93. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas) to Secretary of
State Herter0
Washington,
October 31,
1960.
Dear Mr. Herter: During a meeting between
representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 12 August 1960,1 the State
representatives agreed with the JCS that
a review of the U.S. position with regard to the Central Treaty
Organization should be made. The State representatives requested that
the JCS furnish their military views for
consideration in the Department of State during this review. Accordingly
the military views of the JCS, with
which I am in general agreement, are enclosed.
Reassessment of the U.S. posture toward CENTO seems especially appropriate at this time because of
recent developments in each of the regional countries. Reports from
Turkey indicate that her new government is reexamining Turkish foreign
policy at a time when her lack of political and economic stability may
make her unable to resist tempting offers of Soviet aid. President Ayub
has recently indicated that Pakistan intends to seek more agreeable
relations with the Soviet Union. The Government of Iran has expressed
similar views. In addition, the latest communication from Mr. Khrushchev to the Shah makes it clear
that
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Iran continues to be
under heavy pressure as a prime target for the USSR in the Middle East. It appears to me that a renewed
and concrete demonstration of U.S. interest in the security of the
regional states of CENTO would do much
to fortify these countries against Soviet inducements and threats.
In brief, developments over the past several months and the present trend
of events in the regional states of CENTO lead me to the conclusion that military
considerations indicate the need for urgent State–Defense consultation
regarding the courses of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as means for strengthening CENTO and
the United States security position in the area. I propose that we
undertake such consultations at the earliest possible date.2
Sincerely,
Appendix3
Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
STATES IN CENTO
- 1.
- The relationship of the United States to the Baghdad Pact and
CENTO has been a subject
of controversy, both within the United States Government and
between the governments concerned, ever since the Pact came into
existence in 1955. The regional member nations of the
organization have consistently pressed for U.S. adherence and
for more active U.S. military participation. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Department of Defense have generally supported, on
military grounds, a more positive U.S. role. The Department of
State has consistently opposed U.S. adherence, and has permitted
only a very slow and reluctant expansion of U.S. military
participation in CENTO.
- 2.
- There has been no recent systematic analysis of the military
importance of CENTO to the
national security of the United States. Such an
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assessment appears particularly
appropriate today, when Iran is under continuing Soviet pressure
to become neutralist, when a new government in Turkey is
re-examining its foreign policy position and its military
posture, when Pakistan is showing increasing concern over its
position in the U.S.-USSR
struggle, and when the Soviet Union and Communist China are
expanding their activities and influence far beyond their
borders.
- 3.
- A realistic assessment of the optimum role for the United
States in CENTO should answer
at least the following questions:
- a.
- What is the U.S. security interest in the CENTO area?
- b.
- What positive contribution can CENTO make to the
national security of the United States?
- c.
- What kind and magnitude of support should the U.S.
provide CENTO in order
to enable CENTO best
to serve U.S. national security interests?
- 4.
- The U.S. security interest in the CENTO area is based primarily on these
considerations:
- a.
- The area of the CENTO regional member nations forms a land
barrier to Soviet expansion into the Middle East and
Africa, and a barrier to Soviet efforts to reach the
warm seas. It also covers the right flank of NATO.
- b.
- The Middle East itself is a focal area for land, sea,
and air communications connecting three
continents.
- c.
- The Middle East has oil resources that will remain of
great significance to our Western European Allies for
many years to come.
- 5.
- CENTO’s positive
contributions to U.S. national security interests can be
summarized as follows:
- a.
- CENTO provides a
unifying bond between three regional countries, and
provides a means of increasing materially their total
defensive capability and determination to resist
aggression.
- b.
- CENTO, which
incorporates Iran into the alliance system, represents a
vital connecting link in the U.S.-sponsored or supported
collective security system stretching generally around
the periphery of the Communist bloc.
- c.
- CENTO provides
visible evidence of the determination of three important
underdeveloped nations to defend themselves, with U.S.
support, and thus contributes to Free World solidarity.
In addition, the United States has now identified itself
with CENTO to such a
degree that its dissolution would be a serious blow to
U.S. and Free World prestige. Therefore, even though
U.S. military objectives in the area could theoretically
be achieved through purely bilateral arrangements, it is
unrealistic now to consider falling back to such
arrangements.
- 6.
