Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

89. National Security Council Report⁰

NSC 6011

Washington, July 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Toward the Near East

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5820/1
• B. NSC Action No. 2080
• C. NIE 30–59; NIE 36–60
• D. NSC 6011
• E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 6, 1960¹
• F. NSC Action No. 2264²

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 451st NSC Meeting on July 15, 1960 (NSC Action No. 2264):

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6011; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 6, 1960.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6011.

The President, on this date, approved NSC 6011 to supersede NSC 5820/1, except for paragraph 42 relating to the Sudan, with the understanding that paragraph 42 of NSC 5820/1 be continued in effect pending a review of U.S. policy toward the Sudan.³ The President directed implementation of NSC 6011 for implementation by all Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred it to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. The above understanding regarding paragraph 42 of NSC 5820/1 is transmitted to all holders of that document.

James S. Lay, Jr.

Executive Secretary

[Here follows a table of contents.]

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR EAST⁴

Introduction

1. The United States has a great interest in denying the Near East to Soviet domination, in maintaining Free World access to its oil, rights of peaceful passage through the area, and in keeping important strategic positions available to ourselves and our allies. We are, moreover, interested in orderly progress in the area and in a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem, which constitutes a potential threat to world peace.

2. While the Near East presently enjoys some respite from the acute tensions which have afflicted the area, this respite is likely to be only temporary. The Near East is still in the throes of a major nationalist and social-economic revolution; internal instability characterizes almost all of the countries in the area. The predominant force in the area is nationalism with strong anti-Western overtones, which has contributed to neutralism and provided opportunities for Soviet penetration. Thus the present temporary lull could easily yield to greater tensions and unrest with adverse effects on our interests.

3. The most dangerous challenge to long-range Western interests in the Near East arises not from Arab nationalism per se, but from the short-term coincidence of many of its objectives with those of the USSR. As a result, Arab nationalism has frequently appeared to serve Soviet ends, but, in the last analysis, Communist aims are incompatible with the essentially neutralist cast of Arab nationalism and we must devise ways and means of making this incompatibility serve our own ends.

Major Forces in the Area

4. Arab Nationalism. Arab nationalism, the principal ideological force of the area, proclaims the ideal of the freedom of Arab countries from external influences and generally advocates greater political unity among the Arabs. As such it is fundamentally incompatible with ultimate Communist objectives, although many of its short-term aims have been and still are coincidental with those of the Soviet Union.

5. Arab nationalism has been the impelling force in rallying Arab energies to contribute to the ousting of Western influences from the area. The overturn in 1958 of a pro-Western regime in Iraq and removal of outspokenly pro-Western leaders in Lebanon reflected the strength and direction of Arab nationalist sentiment. The creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 reflected the urge for unity.

6. In the last year and a half the dynamism of Arab nationalism has been reduced at least temporarily and has lost a good deal of its radical and unifying appeal. With shifts by Iraq and Lebanon away from their former close association with the West, Nasser’s campaign to reduce Western influence in the area has slackened noticeably. Moreover, the emergence of the Kassem regime in Iraq has challenged Nasser’s previously unquestioned leadership of the movement. Nasser has also become increasingly aware of the threat of Communism and has sought to turn Arab sentiment against it in the Near East, particularly in Iraq. Finally, he appears to be increasingly preoccupied with problems of the UAR’s internal administration and development.

7. One important result has been an increasing Arab awareness of the dangers of Communism and of its deep differences with Arab nationalism. This awareness has reduced the Soviet capacity to utilize a presumed identity of Arab nationalist and Soviet interests to reduce Free World positions in the area. In this atmosphere, the United States has been able to achieve progress in improving its relations with the UAR and in maintaining its friendly ties with several other countries in the area.

8. Neutralism. As new nations recently emerged from foreign domination or binding ties with Western countries, the states of the Near East incline understandably toward neutralism. Only Jordan and Israel have close ties with the United States, though Lebanon’s neutralism is tilted toward the Free World. There seems little prospect that other countries of the area will seek openly to align themselves more closely with the Free World. While more willing support for the Free World among Near Eastern countries would be to our advantage, prevalence of neutralist attitudes need not be an insurmountable obstacle to achievement of U.S. goals in the area.

9. Communism. Developments in Iraq have proven how quickly the Communists, given freedom to operate in the Near East, can rapidly expand from underground cadres into positions of strength with a potential for seizure of power. Fortunately throughout most of the rest of the area, Governments have kept Communist subversion closely in check. We can expect that where real Communist strength becomes evident, a strongly hostile reaction from Arab nationalist groups and leaders is likely. Dominant groups in the military share the ideological outlook of important elements among the Arab middle class and, combined, the two groups constitute another significant counter-force to Communism.

