the UN by getting them to use some of our shipping. However, we will have legislative problems if we provide more assistance through multilateral channels and new legislation will probably be required next year. The Africans have made proposals for new multilateral approaches to aid. If such approaches are developed and the Africans move ahead on them, State feels that we should support them. At present, however, we did not know whether these proposals would get off the ground. This last question and the question of personnel are of greatest importance. We needed, Secretary Dillon stated, to get together a list of people in the U.S. who are knowledgeable on Africa and available for service there. There are not too many people in this category and this is one of the reasons we have supported a multilateral approach.

Finally, Secretary Dillon turned to Question No. 1: “What should the U.S. be prepared to do in the event of anarchy or widespread rioting and bloodshed in other African states similar to that which has occurred in the Congo? If reliance is to be placed on UN emergency forces, are further preparatory steps required?” Answering this question, Secretary Dillon stated that we hoped this was not an immediate problem. We believe that the Congo represents a unique situation. However, in some of the British colonies (e.g. Rhodesia) and the Portuguese colonies, we might in the long run be faced with such unfavorable developments. There were two things, Secretary Dillon stated, on which we were taking action as a result of the Congo experience. That experience indicated that our emergency evacuation plan was inadequate. It was adequate for the immediate area of the Congo, but not in taking account of the problems created in surrounding areas into which the evacuees moved. A State-Defense team would go to Africa in October and develop a better regional evacuation plan. However, despite the strain that was placed upon the areas that received the evacuees, the evacuation had gone very well. The second matter that was under consideration was a Defense proposal that a small naval force with a few marines might visit the area and might be available in an emergency to assist with evacuation. This force would consist of four small naval vessels. Such a group might go sailing around the coast of Africa as an extension of the goodwill visit of the Commander, South Atlantic, to the area a year or so ago.¹⁰ State was circularizing its missions in the area for their views on this proposal. The Department thought it might be a good idea. Nothing further, Secretary Dillon indicated, was required in the way of general action in the UN. In particular, we did not favor the development of a special African military force although we have always favored the creation of a general UN Emergency Force. The creation of a special force for Africa would raise the question of white vs. non-white troops which had already been raised by Lumumba.

Secretary Dillon asked whether Mr. Gray wished to add anything to what he had said about the Planning Board questions. Mr. Gray responded that Secretary Dillon had generally covered them but that there were a couple of matters he would like to mention. There was a suggestion, Mr. Gray said, that the President might wish to consider the creation of an African Advisory Commission similar to the Inter-American Commission. He recognized, Mr. Gray stated, that this was a debatable proposition. Secondly, against the background of difficulties ICA had experienced in recruiting a few technicians for the Congo, should the U.S. institute a major program to develop and recruit people for service in Africa? For example, would it be useful to make use of the services of retired army officers in the area? Such action would require legislation because retired army officers could not receive pay for such work without giving up their retirement pay. Secretary Dillon responded to this last point by stating that State was compiling a list of people available for service in Africa. Once this list had been compiled, we might find that something more was needed in the way of inducements; for example, income tax benefits. The President stated that he did not see anything wrong with such benefits. In a sense people working in Africa would be working for the UN and income tax benefits were extended to UN personnel. Secretary Anderson indicated that he would not object to tax benefits. Treasury was supporting Congressman Boggs’ bill to extend tax benefits to those who brought capital into underdeveloped countries. Such measures were all right if they were limited in application to underdeveloped countries.

Secretary Dillon said that he agreed in general with Mr. Gray’s point with respect to personnel but before we decided what we needed in the way of a program, we would need to make a thorough study of what was available in the way of human resources at present. He pointed out that MIT every year trained a class of about fifteen people for work in underdeveloped countries and that when the present class had been asked, eight had volunteered for service in Africa.

Secretary Dillon indicated that he was leery of proposals for creating a special commission on Africa. The situation in Africa was different from that in Latin America. In Latin America the U.S. has a very large number of contacts with labor, business and intellectuals. In Africa, on the other hand, our contacts were very limited. The number of people with direct knowledge of Africa or with business in Africa was very limited. State did work with the very few individuals who are knowledgeable about Africa. It worked with U.S. businessmen in Liberia and Olin-Mathieson in Guinea. Beyond these there was practically nobody. If you brought big business into such a commission, you would simply be giving the Soviets something to shoot at. They would say that we are exploiting Africans for our own business interests.

