Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

194. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)⁰

August 30, 1960.

Dear Mr. Dillon: The recent beating of an unarmed U.S. Air Force airplane crew by armed members of the Force Publique at the Stanleyville Airport is a matter of grave concern to the Department of Defense. This latest, and most aggravated, of a series of such acts of irresponsible violence emphasizes that positive steps must be taken quickly to restore order in the Congo.¹

The immediate concern of the Department of Defense is for the safety of the members of the U.S. forces, who are engaged in providing and supporting the airlift of United Nations forces and equipment. I urge that strong representation be made immediately to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, looking to the proper security of airfields and related facilities in the Congo. If assurances of adequate security cannot be provided, it may become necessary to revamp our method of providing operational support in the country, one example of which might be to limit airlift operations to the Leopoldville area. A few U.S. personnel who are engaged in support operations within the Congo have small arms available, but have been instructed not to display these weapons openly. Aircrews and other operational support personnel heretofore have not had weapons available. Aircrews are being authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have small arms in their aircraft for the purpose of protecting themselves. A portion of the governing instructions will stress the necessity for prudence and caution in the display and use of these arms.²

The larger problem of restoring security and stability throughout the Congo is a matter of equally grave concern. In this connection, we urge that the U.S. Government should advocate that the United Nations take immediate and positive steps to bring the Force Publique to an acceptable state of discipline and control, and to establish effective United Nations control over the fields, bases, ports and support facilities within the country. If necessary, the Force Publique should be disarmed, reorganized and retrained by the United Nations forces, utilizing whatever degree of force may be required to accomplish this task. In this connection, we are in complete agreement with the assessment of Ambassador Timberlake that if the Force Publique is not at once brought under control, the situation will continue to deteriorate.

It appears that the original purpose of the United Nations in entering the Congo, viz., to restore public order, has become obscured, with the result that the United Nations may, to borrow the burden of Ambassador Timberlake’s assessment, conclude in presiding over disorder.

Sincerely yours,

John N. Irwin II

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–3060. Confidential.

1. President Eisenhower raised this subject with Secretary Herter on August 30. The relevant portion of the memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster, September 7, reads as follows:

   “The President first referred to the situation in the Congo. He thought that the UN must take the position that when it puts troops into an area, these troops must have the authority and instructions to defend themselves against mob violence. He asked the Secretary to have Ambassador Lodge take this proposal up with Hammarskjold at once. He thought it is absolutely inherent in official responsibility to have the right to protect one’s self.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

2. Instructions along these lines were sent in JCS telegram 982157 to USCINCEUR, September 3. (Ibid., White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Congo)