Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

260. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

November 11, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• Belgium
  • Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny
  • Ambassador Rothschild
  • Ambassador Scheyven
  • M. de Bassompierre
• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Bohlen, IO
  • Mr. McBride, WE

Foreign Minister Wigny opened the conversation saying that in view of our common interests in the Congo he would like to present the Belgian viewpoint on the present situation. Initially, he said, he wished to express thanks for the recent statement which the United States had made, with regard to the Dayal report, supporting the Belgian position.¹ He said this statement had ended the feeling of isolation which the Belgians had felt previously. He thought the strong position which we had taken on the Dayal report and on the Hammarskjold notes with regard to Belgian technicians had been very helpful and had materially changed the situation in New York. He said that in particular the fact we had let our position be known had been useful to the Belgians. He also expressed appreciation at the willingness of the U.S. delegation in New York to meet with the group of interested Western delegations almost on a day-to-day basis.

Foreign Minister Wigny then passed to a discussion of Belgium’s difficulties with the Secretary General. He said the Belgian Government believed and recognized the fact that the UN should remain in the Congo for a long time. Nevertheless, Belgium also thought there was a role for Belgians in the Congo as well, both in the private sector and in the supplying of technicians. There should be at least coexistence and preferably cooperation between the United Nations and Belgium in the Congo. Belgium certainly does not want to reoccupy the Congo and her initial action in sending security forces at the time of outbreaks in July was only to protect Western interests. As soon as UN forces had arrived, Belgian forces had been withdrawn.

Foreign Minister Wigny continued by saying that now the Secretary General had undertaken a series of unwise actions. He noted the expressed desire of the Secretary General to crush Mr. Tshombe. Foreign Minister Wigny said that Belgian policy was that Katanga was only temporarily a separate entity. He said that Hammarskjold, however, had the foolish idea that the first step in the Leopoldville struggle should be to get Tshombe on his knees and then to recreate a group of leaders of a united Congo through the parliamentary process. He said he thought this was unrealistic, although in the long run Belgium, of course, hoped that all Congo elements would effectively get together and approve a new fundamental law. However, it seemed unwise to remove Tshombe at such a time as the security situation was worse everywhere else in the Congo than in the domain which he controls. Although Hammarskjold had not written down his views on these points, Wigny continued, he had made them clear and had repeated them again yesterday to him in New York. Foreign Minister Wigny went on to say that there should be created a new unity in the Congo including Katanga, but that this needed the cooperation of the Katanga authorities, including Tshombe, as well as the more sensible elements in Leopoldville. Although the Secretary General said he was not a supporter of Lumumba, he seemed to envisage his return to power. Reconvening Parliament as Lumumba desired would play into the latter’s hands and would probably lead to his restoration to power because of his ability to convince and frighten the Parliamentarians. Foreign Minister Wigny indicated that the Belgians thought that some satisfactory group of leaders should be settled on first with Parliament convened at a later date to approve them. He thought that to ask Parliament itself to select the leaders would almost inevitably lead to the return of Lumumba.

The Secretary said he had been interested by the views of Sendwe in favor of a loose confederation including a central government and strong provincial governments. Under the Sendwe plan the central government would handle foreign affairs, defense, financial and communications problems. Furthermore, Katanga revenues would be turned over to the central government in the amount of one-third while Katanga would keep two-thirds of its revenues for itself. He thought that this seemed like a moderate proposal and therefore was somewhat encouraging.

The Belgian Foreign Minister said that he thought the situation of centralization versus decentralization should be left fairly fluid and that it should simply be stated that the different interested elements in all parts of the Congo including Katanga were working together in a brotherly way. At the same time stress should be put on the fact that Lumumba was the one who was dividing the Congo. Unity should be achieved in Leopoldville first and then an arrangement for decentralization worked out including the Katanga.

