193. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Hare) to Secretary of State Herter0

SUBJECT

  • Status Report on Congo Contingency Planning

You may be interested to know that during your absence in San Jose1 we have been giving intensive and urgent attention to contingency [Page 450] planning on the Congo. This planning has fallen into four phases:

1.
There has been close consultation between the Department and New York and between USUN and Hammarskjold on detailed planning for action in the UN framework on both immediate and long-term aspects of the Congo problem.
2.
As a result of the NSC decision of August 1, approved by the President, that the U.S. must be prepared to take appropriate military action as necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo,2 a State—Defense working group has been formed, chaired by AF, and on which ISA and the JCS are represented along with other interested areas of the Department and CIA, to work on contingency planning in this eventuality.
3.
[Paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified].
4.
A working group, also chaired by AF, is giving attention to contingency planning for actions, short of military action, which might be undertaken outside the UN framework in support of the UN or in the event of a breakdown of the UN effort.3

Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Satterthwaite and I will be glad to fill you in on any aspect of contingency planning activity on which you may want further information.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–3060. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Meloy.
  2. Herter had been in Costa Rica for the Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, August 16–29.
  3. See Document 156.
  4. A memorandum of September 9 from Satterthwaite to Hare outlined several alternative courses of action, developed jointly by AF, EUR, and IO, for the contingency of a breakdown of the U.N. effort. The alternatives were: (1) maintaining U.N. economic and technical assistance to the Congo, (2) encouraging the African countries to establish a new framework for international assistance, (3) U.S. bilateral assistance to the Congo, and (4) U.S. assistance to separate provinces of the Congo, notably Katanga, with support for a federal solution. The memorandum concluded that all the alternatives were highly unattractive; it considered the first alternative preferable and the fourth alternative the least attractive. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–960)