With respect to the problem of technicians, Mr. Gray said that he had heard a figure of 30,000 as the number of people required in the Congo. Whatever the U.S. did, we could obviously do no more than scratch the surface of such a problem. Mr. Riddleberger indicated that the figure 30,000 was too high; it was more like 10–15,000. However, the question of how many people were required depended upon on how far down in the hierarchy one went—for example, whether one included traders. Mr. Gray said that for this reason we clearly needed a multilateral approach—we could not do the job alone. Secretary Dillon stated that in the Congo the only way we could solve the problem was to find some way to bring the Belgians back in.

Secretary Anderson pointed out that the Canadians had a number of people with 25–30 years experience in Africa and that if they made a real effort they would be able to send some really able people. Secretary Anderson went on to say that when the Council had earlier discussed the sharing of UN costs in the Congo and the question of the U.S. share of those costs, it had been said that the Secretary-General would include the costs in the regular UN budget, to which the U.S. contributes 30 per cent. Now, however, we were apparently paying nearly half of the costs. Secretary Anderson wondered whether we had any idea as to the success the Secretary-General was likely to have in getting the costs put in the regular UN budget. In response Secretary Dillon pointed out that Hammarskjold had had no time to give further consideration to this matter since he had been fighting for his life, first against the Belgians and now against Lumumba. However, the U.S. was not paying anything now. We had asked Congress for $100 million for the contingency fund as a sort of round figure. The best estimate was that total UN costs in the Congo for the year would be about $200 million, but there was no agreement that the U.S. would pay half of these costs. If we got the $100 million we had asked for, this would give us funds which could be used elsewhere in Africa if they were not required in the Congo.

Secretary Anderson stated that recent developments in the Congo had raised two interesting questions relating to the World Bank. At the time the Congo became independent, the World Bank had a $140 million commitment to it of which one hundred million dollars had been disbursed. The Belgians had guaranteed the loan and would be liable for defaults. Lumumba had asked for the other $40 million but the Bank had declined to disburse it until it knew that the money would be used appropriately. The Bank had also pointed out that a one million dollar repayment was due. The Congo had then promptly made this repayment. There was an interesting question as to whether now, with the change in sovereignty, Belgium would withdraw its guarantee of the undisbursed $40 million. If it did, the Bank would not disburse this balance, but if it did not, the Bank would disburse it at an appropriate time. This sort of problem had never been presented to the Bank before. Turning to the second question, Secretary Anderson noted that another installment of the repayment of the loan to the Congo was due before the Bank meeting in September. A question might arise as to whether, if the Congo defaults on this repayment and at the same time asks for membership in the Bank, it should be accepted into membership. Both of these questions were rather novel.

Mr. Gray then called on Secretary Gates. Secretary Gates said that we were torn between the problem of not inexhaustible U.S. resources and the need to keep the Communists out of Africa. We could not do everything and people were hard to get, but there was a sense of urgency about the problem of eventual Communist infiltration. Secretary Gates indicated that he was disturbed by the policy of relying upon the European metropoles. He recognized U.S. resource limitations but he doubted whether the Europeans would continue to be welcome. Also they might not be very willing to continue their assistance. The President said that he thought the whole theory of the French Community was to keep the ex-colonies of France closely bound to France economically and culturally. In talking with De Gaulle about French provision of assistance to underdeveloped countries, De Gaulle had said that the French responsibility in this regard was to the French Community. But De Gaulle had also hinted that he expected the U.S. to help in the French Community. Mr. Gray asked whether French ex-colonies would not be coming directly to the U.S. as they become independent and whether we would not have to deal with each of them individually. Secretary Dillon agreed that they would do this as a means of showing their independence.