Foreign Minister Wigny then passed to the question of Belgian technicians and said that the Secretary General was asking for their removal but that it was somewhat hard to follow him. The Belgians were not entirely clear as to what he wanted, whether or not it was to eliminate the Belgian element in the Congo entirely. Foreign Minister Wigny said that on some occasions Mr. Hammarskjold seemed to envisage only the departure of certain categories of Belgian civil servants but that at other times he seemed to want to do away with the Belgian presence entirely. Hammarskjold had asked that Belgian bilateral assistance should stop and should be channeled through the UN. Foreign Minister Wigny was exercised at an article appearing in the US press that morning to the effect that UNESCO was seeking 500 French-speaking but non-Belgian teachers for the Congo. Foreign Minister Wigny pointed out that even if 500 French-speaking teachers could be found, it would not be possible to find ones who understood the local political situation and spoke the local languages. He thought only the Belgians would fulfill such a requirement. Foreign Minister Wigny said he was aware of Hammarskjold’s rationale that if Belgian bilateral assistance were permitted this would establish a precedent for Soviet bilateral aid in the event of the return of Lumumba. The Foreign Minister then pointed out that the Belgians involved in the Congo were not Belgian Government civil servants but were employed by the Congolese Government which has requested their return often by name. He added that it was not only Tshombe but authorities in Leopoldville and other provincial capitals who had requested these technicians, who now numbered about 2100. Foreign Minister Wigny said seven hundred of these were teachers, three hundred were with OTRACO² and five hundred with Sabena. Only a third of the total were in the Katanga. The Secretary asked if it were true that the Belgian Government paid one-third of these salaries while two-thirds was paid by the local authorities. Foreign Minister Wigny said that this was correct.

Foreign Minister Wigny then proceeded to criticize Mr. Dayal, saying that he was unfair to the Belgians on the technician problem and that the Congolese wanted them present. The Foreign Minister added that the Belgians were not undertaking any new bilateral programs but simply carrying out agreements which had been reached before independence. Therefore, this did not establish a precedent for an eventual Soviet presence since the Belgian agreements were a factor of independence. The Foreign Minister then declared that if Belgium had had an additional fifteen years in the Congo it would have been the best prepared country in Africa for independence. The base of the pyramid of people who had been trained was large, but there simply had not been time to build up a sufficient group of upper-level personnel. There were more Congolese in secondary institutions, for example, than there were Nigerians. The UN could not find the proper people to fill technical jobs in the Congo but wanted to displace Belgians. Foreign Minister Wigny said he wondered if the Secretary General, in fact, wished to establish a UN trusteeship over the Congo. He thought this would be a dangerous precedent for Africans generally. He also referred to the Secretary General’s letter to Tshombe which he criticized and added that Lumumba would certainly bring back Soviet technicians on a bilateral basis should he attain power again.

The Secretary inquired regarding the Foreign Minister’s talk with Hammarskjold and Dayal in New York the previous day. Foreign Minister Wigny said that the Secretary General had been courteous but had maintained all of his positions, which the Belgians thought were unwise. Foreign Minister Wigny said he thought that Hammarskjold had been very much affected by the attack which Khrushchev had made on him and felt that he must at all costs have Afro-Asian support even if the Afro-Asians should decide they wanted Lumumba’s return to power. Foreign Minister Wigny stated he thought Hammarskjold was forgetting that he might be damaging the future of the Congo and also acting to the detriment of the West as a whole. He noted that the money for the Congo rescue operation was coming entirely from the West. He said Belgium wanted to cooperate with the UN since both Belgium and the UN are in fact present in the Congo. However, the UN was making it difficult for there to be genuine cooperation and UN policy seemed to be to eliminate Belgium from the picture entirely. He stressed that some settlement must be found but said that the present conditions of the Secretary General were unacceptable. He referred again to Belgian displeasure with the remarks of Bunche in a magazine article and Cordier in a T.V. interview.

Ambassador Rothschild referred again to remarks attributed to Hammarskjold to the effect that Tshombe must be removed and that the Belgian presence in the Katanga should be eliminated because it was the prop without which Tshombe could not continue to exist. Rothschild added that the Secretary General seemed to have the mistaken idea that Congolese unity would be achieved by the collapse of the present Katanga administration. The Secretary noted that it was somewhat difficult to envisage what would happen if Tshombe were to disappear and who would replace him. Mr. Bohlen said that Hammarskjold thought Tshombe was an obstacle to Congolese unity and that he would fall if Belgian support were removed. Therefore, according to the Secretary General’s reasoning, this Belgian help should be withdrawn. The Secretary General, according to Mr. Bohlen, also felt that there was strong opposition to Tshombe in Katanga and that there were numerous Lumumba followers there. However, he said, the Secretary General was not entirely clear on these points. Mr. Bohlen stressed that Hammarskjold was not consciously planning the return of Lumumba though he admitted this might well be the result of the policy which he espoused.

