Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations⁰

November 23, 1960, 11:09 p.m.

971. Dept appreciates effective efforts of GADel to achieve important GA decision in favor Kasavubu. Successful outcome of Congo credentials vote, in Department’s judgment, sets stage for next phases of operation to consolidate gains in effort to restore tranquillity and stability to Congo. Vote was expression by General Assembly of support for Kasavubu and moderates in Congo and rejection extremists both in Congo and in GA. We assume that Hammarskjold will no longer give undue weight to views of Ghana, Guinea and others in implementing UN decisions and will now be prepared work forth-rightly with Kasavubu and his supporters.

We must now take all necessary measures to help place government in Congo on firm constitutional footing. We can expect that Lumumba supporters in Assembly and Congo will make every effort reverse results if given opportunity. U.S. interests and prestige continue be very directly involved in Congo and we believe Kasavubu now in more favorable position to take lead in bringing about improvement in Congo situation.

Pursuant to our policy of maintaining frank and open lines of communication with Hammarskjold USUN should seek earliest opportunity discuss Congo with Hammarskjold, making inter alia following points:

1) United States remains concerned with highly dangerous potential of Soviet and Lumumba activities in Orientale Province. We recall SYG’s previous statements of concern in this regard. Current reports indicate Lumumba continues regard Orientale Province as possible stronghold and base for separatist government is event he unable regain power in Leopoldville. Seating of Kasavubu could trigger Lumumba and his Congolese and other supporters to take further measures in Stanleyville area. You should draw upon Leopoldville’s 1243,¹ 1249² as well as Despatch 138³ to make clear steps already taken by Lumumbistes achieve firm control over province, possibly in preparation Katanga-type secession. Sufficient evidence has now accumulated concerning these activities to make problem one requiring his urgent attention.

Major threat to peace and future of Congo lies in possibility secessionist Lumumba group in Stanleyville would receive prompt Soviet and Satellite recognition and support, as well as that of Guinea and possibly UAR and Ghana. This would bring about critical world security situation UN presence was designed avert. SYG must know US is deeply committed to precluding Soviet take-over in Central Africa.

Possibility of Lumumba-inspired secession by Orientale Province all more disturbing because reports of concentration of Communist-bloc personnel there. (FYI. According to press reports Polish medical team located there. End FYI) With activities of Louis Lumumba,⁴ Gizenga, and Salumu⁵ and others, Stanleyville has emerged as center of extremist activity. Even without Lumumba-Communist involvement, situation would be bad, with breakdown of law and order.

We hope SYG will consider Stanleyville problem carefully. We believe two concrete steps would help: a) assignment of strong, moderate UN personnel in key positions in province; and b) prompt UN intervention to secure release of Songolo⁶ and ten other parliamentarians still being held by Lumumbistes and insistence on future security guarantees. All information we have is that Songolo is not receiving adequate medical treatment. In addition, we believe it would be desirable to have SYG consider desirability of moving some UN forces into Stanleyville area in addition to Ethiopians now there.

2) We hope that Hammarskjold will now work with Kasavubu and his supporters to place Congo Government on firmer footing. In this connection, major role for UN would seem to be in guaranteeing security for moderates in Congo. Without such conditions, it would not be possible to move ahead to putting Congolese Government on more firm footing.

3) If, but only if, Hammarskjold requests US views, you may confirm US not favorably impressed with Dayal. At same time he should be informed that we appreciate fully difficulties involved in changing his top team in Congo. Our hope is that now that Kasavubu position clear that appropriate instructions will be sent to UN Command in field and that tight and effective control be maintained from New York.

4) Re problem of Belgian technicians, US continues be impressed with tremendous gap between requirements for services and ability to meet these which exist almost across board in Congo. We see no reasonable prospect for meeting most of these needs without significant role being played by Belgian technical and other personnel for some time to come. Nevertheless, we recognize that there are Belgian nationals in Congo who are “soldiers of fortune” types, e.g. in Katanga and Kasai, and others who are advancing their personal interests and acting in ways contrary to program which United Nations is trying to pursue in Congo. We think important step to be taken at this stage is for Secretary-General to enter into full and frank discussions with Belgians on full range of these problems. We understand that Belgians are prepared to send high-ranking Belgian official from Brussels and would hope that consultations between him and SYG could shortly be undertaken. Highly pragmatic approach to problem is probably most productive, i.e., examination of problem areas by categories or if necessary on case-by-case basis. We have constantly counseled Belgium to work closely with Secretary-General and will continue to attempt to secure their close cooperation with UN. We prepared to encourage Belgians to exercise more effective control over their nationals in Congo. We believe that this whole problem stands better chance of being resolved satisfactorily if for the time being at least there is a moratorium on public pronouncements on both sides.

5) You should also make it clear there is no question of our continued support for UN effort in Congo. We continue to believe that it affords the only real hope of minimizing the threat to world peace and of restoring stability to the Congo.

USUN should also take occasion of Kasavubu’s continued presence in New York to make following points to him:

1) Favorable outcome of vote on credentials, due mainly to Kasavubu’s statesmanlike behavior in New York, places obligations on him as well as new opportunities. If victory is not to be Pyrrhic, there must be political progress in the Congo. Of utmost importance is need for Congolese Army to act in a responsible and disciplined manner. While we defended in GA Mobutu action in Welbeck case,⁷ subsequent acts of violence against UN personnel most difficult to defend and if repeated can only diminish international support of Congo and Kasavubu Government. Kasavubu should recognize that UN will hold him personally responsible, as Chief of State, for actions of CNA.

2) We have noted with satisfaction Kasavubu’s intention to convoke a round-table conference in Leopoldville of representative provincial leaders. We hope Katanga and Kasai representatives can be induced attend and believe Kasavubu should consider a personal initiative with Tshombe in this regard. We hope conference could be followed at some appropriate time by some move reconvene representative organs of nation either to endorse new government or to elaborate new constitutional framework. Point to emphasize is that we have won a battle and not a war. Proponents of partisan solution in Congo can be expected return to attack.

3) In view importance of UN as political factor in Congo, we believe he should discuss his differences with present UNOC hierarchy frankly with SYG with a view to reaching concrete solutions.

For Embassy Leopoldville: Department hopes every effort will be made capitalize on Kasavubu victory. We hope he will receive warm reception on his return to Leopoldville and that public relations aspects his victory will be exploited to full by friendly news media. UN vote in effect means Kasavubu has now emerged as undisputed spokesman for Congolese people before the world.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2360. Secret. Drafted by Tron, Cargo, and Sisco; cleared by Penfield, Blue, and Bohlen; and approved by Merchant. Also sent to Léopoldville and repeated to Brussels.
1. Dated November 19, telegram 1243 reported that the situation in Orientale had deteriorated since early spring due to the activity of Lumumba and his followers. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–1960)
2. Dated November 19. (Ibid., 332.70G/11–1960)
3. Dated November 16. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–1660)
4. Patrice Lumumba’s brother and Minister of the Interior, Social Affairs, Youth, and Information on Orientale Province.
5. Commissioner of Stanleyville District Bernard Salumu.
6. Alphonse Songolo, formerly Minister of Communications in the Lumumba government, repudiated Lumumba; he and other deputies were imprisoned when they arrived in Stanleyville on October 17.
7. Reference is to an incident that occurred early on November 22 when Congolese army forces sought to remove Ghanaian Chargé Welbeck from the Ghanaian Ambassador’s residence, which was guarded by U.N. forces. It came under discussion in the General Assembly when Ghana proposed to adjourn debate on the credentials issue pending a report by the Secretary-General on the incident.