Major Special Problems

10. Soviet Intentions in the Near East. An increase in Soviet power in the Near East to the point where Western special interests in oil, lines of communication and strategic installations might be denied to the West would be a major setback for U.S. interests. Soviet ambitions in the area are probably restrained by realization that Western reaction to Soviet initiatives in this direction would be vigorous. Nevertheless, the Soviets probably regard with satisfaction the simple fact of their substantial entry into a new arena and will continue to seek means for expanding their position. In the UAR, in Iraq, and in Yemen, the Sino-Soviet Bloc has moved promptly and on a large scale to assume an important role in the economic programs and expectations of the controlling regimes. While Soviet credits have not enabled the Bloc to exercise in these countries any substantial degree of political or economic control, nor had the effect of strengthening indigenous Communist forces significantly, except in Iraq, they have advanced Communist prestige in the area and laid the groundwork for further penetration.

11. Other Special Problems of the Area. Deeply affecting the interplay of the foregoing forces are certain basic problems peculiar to the area.

a. The problem of maintaining a demonstrably impartial position in the Arab-Israel dispute and of resisting efforts of one side or the other to maneuver the United States into special support for individual grievances will remain one of the most harassing and delicate situations with which we have to deal in this area. The Arab-Israel dispute involves on the one hand Arab refusal to accept the status quo and fears of Israeli expansion. The Arab position is hardened by their bitter resentment at what they consider the injustice they have sustained as well as the loss of territory suffered at the hands of the Israelis. On the Israel side there is the inflexible determination of Israel’s people to retain and develop their country. The United States and the United Kingdom seek to promote the peaceful solution of the problem whereas me Soviets see the conflict as a source of weakness and disunity in the area which they can exploit to their gain and our disadvantage. Any advance toward solution of the Arab-Israel dispute, particularly the refugee problem, would be very much in the interests of the United States.

b. Jordan remains dependent on the United States and the United Kingdom, and in this condition it is not only a claimant on U.S. resources but tends also to be isolated politically from its Arab neighbors. The problem of Jordan will remain, however, until some new relationship with the surrounding Arab world is evolved. Until this can be brought about peacefully, the United States and its Free World allies have little choice but to continue support of Jordan lest without it the state collapse and the peace of the Near East be severely endangered in the ensuing scramble for Jordan’s territory among Jordan’s neighbors.

c. British Interests in the Region. The United Kingdom retains interests in the Near East which it considers vital and which are generally consistent with U.S. objectives. British relations with the area nave improved from the low point following the Suez incident. Nevertheless, over a period of time, Arab nationalism may be expected to bring increasing pressure on the British position in the various U.K. dependencies on the Arabian Peninsula. As these develop, the United States will face problems in maintaining friendly relations with the Arab countries while giving appropriate support to vital British interests in the area.

d. Oil. Although the recent petroleum developments in Algeria and Libya and elsewhere will reduce Western Europe’s relative dependence upon the Near East and Iran, present estimates indicate that by 1965 the area will still be supplying Western Europe with the bulk of its petroleum requirements. The effect of the North African discoveries is to retard the growth in Western Europe’s reliance upon the area, not to eliminate it. Under present circumstances, there is in sight no wholly adequate substitute for the vast oil reserves of the area.

Objectives

12. As of paramount importance, continued denial of the area to Soviet domination.

13. Continued availability of sufficient Near Eastern oil to meet vital Western European requirements on reasonable terms.

14. Peaceful resolution as early as possible, in whole or in part, of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

15. Continued availability to the United States and its allies of rights of peaceful passage through and intercourse with the area in accordance with international law and custom and existing international agreements.

16. Political evolution and economic and social development in the area to promote stable governments, popularly supported and resistant to Communist influence and subversion.

17. Continued availability to the United States and its allies of important strategic positions, including military overflight, staging and base rights in the area.

18. The expansion of U.S. and, where appropriate, Free World influence in the area, and the countering and reduction of Communist influence.

Major Policy Guidance

General

19. As appropriate, seek to develop solutions to problems of the Near East region, and cooperate with other nations in developing such solutions, particularly when our cooperation is sought by countries concerned or when necessary to prevent serious deterioration in the prospects for peace and stability of the area.