The Secretary said that Dayal did not seem to be too well informed on the plotting which was going on in Leopoldville and which was anti-UN in nature. He thought there was danger of merely creating additional chaos.

The Secretary then asked Wigny if he was planning further talks with the SYG. Mr. Wigny indicated that he was sending Foreign Office Secretary General Van Den Bosch, who knew Hammarskjold, to New York to hold further discussions. However, he thought that the November 10 discussion which he had had with the SYG had been on the whole discouraging. Nevertheless, the UN must be pushed hard to effect a compromise with the Belgians since both were necessary to the Congo. He added that Hammarskjold was playing the African game, but that the Congolese should have freedom to select technicians as they desire. This was not a Belgian reoccupation. Foreign Minister Wigny indicated he would send to the Secretary details regarding the number and type of Belgian technicians who are now present in the Congo. He referred to the fact that the courts cannot function at the present time because of the absence of Belgian judges and that various Congolese provincial governments had requested the return of such officials. The Secretary referred to the need for Belgian judges and lawyers and wondered how the Congo could operate without them, how courts could operate, how warrants would be written, etc.

Wigny then said that the SYG appeared to differentiate between various categories of Belgians in the Congo. The two categories to which he objected as near as the Belgians could tell were: 1) army officers and 2) “policy makers”. The officers, Wigny said, were public servants hired by the Congolese prior to independence. He noted the contrast between the peaceful conditions existing in the rest of the Katanga where there were Belgians and the chaos now existing in the northern portion of the province where the UN was present. Wigny also stated that there would be a bad reaction among the large and important Belgian colony in Elisabethville if Belgian officers were to depart.

Wigny went on to say that Hammarskjold was also wrong in his feeling about the so-called “policy makers” among Belgian technicians and said these were simply advisers to the Commissioners. When anything went wrong, he said, the Belgians were blamed, but these men were not operating as Belgian government functionaries. Rather, the Congolese felt the need of them and had asked for them. Hammarskjold had asked that they be refused Belgian passports but this was not possible for the Belgian government. Wigny then said he had suggested that there should be personal contact in Leopoldville between a Belgian liaison officer and the UN there. He said, however, Dayal appeared to treasure his troubles and did not want to take steps to iron them out; rather, he would prefer to use a big stick against the Belgians. The Secretary inquired whether, since the Belgian Government was paying one-third of the salaries of these people, it could recall them. Ambassador Rothschild said that these were mostly former colonial officials which had been selected by name by the Congolese. They go under the terms of the agreements reached between Belgium and the Congo before independence. The Belgian contribution is for the upkeep of the families of these people in Belgium. The Secretary thought that it might be useful to go over problems involving Belgian functionaries on a case by case basis and perhaps recall trouble-makers who might be found. Ambassador Rothschild said that the Belgians had proposed a liaison officer in Leopoldville who could be in touch with the UN and use his influence with the Congolese and keep Belgian functionaries in line. However, he said, Hammarskjold had rejected this idea. He concluded that ultimately the Belgian Government could recall these functionaries but that this would be highly undesirable.

Mr. Bohlen then said it might be possible for the Belgians to discuss the problem of their technicians with Mr. Hammarskjold on a basis of different categories, such as para-military technicians, teachers, etc. He said that Hammarskjold had been vague with him some weeks ago when they had discussed this problem as to exactly what technicians he thought should go. It seemed to Mr. Bohlen that he did not mean that all of them should depart but that only some of them.

The Secretary then inquired into the Belgian attitude on the 15-man commission. Mr. Bohlen said that this group was still in New York and that there was some difficulty about its terms of reference. Mr. Bohlen did not think it would go for a couple of weeks. He thought it was important that there be some moderate African representation thereon, and added that Hammarskjold was not keen about it. Mr. Bohlen said that Hammarskjold was well aware of our views on all of these problems and we would continue to talk with him.