Secretary Gates felt this was a most important question of policy. Our present policy was unworkable, he said, if it caused us to relax our sense of urgency; if it prevented imaginative, urgent thinking and getting good people to lead a federal or collective arrangement in Africa. He agreed, however, that we should rely as much as we could on Europe; hopefully the Europeans would maintain their assistance. The President indicated that in the case of the French Community, except for Guinea, we should get the countries to go first to Paris. The President indicated that when he had talked directly with the nine Prime Ministers of the Community, this was their whole notion. Some of these Prime Ministers were not even sure that they wanted independence except for the fact that it would give them a vote in the UN. To every one of them obtaining a UN vote was the most important thing because it would demonstrate their lack of dependence on France.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that one result of Council consideration of Africa at this time had been fuller agreement between State and Defense on the role of military assistance. A year or two ago, he said, when there had been discussion of the use of military aid for political as well as for military purposes, Defense had not shown much interest in aid for political purposes. However, the JCS comments on the present Discussion Paper emphasized the importance of military assistance for political purposes. Secretary Dillon then read from Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the JCS views.¹¹ Secretary Gates said that the problem was one of defending in Congress the provision of military assistance for political purposes.

Mr. Gray then called on Mr. Stans who noted that he had been interested in Africa since 1948. He said that there were two matters that he wished to discuss. One was the question of political boundaries; the other was the economic aspects of anything that we undertake in Africa in relationship to the massive dimensions of African problems. Turning first to the boundary question, Mr. Stans noted that existing boundaries in Africa were highly artificial, cutting across tribal and racial divisions. This was true not only of national boundaries but also of provincial boundaries. The six provinces into which the Congo was divided gave no recognition to tribal lines. This situation, Mr. Stans said, foretells tremendous trouble in Africa. Members of a tribe move back and forth across national and provincial boundaries, raising questions of grazing and water rights, administration of justice, etc. Where the U.S. has the opportunity to use its influence on the boundary question, he felt that we should support recognition of the historical tribal boundaries.

The President asked Mr. Stans whether he would care to serve as a mediator on such a question with the Emperor of Ethiopia. In response Mr. Stans said he recognized that the problem was not an easy one to deal with. He said that the tribal situation was related to the kind of democracy that was appropriate for these countries. The Africans do not understand Western-style ballot box democracy. If the Congo were to be reorganized politically, the reorganization should start on the basis of tribal lines. Tribal federations like those formed by the American Indians would provide the best basis for political organization. We could not assume that Africans would accept our kind of democracy. Democracy in Africa did not extend beyond the village; beyond the village the people look to the chief of the tribe who is a kind of dictator. Mr. Stans said he had no solution to this problem but he felt that we should recognize it in everything that we plan in Africa.

Mr. Stans suggested that it was important to recognize the size of the economic problem. It was claimed that per capita income in the Congo was $42 per year, but actual money income of many Congolese was less than one dollar per year. To build any kind of a viable economy would be a tremendous undertaking in most of these countries. In this connection the time span involved was important. If the job had to be done in a short time, it would cost much more than if it were done gradually with a greater amount of self-generated financing. The people of Africa now are impatient for economic growth and advancement. Their demands were insatiable. Through the years, Mr. Stans said, anything that the blacks had got had come from the whites and they are going to continue to look to the whites for assistance. Anything diverted to military uses would accentuate the tribal problem and the economic problem. This suggested that we should provide as little military assistance as possible except for assistance to police forces. The more these countries could play the USSR off against the West, the higher would be the costs to us. This suggested that we should do almost everything multilaterally. No country is going to be satisfied with what it gets. It was sometimes tempting, therefore, to think of letting the USSR handle the problem alone for say 25 years because the Soviets could not possibly meet African demands. Mr. Stans recognized that this was not possible, but he expressed the view that direct competition with the USSR was not desirable.

Mr. Stans suggested that we should do some long-range thinking about what was really involved in building up the economies of African countries. We should examine how much it would cost, say, to build up the per capita income of a particular country to $500 per year in ten to twenty-five years. Five hundred dollars per year would not satisfy the Africans any more than $300 or $2000 would. We were talking, Mr. Stans suggested, about so many billions of dollars that to start with $100 million was illusory. If we knew how much was involved, it would help us answer such questions as the extent to which we relied upon a multilateral approach and whether we should cooperate with the USSR.

