344. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State0
315. In my interview with Faisal on November 281 he waited until his uncle Prince Abdullah Bin Abdel Rahman who had stayed more than one hour of our interview had left the room and then drew his chair close to mine, paused dramatically, then said, “I want to tell you something which I have told absolutely no one else. In fact the three of us (including my interpreter, Pao Isa Sabbagh) will be the only persons who will have ever heard it.” After another pause Faisal continued:
“In this modern world, with all the new inventions, the airfield at Dhahran is not of as much use or value to you as in the past. In any case, although it is an airfield, you people still call it an airbase and others regard it as an American airbase.” Later on I interjected the remark that we had long ceased calling it a base and that we have for a long time made it clear it was a Saudi airfield where we are, by agreement, accorded certain facilities. I added that the late Secretary of State Dulles and his successor Herter made a point of clarifying that it was not an American airbase. Faisal insisted that “we waited a long time for a definite clarification but we heard of none. The clarifications Your Excellency speaks of must have been made just in passing and were not adequate to dispel the notion that Dhahran was a base.” Before I could reply, Faisal added, “At any rate this is not important. We do not want to go into the past. The burden of my view which as I said is expressed here for the first time is that with all the eyes on us, with all the fingers pointing at the airfield, I find that its presence hampers cooperation between us. I want to cooperate, but I can only do so when this obstacle is removed. Of course, I know that the agreement between us regarding the airfield and USMTM has yet a year and half or two years to go. What I envision is to turn over the management of the airfield to some civil company, such as TWA, in a way similar to the arrangement we have regarding the Saudi Arabian Airlines.”
I asked Faisal if what I understood his intention to be applied also to USMTM. Faisal replied: “No, training missions could train anywhere. They need not be attached to, or thought of in connection with, an [Page 769] airfield. The presence of one or more training missions in our country is less of an eye-catcher or finger-pointer than the existence of what has come to be considered a foreign base.”
I told Faisal I would convey his remarks to the Department but could promise no quick reply. To this Faisal said, “I am not expecting a quick reply, or any reply at all yet. My purpose in telling you this is so that your minds will be prepared for what we intend to do. [5½ lines of source text not declassified]
He further asked that we make an Arabic version of this segment of the meeting and send it to him directly, not through the Foreign Office or any other intermediary.
Comment:Faisal’s delay in talking to me about the Dhahran airfield when his uncle Abdullah had left is significant. Abdullah has considerable influence over Faisal, the King, and Royal family. Faisal obviously was afraid that “Uncle Abdullah” would tell the King of this conversation. I feel rather certain that the King has no desire to terminate the airfield agreement since he probably regards the presence of American troops there, even though, technically, they do not bear arms, as a deterrent against any revolution against the Throne.
I thought it well, without going into details, to inform General McGehee that I had received an intimation from Faisal that he would be opposed to the extension of the Dhahran airfield agreement.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.56311/11–3059. Top Secret; Priority.↩
- A report of that discussion, which lasted 1-1/2 hours, is in telegram 303 from Dhahran, November 29. Topics included the resumption of Saudi payments for U.S. arms purchases and American servicemen’s PX privileges at Dhahran and their effect on the Saudi economy. (Ibid., 786A.11/11–2960)↩