The Secretary agreed with the Belgian point to the effect that the West was paying the bill for this operation and that the Afro-Asians were trying to direct it. He did not approve of the idea of placing only Africans on the 15-man commission and eliminating countries such as Ireland which is also participating with forces in the Congo. Wigny said that he was afraid the 15-man commission would take certain decisions and that perhaps these would be adverse to the West. He admitted that Kasavubu had not presented his viewpoint effectively to the other Africans in New York. Wigny said that he had also thought perhaps it could be suggested to Kasavubu that he might invite a group of friendly African Chiefs of State to Leopoldville in order to counter-balance the 15-man group. Perhaps all Chiefs of State of countries south of the Sahara could be invited, as this would lead to the presence of, on the whole, a moderate group. The Secretary inquired if it were the Belgian thought that Kasavubu should initiate such an invitation. Wigny replied in the affirmative and Ambassador Rothschild added that the 15-man group would undoubtedly favor Lumumba. Mr. Bohlen said that not all of them would favor Lumumba but admitted that the dominating ones probably would, although perhaps this was not a numerical majority. Rothschild added that the Belgian thought was that this would be a parallel operation to the dispatch of the 15-man group and that it would not be an operation mounted through the UN but rather by direct invitations to the countries involved.

The Secretary thought that it would be a good idea to seat the Kasavubu delegation first or otherwise it risked adding to the confusion. Wigny agreed. The Secretary said he was disturbed by the strong racial element involved and the exclusion of Sweden, Ireland and Canada from the 15-man group although these countries were also participating in the UN operation. Furthermore, countries like ours which were providing the money for this operation were also worried about the “stacked” nature of the commission. He thought that Malaya might be helpful but that Indonesia would not be so good.

Ambassador Rothschild added that Kasavubu was personally opposed to this commission. The Secretary said that unfortunately Kasavubu had not made a particularly good impression in New York³ and had not been very forceful. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that Kasavubu was of course the one person on whose status there was universal agreement. Wigny said it was therefore important to seat him and his delegation in New York. Mr Bohlen noted that the Credentials Committee had reported favorably by a six-to-one vote.⁴

Foreign Minister Wigny then returned to the problem of Belgian teachers in the Congo and referred again to the press report that UNESCO was seeking five hundred French-speaking teachers but excluding Belgians. The Secretary said he had not been under the impression that Hammarskjold was particularly concerned about Belgian teachers, but rather by Belgian officers in the cabinets of the Congolese Commissioners. Therefore he thought the suggestion of the Belgians studying with Hammarskjold the different categories of Belgians involved would be helpful. Wigny repeated his desire to be cooperative with the UN in the Congo, but noted that of course Belgium has no Ambassador in Leopoldville and that his suggestion for a liaison arrangement had been turned down. He said that Belgium would continue to have a role in the Congo if only because of the private sector.

The Secretary said he would be glad to have the figures regarding Belgian technicians. Mr. Bohlen asked if this problem would be discussed further by Wigny with Hammarskjold. Wigny said he did not believe so but that he would send Van Den Bosch to New York to follow up on the previous talk. The Secretary said he thought this would be a good idea and that further exploratory talks would be useful. The meeting closed with a further reference to the credentials situation in New York with Wigny saying he thought it would be helpful to have the plenary on seating the Kasavubu delegation as soon as possible. Mr. Bohlen said we would push forward, but of course we did not know yet how the voting situation looked for the plenary. It was agreed that the Belgians certainly would not take any leading role on this problem either publicly or even privately. There was then a brief reference to the postponement of the Congo debate and Mr. Bohlen said he believed that the official who had been in the chair at the time had not followed the proper rules of UN procedure.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–1160. Secret. Drafted by McBride and approved in S on November 25.
1. See footnote 2, Document 255.
2. A parastatal transportation organization.
3. In an address to the General Assembly on November 8, Kasavubu announced the names of a delegation headed by himself and requested that they be seated immediately; for text see U.N. doc. A/PV.912.
4. The Credentials Committee voted on November 10 in favor of a U.S. draft resolution recommending acceptance of the Kasavubu delegation’s credentials. For the committee’s report, see U.N. doc. A/4578; for text of Barco’s November 10 statement before the committee, see Department of State Bulletin, December 12, 1960, pp. 904–906.
5. Reference is to a procedural issue during a General Assembly debate on the Congo on November 9. Ghana moved to adjourn debate on the subject on the ground that further debate might obstruct the task of the Conciliation Commission. The U.S. Delegation sought priority for a motion to adjourn the meeting, which would have postponed the vote on the Ghanaian motion, but General Assembly President Frederick H. Boland of Ireland ruled that the latter had priority. The General Assembly adopted the Ghanaian motion by a vote of 48 to 30 with 18 abstentions. For the record of the meeting, see U.N. doc. A/PV.913.