Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

32. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security (Bell)⁰

June 30, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Some Observations based on the Tangier Conference

I wish to thank you for the interest you have taken in our Conference at Tangier, for your attendance there and the contribution you made, and for the time and trouble you have taken in setting down your impressions in writing. At the same time, however, my impressions of the consensus of the Conference differ in important respects from those in your memorandum of June 2 which you sent me on June 16.¹

First of all, it is my conclusion that the Conference showed a clear consensus that we will not be able to prevent Communist economic penetration of the African continent but are setting as our objective to keep Communist contacts and influence within reasonable bounds, i.e., to prevent the penetration of sensitive sectors and to avoid conditions in which African nations will turn to the Bloc for massive aid. It seems to me that this was brought out quite clearly in my opening statement in which I interpreted the NSC objectives. While these objectives do not apparently seem sufficient to you, I think there was no uncertainty about them at the Conference.

You state in your memorandum that “Conceivably, if the Western powers were really determined to exclude the Soviet, and were pre-pared to meet all reasonable African desires for development (not always existent) quickly and painlessly, Soviet penetration might be confined or restricted if not prevented.” Your memorandum, further-more, seems to set up the alternatives of either having such a comprehensive and all-inclusive program or else accepting defeat in certain areas of Africa while concentrating on others where the prospects are more promising. I do not agree with such artificial alternatives, and wonder whether upon reflection you will not agree that we are not really caught up in such a dilemma.

There is a tendency, I think, for some officers in the Department to feel that it is the task of the United States Government to create conditions in Africa where the Soviets will have no opportunities at all to give economic aid. However, the requirements of the African continent are so great that we are in my opinion bound to be defeated if we set for ourselves such an overly ambitious objective. If we tried to meet all African requirements we would only scatter our resources and encourage African countries to invite the Soviets and the West to the kind of competitive bidding in which we would soon find ourselves in the position of gamblers having to double the stakes in order to keep in the game. I do not believe this would be realistic or wise.

I think I detect a note of impatience, if not of irony, in your memorandum where you purport to summarize our discussions of French aid to African countries. (“Great uncertainty seemed to exist as to what should be done in any case.” “It was not very clear how the anticipated erroneous French views would differ from ours … “)² Actually, I think the Conference brought out very clearly that our commitment to consult with the French about aid to their present or former dependencies constitutes a serious but unavoidable policy problem, but that the French have a right to ask for such consultations because they are at present pumping half a billion dollars a year into Africa and are extending the kind of massive assistance in personnel services which the United States would be quite unable to provide. The Conference noted that it would be a fatal mistake for us to jeopardize such assistance by trying to charge forward in spite of French objections. Our major problem, as was brought out again and again at the Conference, is to gear ourselves to move in quickly if the French permit a vacuum to be created as in Guinea. This is, of course, a contingency situation. I realize that such situations make your job more difficult, and perhaps the tone of your memorandum reflects some frustration that we have not been able to make it easier. However, there is no use fighting the problem: The French do have a large program of assistance in Africa and we must be concerned, first of all, with maintaining that program.

Your memorandum seems to reflect a certain disappointment that the Tangier Conference did not call for an especially large US aid program. It is true that we reached no such conclusion. At the same time, however, the Conference did express itself quite clearly that we are confronted with a crisis situation in Africa; that early US action to engage the expectations of the new countries in a Western direction would be of vital importance; that “ten million dollars spent now may well be worth one hundred million spent two years from now;” that action on our part should not wait for the creation of some concerted Western mechanism for assistance; that the present aid instruments are not suited to the situation in Africa and that we should be prepared to revert in some instances to instruments that have been used successfully in other parts of the world at earlier times (including grant aid and where necessary budgetary support); and that we should be alive to situations where Soviet actions would necessitate our preempting certain sensitive sectors.

You state that the “major impediment to further Bloc penetration appears to be only the lack of a firm Soviet decision to move in.

