Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

48. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McElroy⁰

Washington, October 13, 1958.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Toward the Near East (NSC 5820 (C))¹

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the subject draft statement of policy which will be considered by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 16 October 1958. In general, the draft statement of policy is acceptable from a military point of view provided the comments and recommendations contained in the Appendix hereto are accepted. The comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the draft statement of policy are contained in the Appendix hereto.

2. Subject to the comments and recommendations contained in the Appendix, it is recommended that you concur in the adoption of NSC 5820 to supersede NSC 5801/1 as U.S. policy toward the Near East.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining²
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH RESPECT TO THE DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY

1. Paragraph 4, page 3: Support the Defense–Treasury proposal.³

Reason: The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is in the U.S. interest to disassociate legitimate Arab nationalism from Nasser’s leadership to the extent possible and to deal with Nasser only on those issues in which he has a legitimate interest as head of the nations under his direct political leadership.

2. Paragraph 7, page 6: Support the Defense–Joint Chiefs of Staff–Treasury proposal.

Reason: The basis for the diverse views expressed is the extent to which the United States should accommodate to the radical elements of the Arab nationalist movements and the extent to which the United States will recognize Nasser as the leader of all of the Arab nationalist movements. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the radical elements of Pan Arab nationalism, as symbolized by Nasser, are characterized by many elements inimical to basic U.S. objectives in the Near East, such as: unscrupulous expansionist tendencies; interference, including incitement to violence in the affairs of neighboring nations; and, unfriendly propaganda activities directed against other nations of the Near East, the West in general, and the United States in particular. A complete accommodation to Nasser would mean U.S. acceptance of these elements, and amounts to adoption of a policy of expediency in handling the problems in the area even though such handling might compromise basic U.S. principles. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is in the U.S. interest to disassociate legitimate Arab nationalism from Nasser’s leadership to the extent possible and to deal with Nasser only on those issues in which he has a legitimate interest as head of the nations under his direct political leadership.

3. Paragraph 10, page 7: Support the majority view.

Reason: Even though the meaning of the OCDM proposal is not completely clear, it would appear to accept as a fact that a pro-Western orientation of nations in the area is impossible and that we should, as the next best thing, encourage neutralism in the area. As a U.S. policy it is largely negative and does not encourage an active program to win the Near Eastern states to the side of the Free World.

4. Subparagraph 14–d, page 9: Delete the phrase “… provide limited military aid, grant or reimbursable.” and substitute therefor: “… provide military aid in amount and type appropriate to meet the situation.”⁴

Reason: As presently worded this phrase makes it appear that the Soviet offers of military aid can be met by comparatively minor outlays of equipment and money on the part of the United States. This in turn can lead to faulty U.S. budgeting to meet the policy, and place unexpected and unbudgeted requirements upon the Department of Defense when such offers by the Soviets must be countered.

5. Page 12: Insert the following new paragraph 21 and renumber the succeeding paragraphs accordingly:

“21. Recognize that the United States has, through the London Declaration of 28 July 1958,⁵ undertaken to increase U.S. participation in the Baghdad Pact and hence should be prepared to accept increased responsibility short of complete adherence.”

Reason: The important subject of the U.S. relationship with the Baghdad Pact Organization has not been included in the draft policy statement. The above language reflects the most recent U.S. policy decision on this subject.

6. Paragraph 24, page 14: Support the Defense–Joint Chiefs of Staff–OCDM proposal.

Reason: The most recent intelligence estimate⁶ dealing with the Arab-Israeli problem concludes that an outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities is possible at any time and that the chances of such hostilities are increasing. In view of U.S. objectives in this area, it is in the U.S. interest to take the initiative toward the settlement of this basic dispute. The need for the initiative is further emphasized by subparagraph 32–b of this draft statement of policy, which points out the need to “… develop on an urgent basis possible long-range solutions for the refugee problem.”

7. Subparagraph 36–a, page 18: Support the Defense–JCS–Treasury proposal.

Reason: This is another manifestation of a basic divergence of views. The reasoning under paragraph 2 above applies here also.

8. Subparagraph 37–d, page 20: Support the JCS proposal and delete the bracketed portion.

Reason: The United States currently maintains its base at Dhahran pursuant to an agreement recently and. freely made by the Saudi Arabian Government and the U.S. Government. This agreement is of relatively short duration (5 years). Should this agreement be terminated by the unilateral action of the Saudi Arabian Government, the United States will have no choice but to withdraw its personnel and disestablish the facility. This contingency does not require recognition by a policy statement. Dhahran is the only sizeable military installation in the area available to the United States. There is a valid continuing requirement for U.S. use of the facility. The base should be looked upon as a “foot in the door” and as a springboard to strengthen Western position in the area. Therefore, barring political or economic blackmail on the part of Saudi Arabia, we should plan to retain the use of Dhahran Air Base on the best terms that are obtainable and not at this point in time give serious consideration to planning for withdrawal or reduction.

9. Subparagraph 38–b, page 21: Support OCDM–JCS proposal and delete the bracketed portion.

Reason: The probability of attaining the stated objective appears so remote as to render it of questionable value as a U.S. political objective.

10. Subparagraph 39–a, page 22: Delete the second sentence of the subparagraph.

Reason: The policy stated in the first sentence is complete and unambiguous. It enables the United States to meet all situations that may arise in the changing relations between the Governments of the United States and Iraq. The implementation of the policy stated in the second sentence would place the United States in the position of asking Iraq to accept U.S. technical assistance either as a continuation of the programs repudiated by the new regime, or of offering assistance before Iraq has asked for it. Either could degrade the prestige of the United States in the area. The United States should be prepared to consider any requests by Iraq for new programs or to reinstate certain old ones on the same basis as requests of other Near Eastern countries. Expeditious handling of such Iraqi requests would meet the purposes or indicating friendship and limiting Soviet influence.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/10–1458. Top Secret. On October 14 Lay transmitted this memorandum and its enclosure to the members of the NSC for their consideration prior to the meeting on October 16.
1. See Document 46.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
3. See Document 46 for all references to paragraphs to the draft statement of policy cited here.
4. All ellipses are in the source text.
5. See Document 33.
6. SNIE 30–4–58. [Footnote in the source text. SNIE 30–4–58, September 30, “The Arab Israeli Arms Problem—Relative Capabilities and Prospects for Control,” is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)]