20. Seek to demonstrate to the peoples and governments of the area that primary U.S. objectives are fundamentally compatible with orderly progress toward their chosen economic and political goals, including those of Arab nationalism. Facilitate increased awareness that the objectives of international Communism are incompatible with the aims of true nationalism.

21. Seek to develop and encourage pro-Western tendencies among peoples and governments of the area but refrain from pressing them for closer overt political alignment with the West. Accept prevalent neutralist postures when necessary but endeavor to maintain diplomatic, trade and cultural relations between the individual states of the area and the United States and its allies which at least reasonably balance those maintained by these states with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

22. Be sympathetic toward the idea of Arab unity and a closer association among the Arab states of the area, so long as that association is achieved in accordance with the desires of the peoples of the states concerned and without posing a threat to U.S. interests or to the general peace and stability of the area.

23. Promote both national and regional economic development by:

a. Encouraging the governments of the nations of the area to follow policies and develop institutional arrangements which would facilitate mobilization of local capital for domestic economic development and would promote both domestic and foreign private investment.

b. Encouraging the governments of the nations of the area to use oil revenues for economic development and the welfare of their people.

c. Pressing the industrialized countries of the Free World to facilitate movements of private capital and to supply public capital to the nations of the Near East, and where appropriate to join with the United States in combined efforts to build economic strength in these nations.

d. Encouraging U.S. private industries and foundations to participate increasingly in providing investment capital and technical know-how which would facilitate the economic growth of the nations of the area.

e. Utilizing and supporting the efforts of Free World international institutions to promote economic development and to bring about economic reform in the area and, in general, supporting loans by international organizations to these nations where consistent with relevant U.S. loan policies.

f. Being prepared to provide U.S. loans for projects consistent with relevant U.S. loan policies, unless such loans would be likely to have undesirable political consequences.

g. Continuing technical assistance.

h. Being prepared to support a soundly organized Arab development institution should the nations of the area agree on the usefulness of such an institution, and should they be prepared to support it with their own resources.

24. Be prepared, on a case-by-case basis for essentially political reasons, to provide financial assistance which might be utilized for budgetary support, balance of payments and support, or economic development.

25. a. Emphasize the political and economic aspects of our policy over its military aspects, but maintain a capability to use force to achieve our present objectives.

b. Avoid for the United States a significant role in the supply of weapons to countries of the Near East, and, in consultation with our allies or through the United Nations, seek to prevent an arms spiral of procurement of military equipment beyond economic capabilities of countries of the area.

c. If desired by the countries of the area, support the establishment of an appropriate UN body to examine the flow of heavy armaments to the Near East with the aim of preventing a new arms race spiral.

d. Nevertheless, if it is determined that U.S. objectives in the area would be advanced thereby (as might be the case if area states were to be prevented from becoming wholly dependent on Soviet Bloc sources for military equipment), provide military aid in minimum amounts and of the type appropriate to meet the situation.

26. Support leadership groups which offer the best prospect of progress toward U.S. objectives in this area, but avoid becoming identified with specific internal issues or individuals. Seek to discredit groups which promote pro-Soviet thinking. Seek to increase the Western orientation of urban “intellectuals.”

27. Where feasible, encourage growth of anti-Communist, Western-oriented, democratic, Near East trade union movements.

28. a. Seek to create a climate favorable to the United States through the maximum encouragement of effective direct relations between U.S. citizens and peoples of the area.

b. Continue to develop local leaders, administrators and skilled personnel by strengthening educational institutions and by selectively expanding training programs in administrative and technical skills.

c. Emphasize personnel exchange programs on a selective basis.

d. Emphasize those cultural efforts which in the long run develop better understanding of the United States and build better relationships with and among the peoples of the area.

29. Accept major responsibility for providing Free World leadership toward the area as a whole. However, encourage the United Kingdom to make a vigorous effort to promote Free World interests in the area whenever such effort could be expected to contribute to U.S. objectives. Keep the United Kingdom currently informed through agreed channels of U.S. policies and programs and, to the extent compatible with U.S. area objectives, make a major effort to achieve and maintain harmony, particularly with the United Kingdom but also with other Free World countries interested in the Near East; but reserve the right to act alone. In consulting generally with the French, exercise appropriate caution, bearing in mind France’s special relations with Israel. Recognizing that efforts to work constructively with Arab nationalism may sometimes conflict with interests of NATO allies, seek in particular to persuade the NATO governments of the advantages to the West of such efforts.

