172. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State0
401. Events of past week lead me to believe there will shortly be political showdown between Lumumba and his followers and elements in the opposition to him. Regional groups have been talking more insistently in favor of decentralization of authority and several of outright secession. We believe that the principal motive behind them is opposition to Lumumba’s policies and fear that he is moving toward a dictatorship which will submerge their interests. Thus far such opposition is inchoate and has expended its energies in relatively fruitless pursuits such as issuing manifestoes and directing appeals to the UN to support their regional causes. In discussions with leaders who have approached Embassy Officers we have emphasized:
- 1.
- Provisional constitution provides legal remedies if they are dissatisfied with present government;
- 2.
- UN is not a world government which could or would act to change the government of the Congo or any other government;
- 3.
- World opinion and the UN would find it difficult if not impossible to accept a change of government brought about by violent means as some have suggested.
We have added that in democratic countries if the opposition to a government is united and determined, it can vote that government out of office which is one of the greatest advantages of the democratic form.
The arrest yesterday of Makoso, editor of the Courier d’Afrique and President of the Congolese Press Association, the announcement of a state of emergency and the reported drafting of three decrees (Embtel 400)1 which would in effect set up courts-martial, require the short-term licensing of Congolese periodicals and imports of foreign periodicals and limit the right of public assembly are rather clear indications that Lumumba is moving steadily toward a very strong dictatorship. None of us doubt that he will establish a dictatorship if he can get away with it.
I feel certain world opinion, which is still in sharp focus on the Congo, will be a strong deterrent. UN presence here will inevitably be involved and the SC will very likely be seized one way or the other with such an issue.
Soviet policy, so far as we can measure it here, seems to support Lumumba and the unity of the Congo largely because they believe he can be at least manipulated by them in the service of their own objective of obtaining a prominent influence in the management of the Congo. It is quite possible that should Lumumba fail and more moderate elements win out, the Soviets might well change their present policy and work toward the fragmentation of the Congo in the hope they might obtain control of one or more of the fragments.
Belgian policy seems to have favored the separation of the Katanga and quite possibly of other regions and we have some evidence, albeit not conclusive, that this is still being pushed by some Belgian elements.
I believe our general policy of support of the UN effort and the legitimate government of the Congo is correct. As I understand it, it would of course permit the legitimate change of the form of the constitution and government provided this were to be accomplished by legal means as provided in the present constitution and represents the will of the people of the Congo. I have grave doubts however whether this possibility is not being seriously compromised by the direction which Lumumba is taking. If he is able within the near future to weld together enough fragments of the FP, as he is now trying to do, this could become an important personal weapon to intimidate his opponents and support his bid for dictatorship.
[Page 409]I feel therefore that we should be particularly careful to avoid public expressions which might strengthen Lumumba’s position or the announcement of policies which might help him to achieve his apparent ambition. Where we can do so discreetly, it would seem to me good policy to strengthen those moderates who might be a restraining influence at the least and might be expected to replace him, under the most favorable circumstances, with a government much nearer the middle of the road.
It is quite possible for the showdown to come within the next week. The Senate is scheduled to reconvene Tuesday August 16 and the Abako, now even more opposed to Lumumba since the FP sacked its national headquarters day before yesterday, has scheduled a Congress of its leaders for August 13. Much will of course depend upon the degree to which the diverse elements in the Congo can join forces in the pursuit of this one common objective. Their performance and instincts to date do not persuade me to express optimism at this juncture.