195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium0
501. Following based on uncleared memcon.
Belgian Ambassador called on Merchant August 31 at his request to discuss evacuation Belgian troops, Soviet activities in Congo, and future of Katanga. Ambassador explained that there were still 337 troops at Kamina awaiting evacuation to Belgium and explained the delay as partially due inadequacy facilities offered by USAF. He demonstrated keen resentment of Secretary General’s protest on delay.1 He bespoke our understanding of delay and again requested assistance to facilitate airlift. Mr. Merchant assured him we already in touch with Defense and Air Force and he could count on full cooperation.
Ambassador expressed his concern over the continuing reports of Soviet activities in Congo, mentioning particularly heavy material unloaded from Soviet planes at Luluabourg, unusual activities of members of Soviet medical mission at Stanleyville, and arrival in Congo of ten Ilyushin aircraft and asked if we had talked to SYG about controls. Mr. Merchant said that we had had similar information and were very disturbed about it. He also indicated our mission in New York was at the very moment talking to the Secretary General about problem.
Ambassador said main purpose of call was to discuss future of Katanga. He said if Katanga invaded, all Belgian civilians and technicians would leave. He stressed the importance of loss not only to Belgium, but to entire free world. He asked the US to use its influence [Page 453] with the Secretary General to maintain UN in Katanga. Mr. Merchant said US aware of vital role which Katanga plays in economy of Congo and of importance its production to Belgium, US and Free World. He also indicated he hoped Belgian businessmen and technicians would be able to stay in Congo under secure conditions. He mentioned that US of course was not now prepared to recognize independence of Katanga. He said that he believed the Ambassador would appreciate the difficulties in coping with covert methods used by Soviets but that we could use our influence in two ways: first on the SYG to be sure that he would not agree to withdrawal of UN at the unilateral request of Congo government; to reiterate position that UN was not there to interfere in internal affairs; and to urge that law and order be maintained so that technicians and others could live securely and free from attack. He said secondly that we could use influence on African states, particularly those contributing troops, in an effort to have them exert a moderating influence on Congo government. He added that basically he felt we must rely on judgment and efforts of Secretary General in handling this matter. He agreed with Ambassador that we should make effort to prevent introduction into Congo of war materials. In conclusion he paid tribute to loyalty with which Belgian government had carried out its responsibilities in Congo in complying with UN resolutions and said that this had been a most honorable thing. Herter
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–160. Secret. Drafted and approved by Blue and cleared by Buffum, Wight, and Calhoun. Repeated to Léopoldville, USUN, and Paris.↩
- For text of a note verbale of August 30 from Hammarskjöld to Loridan, see U.N. doc. S/4475, Annex 5; printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. V, pp. 146–147.↩