Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

178. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State ⁰

Léopoldville, August 17, 1960, 3 p.m.

432. As Department will have observed from Embtel 401¹ answer to each of first three assumptions Deptel 438² is yes.

Re point 4, there is no one with national stature in opposition to Lumumba. We are now satisfied Kasa-Vubu will continue to be a political zero so long as Lumumba is active; in my opinion he is naive, not very bright, lazy, enjoying his new found plush living and content to appear occasionally in his new general’s uniform.

Joseph Ileo seems most likely successor if Lumumba Government unseated by legal means. He is President Senate where greatest chance lies to obtain vote no confidence in Lumumba. Although we have been in frequent contact with Ileo and he believes he has necessary two-thirds vote, we are not persuaded they will be delivered when the Senators have to stand up and be counted. In fact I am fairly certain Lumumba will prevent any such Senate action and would have time to do so since motion of no confidence has to be before Senate for 48 hours before vote can be taken. If he unable buy and control enough votes to defeat motion he quite capable of stationing FP troops at Senate chamber to prevent session. This he would probably justify under state of martial law which he unilaterally declared last night at press conference and defend as necessary to save Congo Government from Belgian plot take over through subversion some members of Senate. In light of foregoing, I have suggested to some of Ileo’s supporters that they must be prepared for such countermeasures, adding that they might consider going into first session (if allowed) with enough sandwiches to last full course of 48 hours. That should at least force Lumumba into taking more extreme measure of ejecting them bodily.

Foreign Minister Bomboko is another moderate who might well come to fore in successor government. He has displayed courage on number of occasions and has more than once been on verge of being ousted by Lumumba.

Both Bolikango and Kalonji have considerable regional backing and would probably be moderates in a government favoring loose confederation. Yumbu, Vice Premier of Leopoldville province, is another moderate who opposes Lumumba.

These are all, I believe, reasonable men who would work for constructive solutions to the problems of the Congo. They are woefully untutored in parliamentary tactics, only feel really secure in the familiar warmth of their own regions and show no hopeful signs of being able to organize a successful fire brigade. I would not, accordingly, be surprised if an attempt is made on Lumumba’s life. These people have more experience in the latter field than in the other. While Lumumba’s elimination would remove one problem, it might well create many more. Gizenga would presumably succeed him and is under same influence of Communist advisors. More color would be given to the Belgian plot thesis and more reason for martial law. UN would also be accused at least of negligence, if not of complicity.

I could not more heartily agree we must not allow ourselves to get into the apparent position of being out of sympathy with most of the African states and Lumumba at the same time. The Soviets, of course, feel very comfortable in this regard. It seems clear that Guinea is going straight down the Communist line and will continue that way. Ghana is at least giving aid and comfort to Lumumba and the Communists but for reasons peculiar to Nkrumah, as I see it. We should therefore count on the strong possibility that these two would oppose any change in the GOC and any action of the UN which would reduce Lumumba’s power or change his political course.

We should, in my opinion, now make a quick and strong effort to convince the rest of the African states of the real state of affairs in the Congo and what defiance of the UN and/or its withdrawal would mean. I would hope that most if not all of the rest could be persuaded support a strong UN policy re which see my next following telegram.³

Re point 5. We have been trying educate and encourage selected individuals and hope some progress being made. We feel whip hand is Lumumba’s and unless he is stopped he will very shortly neutralize or eliminate the opposition near him. He will have a much harder job in extending his influence to other parts of country, excepting perhaps Luluabourg and Stanleyville where his position is strong. Our best bet is to keep as many African states on our side as possible. The West in general should support a stronger UN hand.

Timberlake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1760. Secret. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, and Elisabethville.
1. Document 172.
2. Document 173.
3. Document 179.