Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

396. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 15, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Equipment for the Tunisian Army

Discussion:

As you know, the French Government has replied to the presentation envisaged in Tab B,² on the subject of Tunisia’s urgent arms requirements, by stating that it has no desire to exercise an arms monopoly in Tunisia, though it does wish to maximize standardization. The reply also stated that France desires shipments from Western sources other than France be held to “quasi-symbolic” levels and wishes to be consulted in all cases (Tab C).³ We thereupon instructed our Ambassador at Tunis to inform the Tunisian Government that the United States arms market is now open for reasonable purchases on terms similar to those offered last November, including guarantees against transfer and aggressive use. (We expect to remain within the $3.5 million program envisaged at that time.)

In response to our offer, the Tunisian Government specified its most urgent need from the United States as arms to equip two battalions (1,200 men) of the Tunisian Army which, though presently in uniform and partially trained, are without weapons. An itemized list of requirements is attached (Tab D).⁴ Tunisia has also asked the United Kingdom to arm another two battalions in similar circumstances.

Tunisia adamantly refuses to accept arms from France before it has demonstrated its access to other sources of supply because of concern that such an arrangement with France would be interpreted by the North African public as involving secret conditions disloyal to Maghrebian unity, and that the FLN would be thereby impelled to align its policy with that of Cairo. Meanwhile, the dispute between Bourguiba and the FLN over Tunisian agreement with France for construction of a pipeline from Algeria across Tunisia has become more acute. An FLN representative has told us that the FLN is determined to prevent Bourguiba from “drifting further toward a pro-French policy.” Bourguiba’s pro-Western attitude also has recently been criticized openly by Moroccan political leaders.

In these circumstances Bourguiba is in serious danger of becoming politically isolated in North Africa. Bourguiba of course is almost unique as a popular Arab government leader outspokenly friendly to United States policy, and his importance to us in the United Nations and other global contexts is very great indeed, as indicated by President Eisenhower’s recent message (Tab E)⁵ of appreciation to Bourguiba for the latter’s pro-Western speech of July 25. Moreover, Bourguiba’s influence with the FLN and his support for moderate leaders in Morocco is a vital political asset for the West in blocking efforts by the UAR or the USSR to capture North African nationalism and eliminate Western interests there. If he is to retain these vital positions, and to speak with persuasion in our behalf, Bourguiba clearly needs concrete assistance from the West in a number of fields, and most urgently in assuring the physical security of himself and his government.

The British share with us this sense of urgency, and appear prepared to supply at least some arms to Tunisia promptly.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize me to make a presentation to the French along the following lines:

A. We are gravely concerned at the evident deterioration of internal security in Tunisia since our last conversation on this subject, particularly in view of the grave lack of arms available to the Tunisian security forces. If Tunisia were to be subverted by Nasser, we do not believe the government in Libya (where the United States and the United Kingdom have vital interests) could long survive. Similarly, we are convinced that control by Nasser of Libya and Tunisia would deal a mortal blow to French interests in Algeria. The example of Iraq is fresh in our minds, [1½ lines of source text not declassified].

B. In this situation, the Western powers must act decisively. As the French Government is aware, we are engaged in a program of equipping and modernizing the police and the gendarme forces, but have delayed the difficult aspect of lethal items until we could be sure of their minimum requirements. The police arms which we intend to begin shipping by August 25 are listed in Tab A.⁶ No allowance in this list is made for the gendarmérie.

C. Meanwhile, we and the British each have been asked by Tunisia to equip two battalions (1,200 men) of the Tunisian Army which are as yet wholly without arms. The Tunisians have made plain to us that they cannot accept French arms until some arms have been obtained from other sources, in order to obviate charges of disloyalty to Maghreb unity and to prevent the political isolation of Bourguiba in North Africa. We continue to be most reluctant to enter the military equipment field, and agree with French views about the value of standardization, but realize that something must be done to catalyze Franco-Tunisian military cooperation. Accordingly, we have in mind to inform Bourguiba that we will fulfill his request to us for light arms for 1,200 men on the understanding that:

a. These arms would be transferred to the gendarmérie, under the U.S. police equipment program, when deliveries for the Army from France have been effected, so as to maintain a homogeneous arms pattern on the French model in the Tunisian military establishment;

b. Such outworn weapons as may be displaced in the gendarmérie by this eventual transfer would be subject to the same guarantees against transfer or diversion that apply to the United States arms delivered under this program.

D. We hope and expect that these deliveries would smooth the way for Tunisian acceptance of French arms. If the idea commended itself to France and Tunisia, we would be prepared to consider helping finance such military purchases in France through an Off-Shore Procurement program.⁷

2. That you authorize me to concert our action in this matter with the British.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/8–1558. Secret. Drafted by Stokes on August 14 and concurred in by Jandrey, Palmer, Barnes, Van Dyke, and OSD/ISA. Sent to Murphy through S/S, initialed by Palmer for Berry, and initialed by Murphy. A note attached to the source text reads:

   “ICA (Van Dyke) clearance granted if following note brought to Acting Secretary’s attention:

   “‘ICA feels that if Tunisia is to acquire arms in the U.S., it should be in the form of military assistance rather than purchase, in view of Tunisia’s weak economic position. Any purchase of arms would add to Tunisia’s budget deficit, which is already acute, and thus increase Tunisian requests for economic assistance from the U.S.’”

2. Memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, July 25. (Ibid., 772.5/7–2558)
3. Telegram 106 to Tunis; see footnote 4, supra.
4. Attached to another copy of the memorandum in Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 304, Request for Arms, 10/31/58.
5. Eisenhower’s August 2 message to Bourguiba; see Document 393.
6. Attached to another copy of the memorandum; see footnote 4 above.
7. Palmer spoke with Lucet on August 18. Lucet asked that the United States issue a communiqué announcing the quantity of arms shipped to Tunisia, noting that France would issue the statement if the United States did not. Palmer requested that the French Government reconsider this decision and examine the proposals outlined. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/8–1858)
8. Murphy initialed his approval on August 15. Bovey discussed the proposed U.S. approach to the French with Roger Jackling of the British Embassy on August 16. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 772.56/8–1658) Jackling reported on August 18 that the British Government found the approach generally correct. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 772.56/8–1858)