- Determination of the degree of U.S. support that is required
to enable CENTO best to serve
U.S. interests involves weighing the military advantages of an
effective defensive alliance against its cost to the U.S. in
political and economic terms. Clearly it would be desirable from
a purely military viewpoint to have such a high degree of
western-oriented
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military strength in the CENTO
countries that it would be unprofitable for the Soviets to
attack this area, and that in fact the Soviets would need to
commit substantial defensive forces on their side of the line as
a precautionary measure. But the economic cost of providing such
a powerful defense posture in the area in the immediate future
would be prohibitive; and the political complications it would
entail would presumably constitute an overriding disadvantage. A
moderately improved defensive posture for CENTO is, however, both desirable
and feasible.
- 7.
- On balance, it appears that a rational objective for the
United States in supporting CENTO would be an approach that provides for:
- a.
- Increasing the viability of the alliance, as an
essential part of the Free World’s collective security
system. This means that the regional member nations must
be convinced that it is in their national interests to
remain in the alliance and to make it effective.
- b.
- Supporting a positive, progressive program of
improving the defensive capability of CENTO, through
improvements in military organization, the development
of realistic, comprehensive military plans and the
introduction on a carefully phased basis of improved
weapons and equipment. These measures should contribute
to the defensive capability of the CENTO barrier between the
USSR and the Middle
East, without absorbing a disproportionate share of U.S.
resources and without entailing unacceptable political
disadvantages.
- 8.
- As regards the viability of CENTO, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit that
implementation of current United States policy has not achieved
a sufficiently positive and constructive approach to provide a
reasonable assurance that the organization will remain in being.
The most recent National Intelligence Estimate says “… continued
political instability coupled with Soviet threats or inducements
could cause Iran to withdraw from CENTO.”4 Iran today is seriously unstable,
subjected to continuing Soviet pressures, and increasingly
depressed over what is regarded as the failure of the United
States to provide adequate support for CENTO. Pakistan has periodically indicated
disillusionment with the U.S. attitude toward CENTO and with the U.S. attitude
toward Pakistan’s defense problems. Turkey is in the throes of
re-examining its over-all policy and its defense posture. Turkey
has repeatedly urged more positive U.S. participation in CENTO, and there are some
indications that it may now be adopting a more independent
outlook. In short, the U.S. role in CENTO has been too negative to give the
organization real vitality. A more positive approach by the
United States, plus relatively minor additional U.S. material
support, should give an impetus to CENTO resulting in increasing loyal support from
its members.
- 9.
- As regards a program for improving the defensive capability of
CENTO, it is the view of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States has not
supported an adequate degree of military development. After five
years’ existence, CENTO has no
military command organization, no agreed military plans, no
effective liaison with NATO and
SEATO, no arrangements for
tactical nuclear support, and antiquated air defense equipment.
Significant improvements in CENTO’s military capability could be achieved at
relatively small cost to the United States.
- 10.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, unless increased
efforts are made to indicate U.S. support for CENTO and to improve the military
effectiveness of the alliance, CENTO is in danger of collapsing, with the probable
consequences that Iran would become a neutral and eventually
would fall under Soviet domination.
- 11.
- Iran today is the soft spot in the CENTO defense line and one of the soft spots in the
Free World’s collective security system surrounding the
periphery of the Soviet Bloc. Iran is weaker militarily than
Turkey or Pakistan, and the latter two nations have the added
advantage of being members of NATO and SEATO
respectively. There is no indication that Russia has given up
its traditional desire for an outlet on the Persian Gulf and
Iran offers the easiest route to this goal. Iran has a long
border with the USSR and
borders with two potential Soviet accomplices—Afghanistan and
Iraq. Loss of Iran to the West would destroy CENTO, drive a wedge between
NATO and SEATO, threaten Western access to
Middle East oil, and expose the Middle East, South Asia and
Africa to further Soviet penetration and expansion.
- 12.
- It is clear, therefore, that the basic problem in CENTO, both politically and
militarily, is Iran; and that the question of the degree of U.S.
participation in CENTO hinges
on the extent to which there is a politico-military requirement
to retain Iran as a strong pro-Western ally. As a vital part of
the Free World collective security system, as the link between
NATO and SEATO, as the heart of CENTO, and as a specific barrier
to Soviet expansionism in such an important region, Iran is of
strategic importance to U.S. security interests.
- 13.
- There are several measures that the United States could take
with a view toward achieving the closely interrelated objectives
of increasing the political viability of CENTO and improving its military
effectiveness. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on several
such measures are set forth in the Annex hereto.5 These views have
been
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developed on the
basis of the contribution each proposed measure would make to
the political viability and military effectiveness of CENTO, weighed against its
probable cost to the United States in political and economic
terms.