30. Support a continued substantial British position in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula with particular reference to the Sheikdoms. Endeavor to influence peaceful and equitable solutions to questions in which Britain is interested, such as the frontier problems of Southeastern Arabia and the Yemen-Aden frontier.

Psychological

31. In all of our relations with the Near East recognize that the Arabs’ experience with and fear of Western domination and the cultural and linguistic as well as other differences between the United States and the peoples of the area require a special effort on our part to promote better basic understanding and to reduce their suspicion of the West. Recognize also the Arabs’ deep-rooted suspicion of the United States based on their belief that the United States is the special friend and protector of Israel.

32. Work to strengthen our influence and to better the comprehension of our aims by:

a. Stressing U.S. sympathy for certain major Arab goals, including:

(1) Freedom and independence of Near East nations.

(2) National responsibility for local problems.

(3) The idea of Arab unity and a closer association among the states of the area.

(4) Opposition to external domination and infringement of national sovereignty.

b. Seeking to demonstrate to the peoples and governments of the area that U.S. objectives are generally compatible with goals of Arab nationalism, whereas the objectives or international Communism are incompatible with the aims of true nationalism.

c. Further and explain U.S. policies and objectives by emphasizing:

(1) U.S. willingness to contribute to economic development.

(2) U.S. support for the United Nations.

(3) U.S. concern for the social and cultural advancement of the peoples of the area, without minimizing the dangers of Communism and Soviet aggression.

(4) That the United States and the Free World generally desire (as contrasted with USSR and international Communism) to see established in the area conditions of peace, and economic and human development.

(5) U.S. acceptance of neutralist policies on the part of Arab states.

(6) U.S. impartiality in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Countering Soviet Influence

33. Take action where necessary to demonstrate the continued U.S. willingness and intention to counter Communist aggression in the Near East under the policy established by the American Doctrine and related policies. Be prepared to use force in the Near East region should it appear that peaceful countermeasures will no longer suffice to prevent Soviet dominance in the area.

34. While continuing to encourage the resistance of Arab nations to Soviet imperialism, avoid for the present any active efforts to enlist Arab nations in regional collective security arrangements.

35. a. While recognizing Soviet presence and interest in the area, continue to make clear to the USSR the nature of Free World interests in the area and Free World determination to defend these interests.

b. Endeavor to place the USSR in positions, within the UN and elsewhere, wherein it cannot openly oppose constructive measures including such matters as an Arab-Israeli settlement and a verifiable arms control system, without bearing the onus for their failure.

c. Decline to enter into arrangements with the USSR in respect of the area except in forums in which the states concerned are duly represented.

Oil

36. Be prepared, when circumstances demand, to assist in reconciling vital Free World interests in the area’s petroleum resources with the rising tide of nationalism in the area.

37. In cooperation with the United Kingdom, and other allies as appropriate, endeavor to ensure by all feasible means, being prepared for the use of force as a last resort, that the quantity of oil available from the Near East on reasonable terms is sufficient, together with available oil from other sources including North Africa, to meet Western Europe’s vital petroleum requirements.

[Here follow paragraphs 38–47, which are similar to those in Document 51, but are differently numbered.]

Israel

48. Make clear as appropriate that, while U.S. policy embraces the preservation of the State of Israel in its essentials, we believe that Israel’s continued existence as a sovereign state depends on its willingness to become a finite and accepted part of the Near East nation-state system.

49. Apart from possible financial assistance to Israel in the context of a satisfactory solution of the refugee problem, be prepared to continue economic assistance to Israel up to the present level, abandoning as soon as feasible the grant economic aid component.

United Arab Republic

50. a. Seek to keep our relations with the UAR on a plane of normal intercourse among governments, developing cooperation in areas of mutual interest without arousing expectations of large amounts of U.S. aid.

b. Be alert to any possibilities which may occur for broader understanding or consultation between the United States and the UAR. Explore particularly the extent to which greater U.S. cooperation with the UAR might serve to limit UAR contacts with the Soviet Bloc and Soviet influence in the area and might also reduce UAR dependence upon Soviet trade and military assistance.

c. While avoiding a stance antagonistic to the goals of Arab nationalism, make clear, as circumstances require, to the leaders of the UAR that we do not condone the imposition of these goals on peoples of other Arab states.

d. Seek discreetly to maintain U.S. contact with and influence among Syrian leaders.

e. Without encouraging or supporting UAR ambitions in Africa, exploit, as feasible, any UAR anti-Communist efforts that may develop in the area.

[Here follows paragraph 51 on Saudi Arabia, which is similar to paragraph 37 in the enclosure to Document 51.]