Certainly opportunities for penetration are obvious, numerous, almost made to order … “I strongly believe that the same opportunities also exist for the United States. The trouble is, as I see it, that the United States Government seems to be unwilling to budget sufficient funds to enable us to pre-empt sensitive sectors and to fire at targets of opportunity, which is precisely what the Soviets seem to be preparing to do. Since we cannot occupy all positions, planning on a contingency basis seems essential—but it is just this principle which is being continuously denigrated.

Nor can I agree at all with your statement that “one gets the impression our people are, if not content with this limited pattern (reliance on technical cooperation, cultural exchange and old-fashioned diplomacy), at least not prepared to urge strongly a larger action program or to define their ideas as to what might be effective.” The difficulty, rather, seems to be that you and others in the Department expect us to come up with concrete plans for aid on either a continent-wide or a country-to-country basis, failing which it is felt that we cannot go to Congress and ask for the necessary funds to counter the anticipated major Soviet effort in Africa. I do not believe it realistic to expect this kind of neat programming precision in a fast-moving situation when there are so many unknown and variable factors.

You state “no impression was given me that our representatives have very much information or assessment of the Soviet intentions in such matters.” That is entirely correct, and it is the reason why we may be defeated in Africa if detailed information of this kind is a precondition for United States preparation for action. You also state that “The strategic significance or political importance of the area seemed to be viewed in low key, especially by the Washington AF representatives, who cannot be accused of encouraging grandiose schemes.” I am afraid that such sentences convey an entirely inaccurate impression of the proceedings in Tangier. Surely, the encouragement of “grandiose schemes” is not the only measure of our seriousness in viewing the African situation.

I completely agree with you that we need better information, clearer analyses of the problems, prompt and effective programs of political and economic action, stronger staffs and clearer policy guidance. However, if we are going to wait until all of these elements or conditions are met we will surely be defeated in Africa. The solution does not lie in waiting until we have larger staffs in Africa, have solved the problem of African technical education, have G–2–d Soviet intentions in great detail—or in throwing up our hands in despair and concentrating only on the most promising countries in Africa.

It seems to me that we have a real difference of basic approach. Your memorandum attempts to place on the Bureau of African Affairs and its field representatives the blame for the inability of the United States to move swiftly in a swift-moving situation in which not all the factors are known, in which the intentions of our opponents are not yet quite clear, and where neatly worked-out programs of the conventional kind cannot be prepared quickly. I think we can work out a different approach together, and I earnestly solicit your cooperation to that end. Perhaps you can think of ways in which the findings of the Tangier Conference could be used to document the urgent needs of the African area and the unique situation we have there, so as to justify what someone at Tangier called “unconventional solutions to unconventional problems” in Africa.

I greatly appreciate the comments you made about the personnel situation at some of our African posts, and the need to beef up some of our posts so that we can be better prepared for the emergencies that are sure to arise there in many places. I know that I can count on your support in carrying our requests to the highest levels in the Department if necessary.

Our report of the Tangier Conference, which sets forth its conclusions and summarizes the proceedings in some detail, has been circulated to the field and will be disseminated throughout the Department as soon as field comments have been received. Meanwhile, I would appreciate it if you could let me know to whom, in addition to Mr. Hare, your memorandum was disseminated, so that I may send copies of this memorandum to them also.³

0. Source: Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 69 D 295, Tangier—Chiefs of Mission Conference. Confidential. Drafted by Martin F. Herz, United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of African Affairs. Copies were sent to the Under Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, the Special Assistant for Communist Economic Affairs, the Deputy Director of ICA, the Policy Planning Staff, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary.
1. Not printed. (Ibid.)
2. All ellipses are in the source text.
3. Bell responded to Satterthwaite on July 5. He noted that the amount of aid did not concern him only that it advance the “attainment of U.S. policy objectives.” (Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 69 D 295, U.S. Aid)