395. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia1

108. Joint State ICA. Viewed in context events Near East, Bourguiba’s courageous defense of US in recent speech greatly appreciated here (Embtels 107, 110).2 His forthright refusal espouse position of non-alignment, given precarious economic position Tunisia as well as internal difficulties with FLN and pro-Nasser elements, makes it all the more important that US make an overt and timely gesture strengthen Bourguiba’s hand. Agree with Rabat’s 26 to Tunis3 that “given slippage in our position in Morocco, a stable westward-turned Tunisia is more than ever essential to keep North Africa from being drawn into Nasser orbit”. While Mutual Security appropriation legislation FY 59 not yet passed and now clear world-wide availability funds will be below requested amount, Department and ICA authorize you offer in your discretion immediate economic assistance to Bourguiba at same time you discuss police carbines and other arms (Deptel 106).4 Suggest your approach be along following lines:

In spite reduced availability aid funds FY 59, increased requirements Middle East, and policy against committing major amount of assistance prior to completion legislation US wishes inform Tunisia that US prepared exceptionally offer $10,000,000 immediately order assist continued financing Tunisia’s most pressing economic development needs. Prepared obligate such funds as quickly as agreement can be reached uses dollars and local currency, subject provisions Section 517 and normal MSP procedures.

This offer being made as further demonstration US intention stand beside Tunisia and assist her attain position of independence and stability in economic field comparable to that now held in political.

FYI. If necessary US prepared obligate funds offered under continuing resolution in advance precise knowledge level of final appropriations. While we consider preferable reserve some funds for later urgent [Page 853] needs (e.g. additional police equipment), if Bourguiba nevertheless able present compelling case for entire $14.5 million presently planned for FY 59 and Embassy/USOM believe higher political and economic dividends could be obtained through such procedure, Department/ICA willing reconsider current position.

Recognize original FY 59 $14.5 million estimate based on optimistic assumptions re quantity, timing French assistance which currently invalid. Possibility remains that French will be forthcoming next few months. In any event impossible at this time program FY 59 economic aid funds beyond level in Congressional presentation particularly in view increased pressures resulting other impacts Middle East situation and prospect reduced appropriation which would make it difficult for US to increase aid appreciably. Under circumstances believe early and forthright offer could go long way toward meeting political necessity current situation Tunisia. End FYI.5

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 672.00/7–2658. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Dolgin and Buckle on August 1; cleared by Palmer, Jova, Bovey, Barnes, FitzGerald, and Van Dyke; and approved and signed for Herter by Dillon. Repeated priority to Paris and Rabat.
  2. Regarding telegram 107 from Tunis, see Document 393. Telegram 110 from Tunis, July 26, reported Tunisian public opinion that the United States must respond to Bourguiba’s July 25 address. (Department of State, Central Files, 672.00/7–2658)
  3. Dated July 30 and repeated to the Department of State as telegram 130, this telegram commented on the value of Bourguiba’s friendship with the West. (Ibid., 611.72/7–3058)
  4. Telegram 106, August 5, authorized the Embassy to inform Mokaddem that the U.S. market was now open to Tunisia. (Ibid., 772.56/8–558)
  5. Telegram 161 from Tunis, August 7, requested clarification of the kind of “overt gesture” the Department envisioned. (Ibid., 772.5–MSP/8–758) Telegram 126 to Tunis, August 12, replied that the offer of funds to Tunisia before completion of U.S. legislation and fiscal year 1959 aid programs was intended to be the “overt gesture.” (Ibid.) Telegram 216 from Tunisia, August 15, reported that Mokaddem found this gesture “significant.” (Ibid., 772.5–MSP/8–1558)