Jordan

52. a. Accept, and, where we believe reasonably stable conditions may result, encourage Jordan’s peaceful evolution toward association with a larger Arab entity acceptable to the people of Jordan and to the other areas affected and tending to reduce the U.S. financial burden in Jordan.

b. Bearing in mind that an abrupt change in Jordan’s status would be viewed generally as a political defeat for the Free World and contribute to instability of the area, be prepared in the interim, for essentially political reasons, to provide military assistance, assistance which might be used for economic development, and budgetary support. Seek to transfer to Jordan’s Arab neighbors major responsibility for economic support of Jordan if at all possible.

c. Continue to urge the United Kingdom to assume an increased share of the burden of financial assistance to Jordan until such time as major responsibility for such assistance can be shifted to Jordan’s Arab neighbors.

d. Make every effort to avoid conflict between the Arabs and Israel as a result of change in Jordan’s status.

Iraq

53. a. Seek to maintain friendly relations with the Iraqi Government on a reciprocal basis, keeping under careful observation the implications of increased Communist influence in Iraq but discouraging Iraq’s neighbors from interference in Iraq’s affairs.

b. Seek gradually, and without pressing for Iraqi concessions, to expand and normalize the U.S. presence in Iraq through such activities as continuance of U.S. technical assistance programs, reestablishment of modest USIS facilities, negotiation of routine treaty arrangements, and exchange of persons.

c. For essentially political reasons indicate on request that we are willing to give consideration to extension of limited military assistance.

d. Discreetly encourage tendencies in Iraq which may in time lead to a further lessening of Soviet Bloc and Communist influence and to a continued improvement in Iraq’s relations with the Free World. Should a regime favorable to Free World interests come to power in Iraq, be prepared to support it promptly.

e. In the event of civil war or an attempted Communist takeover in Iraq, be prepared to support elements favorable to Free World interests if it appears at the time that such action would have a reasonable chance of success. Continue the preparation of appropriate contingency plans, in cooperation with the United Kingdom to the extent deemed appropriate, dealing with the possible developments outlined above.

Lebanon

54. Support the continued independence and integrity of Lebanon, but avoid becoming too closely identified with individual factions in Lebanese politics and seek discreetly to disengage from relationships that may be disadvantageous to U.S. interests.

a. Provide Lebanon with political support and with military assistance for internal security purposes, stressing our support for the country as a whole rather than for a specific regime or faction.

b. Where appropriate seek to encourage the acceptance of Lebanon’s unique status by its Arab neighbors.

Yemen

55. Seek to improve the U.S. position in Yemen, as opportunities present themselves, through such measures as the rapid implementation of a few sound development projects with impact value and the encouragement of U.S. private economic activity. Seek through cooperation with other appropriate states to restrict Sino-Soviet penetration. Seek to lend good offices to the extent possible to improve United Kingdom-Yemen relations.

Agricultural Surplus Problems

56. Encourage countries of the area to adopt realistic production and export policies and programs aimed at meeting the problem of their critical surpluses.

57. In carrying out U.S. surplus disposal programs:

a. Give particular attention to the economic vulnerabilities of Near East states and avoid, to the maximum extent practicable, detracting from the ability of these countries to market their own exportable produce.

b. Give particular emphasis to the use of such surpluses to promote multilateral trade and economic development.

[Here follow a 13-page Financial Appendix that includes Defense and ICA comments; Annex A, “Strengths and Capabilities of Near Eastern Forces”; and Annex B, “Summary of Publicly Announced U.S. Policy on Near East Question.”]

0. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6011. Top Secret.
1. See footnotes 1–7, Document 88.
2. See footnote 9, Document 88.
3. NSC 6106 supersedes paragraph 42 of NSC 5820/1 (“US Policy Toward the Near East”). [Footnote in the source text. NSC 6106, “U.S. Policy Toward the Sudan,” January 10, 1961, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6106.]
4. Includes the UAR (Egypt and Syria), Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, and the Arabian Peninsula Sheikdoms. Takes into account as appropriate, the importance of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan to the Near East, but does not attempt full coverage of U.S. policies toward Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, which are included in other NSC reports (NSC 6010, NSC 5708/2 and NSC 5909/1). [Footnote in the source text. For text of NSC 6010, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” July 6, see Document 293; and for texts of NSC 5708/2, “Statement of U.S. Policy on Turkey,” see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 720–727; NSC 5909/1, “U.S. Policy Toward South Asia,” August 21, 1959, see vol. XV, pp. 29–46.]