Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

267. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, November 25, 1960, 9 p.m.

1526. Congo.

1. SYG asked to talk to us yesterday on Congo, so we had opportunity take up with him points in Deptel 971.¹ (Before this meeting we had exchange views with UK and found their instructions virtually identical with ours, including attitude toward Dayal.)

2. SYG started mtg out by discussing events Wednesday² re Conciliation Commission. He took strong exception to first letter Kasavubu had written to commission,³ said Kasavubu had been more forthcoming in their subsequent conversation, but that second letter had been less satisfactory than their oral discussion.⁴SYG said Kasavubu was obviously getting advice from different quarters which accounted for his shifts in position. (We felt he implying US doing some of this and in unhelpful manner.) Subsequently Kasavubu had met with Advisory Comite.⁵ Kasavubu had told them he needed time to quiet situation in Congo before any UN Conciliation Commission was sent. To question from Wachuku (Nigeria) as to how long this would be, he replied would depend on how preparations went. SYG said this position was unsatisfactory and Kasavubu should accept Conciliation Commission and agree to it going within 10 days. Kasavubu had also asked him to remove Dayal, which he had immediately rejected. Kasavubu also said there should be no more UN troops and that start should be made in reducing them. SYG said he had pointed out to Kasavubu he (Kasavubu) could not maintain order in Congo with Congolese Army, even if it were all operating under his control. It was not under control since, through no fault their own, there no officers in ANC at all. SYG implied he might threaten Kasavubu with withdrawal UN entirely.

3. Inasmuch as SYG had raised Dayal question, Barco reiterated we continued to believe Dayal not pursuing same policy as SYG and that we had considerable evidence of this. SYG again defended Dayal. He cited as evidence of Dayal’s orientation fact that he had recently asked for Adeel⁶ (Sudan) as his deputy. SYG commented that Adeel’s anti-Lumumba sympathies were well known. Barco replied we did not regard this as evidence of Dayal’s attitude, noting Sudan was located next to Orientale Province and was under political pressures because of this and that in any case Adeel not likely to be counterweight to Dayal. (SYG not apparently aware possible plans involving Stanleyville from Sudan side.) We also referred to vigorous pro-Lumumba position India had taken in UN as evidence Indian attitude and told him our concern continued. SYG said he expected to be able to get Sudanese Govt to release Adeel for assignment at Dayal’s request. We do not think this will be desirable. (UK agrees with us, feeling Adeel too weak.) Dept may wish ask us to urge him to get more favorable deputy such as Irish or Tunisian.

4. In his initial presentation and thoughout later discussion SYG also continued to express considerable suspicion of Belgians and of their influence on Kasavubu. He particularly critical of Wigny’s public attitude, noting he claimed “victory” at Kasavubu seating. SYG clearly regards Belgian Govt as pressing active political interests against UN in Congo. In accordance reftel Barco urged him work out problems with Belgians on case-by-case method and have moratorium on public statements. SYG said he agreed and found Van Den Bosch easy to work with. He said Belgians wanted to “cooperate” with UN. He feels “coordination” all he can do now. As example “coordination” he said Belgians should not attempt to fill jobs UN already holding. He cited case of ICAO personnel whom Belgians displaced. (We also think he means that Belgians should consult UN before they fill any posts so UN can fill them first if UN wishes.) SYG said he prepared to talk with Belgian rep but not for few more days.

5. Re question improved cooperation between SYG and Kasavubu, SYG agreed GA action had strengthened Kasavubu position and that it was important to build him up. He said GA action had both advantages and disadvantages. He thought latter outweighed former but did not specify reasons. As result GA decision he thought Kasavubu should now be built up by UN “internationally” but not “nationally”. Barco said we consider UN should cooperate with Kasavubu and not continue to put roadblocks in way of Congolese exercising their authority. Psychologically it extremely important they not be rebuffed every time they try to act with authority. When he cited Welbeck case as example, SYG defended UN action by saying proper expulsion order (as distinguished from declaration he persona non grata), had not been issued until after action against Welbeck begun. Barco replied we would not expect Congolese to act in diplomatic affairs with precision of Europeans; UN should have told Ghanaians, at time Welbeck declared P.N.G., they should get Welbeck out, instead of protecting him. SYG said perhaps he himself should have done this here with Quaison-Sackey. (It not at all clear yet extent to which SYG prepared to go in developing UN–Congo cooperation, and Dept may want instruct us go back to him on necessity UN supporting Kasavubu nationally as well as internationally.)

6. SYG seemed aware of dangers in Orientale but did not commit himself on additional troop units or getting Songolo out of Gizenga’s hands. On troops he observed Ethiopian were among his best. On Songolo he said UN taking continuing interest. He said Gizenga periodically asked for UN protection there, which UN refusing until he released deputies; he hoped this would bring him around. SYG also said UN had refused permission for Lumumba go to Stanleyville to attend daughter’s funeral, pointing out this difficult decision to take.

7. He referred again to need bringing Ileo govt into more active operation and to necessity Kasavubu establishing control over Mobutu in such govt as Chief of Staff responsible to civil authority.

8. In course presentation Barco read to him all points Dept requested us to put to him in reftel virtually verbatim. SYG said he agreed with our entire position (except Dayal) and our objectives were same. Nevertheless our distinct impression is that there remains considerable difference of approach, as above report shows, and that SYG attitude not yet satisfactory. We also told him what we expected to say to Kasavubu, which he appreciated.

Wadsworth

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2560. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Léopoldville and Brussels.
1. Document 266.
2. November 23.
3. In it, Kasavubu objected to the dispatch of the Conciliation Commission to the Congo. For text, see Annex IV to the Report by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, November 24, 1960; U.N. doc. A/4592.
4. In it, Kasavubu expressed willingness to discuss with Hammarskjöld or the Advisory Committee measures that might promote conciliation in the Congo. For text, see Annex V, ibid.
5. On November 23. It was agreed that the Conciliation Commission would postpone its scheduled November 26 meeting in the Congo until the week of December 5; see the Advisory Committee report, ibid.
6. Sudan’s Representative at the United Nations, Omar Abdel Hamid Adeel.