Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia⁰

Washington, July 22, 1960, 9:32 p.m.

44. Dhahran pass General McGehee for info. Embtels 27, 33, 36, 37 and 38 now received.¹ Dept continues doubt wisdom sending Hawkins [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to search out and probe [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].² We frankly not persuaded of reliability [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Nor do we think he likely to be privy military coup plans.

Those American personnel in Saudi Arabia, civilian and military, who are aware of current plotting, should be cautioned in manner you deem most appropriate and on need-to-know basis that matter is one of extreme sensitivity requiring most careful handling. We do not wish US reps in Saudi Arabia take further initiative in probing for details re alleged military plot, especially view comment in Embtel 36 that Saudi intelligence on lookout and may be associating US with rumors of possible coup activities.

When and if subject raised again with US personnel, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] person approached should discreetly seek discourage any coup action through expression of personal views a long following lines: Experience has shown evolutionary approach to solution outstanding national problems is far sounder and more durable than revolutionary approach. Latter simply perpetuates state of uncertain authority or chronic political and economic malaise as evidenced by Syria, Iraq and Sudan. General good of Saudi people not likely be effectively served by coup which will only turn group against group and class against class and, by fragmenting Saudi Arabia, will in long run only weaken country’s great potential for progress. Present authorities increasingly aware of need for reform and appear to be genuinely seeking improve lot of Saudi Arabian people. All elements in Saudi Arabia can more effectively further interests of Saudi people by encouraging, lending their assistance or even exerting strong pressure by petitions, etc. to constructive reform program in context monarchical regime. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Concur your assessment that military coup in Saudi Arabia not likely further US interests and likely intensify pressures on USG and private American interests in country. In whatever manner you deem most appropriate you authorized advise Faisal (or King) orally and in strictest confidence that rumors of proposed military coup against Saudi regime have come to your attention and, while you have no details any such alleged plotting and are frankly unable to evaluate reliability such rumors, you feel it your duty as sincere friend King, Faisal and SAG to alert Faisal (or King) to those rumors in case they have not already been noted since SAG clearly better able assess their significance. [4½ lines of source text not declassified]³

If you consider it necessary postpone departure for home leave, Dept hopes postponement can be portrayed so as not to give grounds for further suspicions by one side or another of USG involvement some sort of coup plans or counter-plans.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.00/7–2060. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Dhahran. Drafted by Eilts, cleared by Meyer and Cumming, cleared in draft by CIA and in substance by Defense, and approved by Hart.
1. In these telegrams, July 15, 18, and 20, the Embassy reported conversations [text not declassified] military coup to overthrow the Saudi Government and kill Prince Faisal and his entourage. Although Heath realized that he was under general instructions to remain neutral in Saudi power politics, he believed that he had a moral obligation to warn Faisal and other Saudi princes that they were possible assassination targets and to discover more about the plot. To that end, Heath wished to send the Counselor of the Embassy, Richard H. Hawkins, Jr., [text not declassified] to talk discreetly with [text not declassified] and might have some knowledge of the plot. In telegrams 36, 37, and 38 from Jidda, all July 20, Heath reported that USMTM officers [text not declassified] were sufficiently concerned about the coup possibility to update their evacuation plans. (Ibid., 786A.11/7–1860; 786A.11/7–1860; and 786A.00/7–2060)
2. In telegram 29 to Jidda, July 16, based on preliminary accounts of the [text not declassified] plot [text not declassified] the Department of State responded that Hawkins could not meet with [text not declassified] without Faisal becoming aware of it and increasing his suspicions that “some Americans were out to get him.” The Department suggested that Heath maintain “strict neutrality in Saudi power conflicts both within and without royal family,” although the Embassy should continue its efforts to discover possible emerging power groups and anti-government activities. (Ibid., 786A.11/7–1660)
3. Heath responded in telegram 51 from Jidda, July 25, that as he was incapacitated with a slipped disk, he could not go to Taif to see Faisal. Although he agreed that Faisal or the King should be warned by other Embassy personnel he doubted that [text not declassified] would be receptive to the idea of evolutionary change since [text not declassified] view was that Faisal’s reforms were only window dressing. To suggest to [text not declassified] that he use petition to obtain his ends, seemed to Heath an invitation [text not declassified] “to stick his head in the noose.” (Ibid., 786A.00/7–2560)