Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

177. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

August 17, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• The Acting Secretary
• Ambassador Alphand, French Embassy
• M. Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor, French Embassy
• Mr. Woodruff Wallner, IO
• Mr. L. Dean Brown, WE

The Ambassador said that the three heads of state and the three foreign ministers had discussed the possibility of problems in the Congo long before it became independent. The French had said that the three must concert their policies. When the troubles arose, he had told the Secretary that the three plus Belgium would have to work closely together here in Washington, in New York, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, this had not worked out. The effect in Western Europe has been bad.

The Acting Secretary replied that we have had close consultation all along even if we had voted differently in the SC. As for votes, there are occasions in which it is not necessarily bad that our votes differ so far as world opinion is concerned.

The Ambassador said that it must be more than consultation. We must coordinate our policies and our votes. In the future this should be easier given the direction Lumumba has taken. Admittedly, he said, the press has played up too much our differences. But on the whole the differences have been bad for public opinion. He believed that the US delegation should be instructed to work more closely with the French, British and Belgians and work towards a common line. So far as Lumumba is concerned we cannot compromise with his pretensions. There must be a showdown.

The Acting Secretary said that our objectives have been communicated to our delegation which has been asked to talk to the French and other interested members of the SC. He had just talked with the Belgian Ambassador¹ and wanted to give Ambassador Alphand our views. We consider this a very important moment. The UN cannot fail in the Congo. There would be great danger for the whole world if this happened. We must support the UN and the Secretary-General. We agree completely with his position on entry into the Katanga and with his view that there can be no racial distinctions in the force. In view of the exchange of letters between Lumumba and the Secretary-General we believe that the latter is on trial. We have to find out what he wants to do and what sort of resolution he wishes. We have not yet seen him. We have sent no definite instructions to our delegation pending this discussion with the Ambassador. While we agree that basic principles cannot be compromised, there are many ways to bring the debate to a close. We want to carry the Africans along with us. Of course we do not know what the Soviets will do.

The Ambassador said that Berard had seen Hammarskjold. The latter was sure of himself. He said that this is a showdown and that the UN cannot yield. Afro-Asians do not like Lumumba as they believe that his attitude could affect adversely their interests. On the other hand, the Soviets do not like Hammarskjold. The latter believes that the West should not put up a resolution but let the Soviets do so if they want to. The rest can vote against or abstain.

The Acting Secretary said that this line sounded good.

Mr. Wallner said that he understood that Hammarskjold might say that he believes that he has carried out the Security Council’s instructions correctly and rest on that.

The Acting Secretary said this could lead to no resolution at all. The Ambassador reverted to SC votes. He said that the fact that we differ in our votes could lead people to question the value of the Atlantic alliance. This possibility should be borne in mind at the UN.

The Ambassador then said he wanted to discuss another point relating to the Congo. This was the Acting Secretary’s statement to the Congress in which he said that the US would extend aid through the UN and believed that other countries, including France, would do the same.² The French Government has informed the US through the Embassy in Paris that France does not believe that the UN should be the exclusive channel. The UN cannot find all the experts needed to run the Congo. Some day the Belgians will have to return. This should be arranged bilaterally.

The Acting Secretary said he was addressing himself primarily to US aid. We agree that the Congo cannot be settled satisfactorily without a return of Belgian technicians. There may have to be special arrangements for this. What we do not want to see is a whole series of bilateral programs with Lumumba trading one country off against another. This makes it too easy for the Soviets and Chinese Communists. It may be that a UN program cannot prevent bilateral offers by the Soviets but it puts them in a more difficult propaganda position. We also think that our assistance may not be limited to technical help alone. The Congo needs money to run itself. The UN could tailor requests and prevent a series of approaches to different countries for budgetary support. We understand the French position and hope that France understands ours. We are not really apart on objectives.

The Ambassador said France favors: return of Belgian technicians, no Katanga secession, and confederation. He then mentioned Nasser’s launching of an idea of the creation of an African army ready to fight anywhere.

The Acting Secretary said this idea originally came from Nkrumah and been supported by Nasser. He doubted that Nkrumah would look favorably on Nasser’s idea of taking over such an army.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1760. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs L. Dean Brown and approved in U on August 29.
1. Ambassador Scheyven had asked that U.S. influence be used to forestall any changes in the Security Council resolutions under which Hammarskjöld had been operating in the Congo. He and Dillon had agreed that Lumumba’s demands were ridiculous and that it was necessary to support Hammarskjöld’s rejection of them. (Ibid., 332.70G/8–1760)
2. Reference is apparently to a statement made by Dillon before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 15; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1960, pp. 367–372.