259. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas) to Secretary of State Herter0

Dear Chris: From reports available to us it appears that, in his 21 October conversation with Secretary General Hammarskjold,1 Ambassador Bohlen made a forcefully clear presentation of the United States position on the present situation in the Congo. Defense is in complete agreement with the conclusions reached by Ambassador Bohlen as a result of this conference. Additionally, we concur with the three courses of action which the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations suggests be taken within the UN framework.

We are concerned, however, because the reasons offered by the Secretary General for the present inactivity of the UN in a rapidly deteriorating situation in the Congo ignore the pressing requirement for immediate restoration of law and order. The prestige of the United Nations itself is deeply involved in successful solution of the Congo problem. In view of this and the interest shown by Secretary General Hammarskjold in definite ideas about “where to go next”, Defense believes that the United States should take full advantage of this opportunity to influence UN actions and regain the initiative.

Accordingly, I am enclosing a list of recommended courses of action which Defense believes will assist us toward our common goal of:

a.
Establishment of law and order in the Congo and creation of stable conditions for UN operations; and
b.
Establishment of a legally recognized and responsible Congolese Government.

Because of the initial momentum achieved by Ambassador Bohlen and the instability within the Congo, I hope that these courses of action will receive early review and, as appropriate, will be brought to the attention of the Secretary General at an early date.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Douglas
[Page 572]

[Enclosure]

2

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

A. Basic Objectives in the Republic of the Congo

1.
Establishment of law and order in the Congo and creation of stable conditions for UN operations.
2.
Establishment of a legally recognized and responsible Congolese Government.

B. Establish Law and Order

1.
Representations to the United Nations.
a.
Provide the UN Representative in the Congo and the Commanding General, UN Forces, with directives clearly defining their mission and responsibilities so as to stimulate them to take positive action to restore law and order and to maintain public safety.
b.
Neutralize Lumumba by denying him UN protection not in fact accorded members of the Ileo government, removing him from the Prime Minister’s residence and ultimately removing him from Leopoldville.
c.
Transfer Dayal, UN Special Representative, and General Von Horn, Commanding General of UN Forces in the Congo, to UN Headquarters to be advisers to the Secretary-General.
d.
Replace Dayal and General Von Horn in the Congo with more dynamic and effective leaders.
e.
Achieve more effective UN assistance and advice looking to control of the Congolese national army excluding military advisers from Ghana, Guinea, UAR, and Morocco. This would require a reassignment of General Kettani.
f.
Cause UN forces to exercise more effective control of all major ports and airports of entry in order to minimize and restrict introduction of arms, ammunition and unauthorized personnel into the Congo.
g.
Assure that members of Parliament, College of Commissioners and other government officials are provided full protection by UN troops.
h.
Assure and assert centralized, positive command and control of all UN troops to include their redeployment as necessary.
i.
Through UN Special Representative:
(1)
Assume control of traffic in and around Leopoldville.
(2)
Establish curfew in Leopoldville and other major cities.
(3)
Establish control of radio, press, public health and medical facilities, public utilities, and civilian public transportation.
(4)
Establish widely separated points for emergency distribution of food to avoid the assembly of large numbers of people.
2.
Unilateral U.S. Action.
a.
Take all feasible means to discredit or eliminate Lumumba as an effective political force to include support of anti-Lumumba factions financially and by propaganda activities.
b.
Undertake vigorous diplomatic campaign to induce other nations, especially African and Asian, to provide positive, active support of the UN efforts.
c.
Take necessary steps, overtly and covertly, to identify unauthorized foreign agents, particularly Communist Bloc personnel currently in the Congo and initiate propaganda looking to their expulsion from the country.
d.
Keep informed of activities of other nations in the Congo and seek to ensure that their actions are in best interests of the Congo.
e.
Be prepared to implement plans for direct intervention in the event of failure of UN efforts to restore order or to prevent resumption of power by Lumumba.

C. Establish Competent Government

1.
Representations to the United Nations.
a.
Foster the formation of a new caretaker government with Kasavubu as Chief of State, Bomboko as Prime Minister, and Mobutu as Chief of Staff or Defense Minister.
b.
Enhance prestige of the Kasavubu Government by seating of its delegation in the General Assembly.
c.
Develop a basic plan of action for the new government which can be discussed with the political leaders and members of Parliament by UN representatives.
d.
Provide technical, political, economic and military advisers who are fully informed of basic UN policy and able to work effectively with counterparts in Congolese Government.
e.
Provide counsel and support for members of government including legislative elements in an effort to establish a capable, stable government.
f.
Establish and support a judiciary.
g.
Reorganize, train and administer the National Congolese Army and Gendarmérie under the supervision of the UN.
h.
Induce Congolese provincial leaders to support de facto government pending determination of future structure of government.
2.
Unilateral U.S. Action.
a.
Continue efforts to guide and stimulate Kasavubu, Bomboko and Mobutu to develop positive plans and programs.
b.
Enhance position of Kasavubu through positive public relations program and by direct grant of “prestige” accouterments such as automobile and airplane.
c.
Send in modest numbers of U.S. personnel, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to provide counsel and assistance at all levels.
d.
Provide grant aid assistance in economic and social fields as required.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–1060. Secret. Filed with a covering note from William B. Grant of the Executive Secretariat referring it to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs for the preparation of a reply.
  2. See Document 249.
  3. No classification marking.