Responding to Mr. Stans’ last observations, Secretary Dillon said that the U.S. could not consider any area of the world in a vacuum. We had to relate it to our total resources and priorities. Our thinking was that, so far as any major effort was concerned, black Africa should have a relatively low priority. This did not mean that we should not make an effort but rather that our efforts should be limited to technical assistance and some individual projects like Volta Dams. Latin America, where U.S. responsibility is greater and the possibility of success is also greater, should have a higher priority. The same thing was true of India where the prospects of success were also greater and where the country was willing to contribute to its own development. We could not get ourselves into a position where we were committed to vast contributions to Africa.

Secretary Gates suggested that modest help in agriculture and education would have the greatest impact on the people and that this was the best way in the long run to get at the problem of aid to Africa. It was better than pouring money into the pockets of people who could not handle it. In this connection, Mr. Stans told the Council of his conversation with a teacher of an elementary school in Africa who had asked if there was not some way to get money for pencils and blackboards so that he could really teach the children in his school rather than having them spend most of their time singing and marching. As another illustration of the problem Mr. Stans told of how the Basonge tribe in the Congo, having become conscious of a world larger than that of the tribe itself, had discussed how the tribe might make economic progress. As a result of this discussion, the tribe had established an improvement fund based upon a one-dollar-per-year assessment of every member, with the thought that the tribe would then seek advice from the U.S. or elsewhere as to what kinds of things it could grow and what kind of things might have a market outside the tribe. The idea was excellent in concept, but not being successful in finding a way to use the funds collected, the chiefs of the tribe used them to buy fourteen Ford cars.

Secretary Dillon said that Secretary Gates’ basic idea was the one that we had been following. In the presentation to Congress for Fiscal Year 1961 we had asked for a special fund for Africa which was intended primarily for educational facilities. In Africa you could not run technical assistance on the same basis as in other areas because people lacked the basic equipment which was necessary to make the technical assistance work. Therefore, you had to provide them with basic implements as an adjunct to the technical assistance program; this was the purpose of the special fund. Secretary Dillon said there would be some larger projects, mentioning in particular the aluminum complex on the west coast of Africa, where it was a question of either the U.S. doing it or the Soviets doing it. The President said this was the difficulty behind everything we did—the Free World-Soviet competition. He agreed that a UN approach was best, although the Russians would not do their part and would continue infiltration and similar activities. Secretary Dillon said that when a country becomes independent, the first thing that happens is that a Soviet ship arrives and we are “off to the races.”

Secretary Mueller¹² stated that in Somalia, the only country in Africa with which he was somewhat familiar, the ICA team was doing an outstanding job. It was providing assistance in agriculture and drilling wells for irrigation. These were simple and minor things but their objective was to quadruple the agricultural surplus of Somali-land. The Somalis were very appreciative of these programs.

Mr. Dulles noted that information on U.S. human resources was scattered in various departments, universities and foundations. He suggested that a small group be established under State or the OCB to assess these resources. They were shallow enough at best. Secretary Dillon said this was exactly what he had meant. Secretary Mueller said that this was what Commerce was attempting to get the Committee of Economic Development to do; to determine what should be our responsibility in Africa. (The subsequent discussion indicated that Secretary Mueller was speaking of the Committee of Economic Development study of prospects for U.S. investment and trade previously discussed in the Planning Board.)

The discussion then turned to development of the bauxite deposits in Guinea. In this connection Secretary Mueller pointed out that the cost of aluminum is the cost of power and that the U.S. Government might have to provide some sort of guarantee to the private group interested in aluminum development in Africa on the matter of the cost of power. The cost of power obtained from Ghana would be greater than the cost to Kaiser Aluminum of power obtained from the Bonneville Dam. Secretary Dillon pointed out that this was because Ghana had to pay six per cent interest to the World Bank on its loan while Bonneville had no similar interest costs. Secretary Mueller said that we would have to give these businessmen an even shake if we wanted to keep this great resource for the Free World. He thought we should find some way to do it. Secretary Dillon pointed out that we were now in the midst of negotiations with Ghana and the consortium interested in aluminum development and were close to agreement. Financing arrangements for the Volta Dam would make the difference on power rates. The present plan was to have Ghana provide $85 million of the funds required; the World Bank $40 million; and the U.S. $30 million. We have committed ourselves to the $30 million but the question of how we would divide this between the Development Loan Fund and the Export-Import Bank would have a good deal of effect on interest costs. If the whole loan were made by the Export-Import Bank at 5¾, per cent interest, the cost of power would be so high that there would be no development. We were presently thinking in terms of a $20 million, 3½ per cent DLF loan and a $10 million, 5¾ per cent Export-Import Bank Loan. Secretary Gates asked why this could not be done with venture money. Secretary Dillon pointed out that only the dam involved government financing; that private investors were putting up the funds for bauxite development, smelters and port development.

Secretary Anderson suggested that in talking with Ghana it was important to get a commitment to the aluminum project of 70 per cent of the power produced. In response Secretary Dillon pointed out that the problem at the moment was the other way around—Ghana wanted more than 70 per cent committed to the aluminum project. Secretary Anderson said that this was always the way it was at the beginning of such a project but later Ghana would want all the power itself. If we were going to put up much of the money for the project, we ought to have a lot to say about how the power is to be distributed.

Mr. Gray indicated that the Planning Board would take another look at the two policy papers to see whether they needed to be revised. There appeared to be one difference of view within the Council—on the question of providing arms to Africa. Mr. Stans did not take the same position on this question as did State and Defense. Secretary Dillon indicated that he agreed with Mr. Stans’ view as to the appropriate policy up to the point when the Soviets move in. General Lemnitzer said that he agreed that it was desirable to provide arms for internal security purposes only. We did not want to be in an arms competition. The whole continent, he observed, was not ready for independence.

Mr. Stans agreed that independence had come fifty years too soon. He suggested that the Planning Board should consider Item 6 and the last part of Item 2 in the list of Planning Board questions. He hoped we could develop a broad plan which would seek to guarantee free elections in Africa. If the Communists should then take over a country, free elections every four years would provide a means of throwing them out. While the phrase “Monroe Doctrine” might not be the right way to express it, we should develop a Free World position to prevent Communist take-overs. He indicated that he would think some more about these questions and talk to his Planning Board representative about them prior to the Planning Board discussion.¹³

The National Security Council:¹⁴

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral presentation by the Acting Secretary of State, in the light of the Discussion Paper prepared by the Department of State pursuant to NSC Action No. 2219–b–(4) (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 10, 1960); the list of questions thereon prepared by the NSC Planning Board; and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 16, 1960).

b. Noted that the NSC Planning Board would review “U.S. Policy toward South, Central and East Africa” (NSC 6001) and “U.S. Policy Toward West Africa” (NSC 6005/1), in the light of the discussion.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items. For the discussion of the Congo, see Document 180.]

Robert H. Johnson

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Robert H. Johnson on August 25.
1. Document 22.
2. Document 27.
3. See footnote 3, Document 28.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351)
5. Not printed. (Ibid.)
6. This memorandum transmitted the views of the JCS as stated in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated July 28. (Ibid.)
7. Not printed.
8. These programs were intended to develop forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion. For text of NSC Action No. 1290–d, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844.
9. Section 111 (A) (2) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (P.L. 472), approved April 3, 1948, required that 50 percent of the matériel provided as assistance be shipped on U.S. vessels. This provision was carried forward in subsequent Mutual Security legislation.
10. Documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central File 770.5811, and ibid., AF/AFI Files: Lot 63 D 92, Visits 1960: Solant Amity.
11. See footnote 6 above.
12. Frederick H. Mueller, Secretary of Commerce.
13. On August 29, the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Ralph W. E. Reid, transmitted an amplification of Stans’ remarks to Lay. Johnson transmitted Stans’ views to the NSC Planning Board on August 30. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) Further Bureau of the Budget proposals relative to Africa policy were conveyed by Reid to Gerard Smith on September 9. (Ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)
14. Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 2286. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)